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FOREWORD 
 
Our ”Futures of a Complex World” conference 2017 was a success by all standards. We got record 
amount of participants  330 experts from 29 countries  with fascinating array of topics from future 
of agriculture to new modeling tools. Feedback we received in and after the conference was very pos-
itive, encouraging us to continue to bring together researchers from various disciplines all having their 
focus on what’s happening next, or after next. 
This publication, based on papers presented in the conference, is a token of the fascinating variety 
of approaches we can adopt while penetrating the future with the tools of our research. As such, it 
also represents in a splendid way the complexity of our world, embedded with grand challenges as 
well as fascinating new developments. Complexity science itself proves us that we need particularly 
two capacities to thrive in the ever more complex world: on the one hand we need to build more resil-
ience into our systems, on the other, we should create new capacities to transform, if necessary. Both 
aspects are well represented in the articles of this publications. 
We like to thank all of our contributors for their hard work. We hope this publication serves as a 
humble gift to authors who have put time and energy for preparing the articles for this publication. We 
also like to extend our thanks to all participants of the conference. It is due to your active engagement 
that our event became a living proof of rigorous spirit of exploration in our worldwide futures studies 
community.  
Future is complex, but it is also a paradox. As the founder of Finland Futures Research Centre Pro-
fessor Pentti Malaska once commented, we live on the verge of incomprehensible ignorance. The more 
we know, the more we understand how little we actually know. However, this notion should not dis-
courage us but make us more determined to continue our exploration to a largely unknown future.  
 
On the behalf of Scientific Committee of the Conference 
 
Markku Wilenius 
Chairman 
Professor  
Finland Futures Research Centre 
University of Turku 
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1.  COMPLEXITY AND FUTURES OF  
  GOVERNANCE 
(A)Political Futures: The rationale, form and function of independent fiscal  
councils in policy making 
Stuart Connor 
University of Wolverhampton, Institute of Community and Society, UK 
Abstract  
The aim of this paper is to review the rationale, nature and operation of independent fiscal councils, 
and forecasting in particular, as a means to considering the challenges and opportunities for strategic 
foresight in policy making. A review of independent fiscal councils provides a number of insights into 
how futures are being configured at executive levels of government and an opportunity to examine 
how futures could be incorporated in policy making. The transparent and non-partisan forecasts of 
independent fiscal councils are designed to limit the excesses of politicised policy actors and help en-
sure the discipline of fiscal policy and the sustainability of public debt. However it is argued that at-
tempts to secure the de-politicisation of policy making is neither possible nor desirable. It is argued 
that strategic foresight can be used to create an open form of policy making that deepens and extends 
an understanding of what the future could be and the different means by which such futures can be 
created. 
Introduction and Background 
The future is vital to policy making, but presents a number of challenges to policy makers. Policy mak-
ers need to make sense of what might be ahead and in the process develop accounts and claims as to 
the nature and scale of a given problem and subsequent solutions (Fischer, 2003). This sense making 
is made all the more difficult when there are no future facts and therefore the grounds for making 
claims are unclear and uncertain (de Jouvenel, 1967). Policy makers are also required to mobilise sup-
port and attend to opposition in order to realise their plans (Connor, 2013). In this regard, the process 
of organizing and managing coalitions cannot be divorced from questions of meaning making and 
power (Bacchi, 2009; Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Hall, 1993; Ham & Hill, 1993; Heclo, 2010; Majone, 
1996; and Vink et al, 2013). Understood through this lens, the future is a contested and potent site that 
plays a vital role in processes of meaning making and the mobilisation of power.   
The future is a domain where both visions over what the future is and should be and the policies 
and practices that this future requires, are subject to conflict (Dunmire, 2010). Both appeals to a better 
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tomorrow, or the fear of what is to come, can serve as means by which policy makers seek to legitimate 
the actions, conflicts and sacrifices taken today. Subsequently, claims to know the future are inherently 
political. Knowledge claims and forecasts in particular become a resource for determining what is and 
will be deemed realistic and what actions are taken to be feasible in and towards the future (Heller, 
1999).Consequently, agencies granted a licence by authorities to know the future have the capacity to 
wield significant influence over what is deemed possible and desirable (Graham, 2004) and the po-
tential to shape today and tomorrow (Edelman, 1988). Therefore attention needs to be given to who 
receives a licence for representing the future and the conditions under which these licenses are held. 
In an effort to gain insights in to the role the future does and could play in policy making this paper 
reviews the nature and operations of independent fiscal councils (IFCs). IFCs are a set of institutions 
that have been granted a license to know the future. Described as one of the most important innova-
tions in public financial management, IFCs are independent and publicly funded institutions estab-
lished with the aim of strengthening the commitment of elected officials and wider publics to sustain-
able public finances (IMF, 2013; OECD 2014). A review of IFCs provides a number of insights into how 
futures are being configured at executive levels of government and an opportunity to examine how 
futures could be incorporated in policy making. Rather than seek to evaluate the work of IFCs per se, 
the paper uses IFCs as case studies for examining the actual and potential role of futures in the inter-
play between the exertion of power and construction of meaning in long term policy making (Vink et 
al, 2016). 
Particular attention is drawn to the rationale and form of IFCs. With respect to the rationale, it is the 
remit of IFCs to draw attention to the future consequences of today’s fiscal policies that is of particular 
interest to this paper. IFCs are designed to counter the alleged tendency of elected officials to use their 
discretionary powers to focus on accruing short term electoral gains at the expense of medium and 
long term economic costs, in the form of increased public deficits and debts. In terms of form, the 
perceived independent status of the assessments produced by IFC is central to their remit to counter 
and minimise the alleged tendency of governments to produce over-optimistic forecasts and or use 
technical loopholes to bend, if not break, fiscal rules. This places the onus on IFCs to demonstrate the 
rigour and independence of their work.  
Within this paper it is argued that IFCs exhibit what is described as a technocratic approach to 
making sense of the future and policy making. Such a technocratic approach reflects a particular un-
derstanding of the problem of public debt and a limited understanding of the future and policy making. 
If unproblematized, IFCs have the potential to enact a form of temporal imperialism (Sardar, 1999) 
where what are deemed ‘realistic’ views of the future displace what are deemed as unrealistic alter-
natives - closing the future as a space for projecting a range of fears, hopes, and calls for another world 
(Nowotny, 1994). As a rejoinder to attempts to colonise and depoliticise the future, it is argued that 
strategic foresight can enable an open approach to futures and policy making. Strategic foresight en-
ables the necessary ficta for policy making, where engaging with futures is not a struggle between 
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advocates of the real and the possible, but a question of asking what do we take to be real and what is 
really possible?  
 Accounting for Public Debt 
In the years following the Global Financial Crisis of 2008–09, public debt1 to Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) ratios reached near historical highs (see Figure 1) (Abbas et al, 2010; Reinhart et al, 2012). 
Concerns over the sustainability of fiscal policy were in evidence prior to the Global Financial Crisis 
(Blanchard et al, 1990; Buchanan, 1958; von Hagen & Harden, 1995), but the deficits and debts that 
followed, provided a platform for raising questions of fiscal discipline (Beetsma & Debrun, 2016; Rein-
hart & Rogoff, 2009).  
 
 
Figure 1.Central Government debt, Global total (% of GDP) (Source: World Bank, 2017) 
 
In attempts to explain the rise in public debt, it has been argued that the demands and short sight-
edness of voters, combined with the opportunism of politicians keen to satisfy the electorates’ appe-
tites particularly on the eve of elections, have created an inherent tendency for political democracies 
to live beyond their means and accumulate debt (Beetsma & Debrun, 2016; Buchanan & Wagner, 
1977).  
A first wave of measures to tackle the alleged fiscal indiscipline of political democracies was the 
establishment and use of fiscal rules on acceptable levels of debt, deficits or expenditure (IMF, 2009; 
                                                            
 
1 Debt is described as the entire stock of direct government fixed-term contractual obligations to others (includ-
ing domestic and foreign liabilities such as currency and money deposits, securities other than shares, and loans) 
outstanding on a particular date, reduced by the amount of equity and financial derivatives held by the govern-
ment. 
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Wyplosz, 2005). Continued concerns over government debt, led to calls for additional measures to 
ensure the transparency and accountability of fiscal policy (Hagemann, 2011). In part drawing on the 
precedent of independent central banks operating in the domain of monetary policy, proposals for the 
establishment of a new wave of IFCs, tasked with improving policymakers’ incentives to opt for sound 
fiscal policies and avoid deficit bias, were made (Calmfors & Wren-Lewis, 2011; Debrun et al, 2009).   
Unlike central banks, IFCs would not have discretion to set policy instruments, as elected officials 
would retain ultimate responsibility for fiscal policy. Instead, IFCs would provide independent and 
transparent assessments of the fiscal policies produced by governments (IMF, 2013). IFCs would have 
a remit to highlight broken commitments, unsound policies and missed targets. The rationale being 
that the scrutiny provided by IFCs would dis-incentivise elected officials from providing overly opti-
mistic assessments of fiscal policy for short term electoral gain (Calmfors & Wren-Lewis, 2011). Sub-
sequently, the transparency that it is hoped IFCs provide over the political cycle, would discourage any 
opportunistic pre-election tax give-aways or spending sprees - improving democratic accountability 
and realigning policy makers and the wider publics’ expectations as to what constitutes a sustainable 
fiscal policy (Hagemann, 2011). Implicit in this assessment is a recognition that the actions that will 
need to follow from an independent assessment will not be welcomed or prove popular with a wider 
public. Subsequently, the role of IFCs can be described as helping policy makers and the wider public 
to face facts and adapt to future requirements. Arguments for the establishment of IFCs with a remit 
to ground and limit the excesses of politicised policy actors and help ensure the discipline and sustain-
ability of fiscal policies have proved irresistible. Advocates for the establishment and operation of IFCs 
include the IMF, World Bank, OECD and European Union (EU).  
Material and Methods 
The OECD (no date) provides principles for independent fiscal institutions and the OECD Network of 
Parliamentary Budget Officials and Independent Fiscal Institutions (PBO) reviews and discusses how 
fiscal councils can affect fiscal performance. For the purposes of this paper the IMF Fiscal Councils 
dataset was used (IMF Fiscal Council Dataset, 2017; Debrun, Zhang, and Lledó, 2017). The IMF fiscal 
dataset describes key features of 39 institutions identified as fiscal councils (as of end-December 
2016) across 37 different countries. The dataset includes general information such as the official name 
and acronym of the council and the date of creation or major reforms, the main features of the council's 
remit, their specific tasks and instruments to influence the conduct of fiscal policy as well as key insti-
tutional characteristics such as the existence of formal guarantees of independence, accountability 
requirements, and human resources. The aims of the paper are to review IFCs’ orientations to the 
future and policy making and to identify opportunities and lessons for developing strategic foresight 
and policy making. Therefore particular attention has been given to those aspects of the IFCs’ form 
and function that pertain to futures work. 
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Results 
A number of governmental and non-governmental agencies provide forecasts and undertake assess-
ments of government programmes. What distinguishes IFCs is that they possess macroeconomic 
competence, are independent from the political system, and arguably, most importantly for the pur-
poses of this paper have a clear watchdog function that includes assessing the long term sustainability 
of fiscal policy (Calmfors & Wren-Lewis, 2011). 
At the time of writing, there are 39 national IFCs recorded in 37 countries and the number of IFCs 
is expected to continue to rise. IFCs have been in existence since the middle of the 20th century, but 
it was the Global Financial Crisis in 2008-09 and significant increases in government deficits and 
debts that followed that gave real impetus to the development of IFCs and a trebling in the number of 
IFCs since 2008 (see Figure 2). 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Number of IFCs that started activity in each decade (Source, IMF Fiscal Council Dataset, 
2017; Debrun, Zhang & Lledó, 2017) 
 
How IFCs assess and promote the credibility of fiscal plans does vary (Beetsma & Debrun, 
2016).There is no one size fits all model for IFCs as there are variations with regard to status, mandate 
and tasks, leadership, staff arrangements, and budget. The heterogeneity of IFCs, in part reflects the 
values, resources and requirements of particular jurisdictions and contingent factors explaining levels 
of deficits and debts (Kopits, 2013). What is shared is a contracting out the production and or assess-
ment of fiscal forecasts. A commitment to non-partisanship is considered central to the work of IFCs, 
particularly with regard to assessing and promoting credible fiscal policies (Beetsma & Debrun, 2016; 
Von Trapp et al, 2016). A number of measures are built into or adopted the form of IFCs (see Table 1).  
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The importance of non-partisanship is based on the rationale that even if the wider public disagree 
with the particular conclusions that have been reached there is the reassurance that the conclusions 
reflect dispassionate professional judgement - rather than the wishful thinking of politicians. It is the 
independence and more specifically, impartiality of IFCs that is most valued (Connor, 2013). That is, 
IFCs are impartial with respect to their forecasts, in the sense that they are not seen to be influenced 
by those who may be benefited or harmed by such forecasts and assessments.  
 
                                         Ex-Ante Analysis                                                                       Ex post analyses 
Forecast  
preparation 
Forecast  
Assessment 
Long term  
sustainability 
Costing of 
measures 
 
 
46% 
(17/37) 
81% 
(30/37) 
62% 
(23/37) 
43% 
(16/37) 
84% 
(31/37) 
 
Table 2.   Futures tasks and instruments of IFCs (Source: IMF Fiscal Council Dataset, 2017; Debrun, 
Zhang & Lledó, 2017) 
 
A vital part of IFCs corrective function is the use of forecasts (see Table 2). Proposals for the estab-
lishment of IFCs focus on the benefits that independent and transparent assessments and forecasts 
can bring to policy making (Wren-Lewis, 1996; Wyplosz, 2005). The forecasts undertaken by IFCs 
can take several forms and functions, in part depending on the nature and relation of an IFC to other 
government agencies responsible for forecasting (Calmfors & Wren-Lewis, 2011). IFCs in the Nether-
lands and the UK have a remit to produce the official economic and fiscal forecasts used by govern-
ments. IFCs in Canada, Denmark, Korea, Mexico and United States produce alternative forecasts, 
while IFCs in Austria, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Sweden provide an opinion on, 
or endorsement of, the government's forecasts. A common feature of the forecasts produced by IFCs 
is the projection of what is likely to happen if policies are to remain unchanged.  
More broadly, forecasts have a tendency to project existing social practices, visions and interests, 
so that the future is little more than a linear projection of yesterday (Nandy, 1999). The probabilistic 
projections of forecasts have the potential to annihilate any future that is not contained in the present 
(Grosz, 1999). Furthermore, there is a tendency for a hegemonic present to become the norm against 
 Independence /  
Non-partisanship 
Management  
Independence 
Aspect of IFC Legal Operational Safeguards on budget Right to select staff 
Percentage of IFCs that have
adopted measure 
87% 
32/37 
76% 
28/37 
57% 
21/37 
84%  
31/37 
 
Table 1.  Measures to ensure the independence and non-partisanship of IFCs (Source: IMF Fiscal 
Council Dataset, 2017; Debrun, Zhang & Lledó, 2017). 
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which futures are assessed. This is not to say that forecasts should not play a part in the work of IFCs 
or that the use of forecasts in IFCs is not reflexive. There are IFCs, a notable example being the Con-
gressional Budget Office in the USA, that examine what ‘unchanged policy’ actually means and con-
sider different debt targets and alternative paths for reducing debts. However, the scenarios developed 
tend to assume and operate within the unstated parameters that today’s predominant social, political, 
economic relations will continue far into the future. Furthermore, discussions regarding the social im-
pact of such measures and a deeper questioning of the relations and interests that create the problem 
of debt are notable by their absence.  
 
Table 3.  Role of IFCS in budget process (Source: IMF Fiscal Council Dataset, 2017; Debrun, Zhang & 
Lledó, 2017). 
 
There is a significant variation in the form of relationship and remit IFCs have with regard to the 
budget process (see Table 3). A potential threat to the perceived impartiality of IFCs stems from the 
remit to promote sustainable fiscal policies and make direct contributions to public debates on fiscal 
policy. Through the use of comply or explain clause, briefings, hearings and most notably the open 
publication of independent analysis, assessments, and forecasts, IFCs seek to raise public awareness 
about the consequences of certain policy paths and contribute to the development of a stability cul-
ture, which in turn is intended to reduce a public appetite for fiscal indiscipline (Debrun & Kinda, 2014). 
Thus not only are IFCs to be judged on the accuracy of their forecasts but the potentially contradictory 
measure of IFC’s capacity and record for initiating necessary changes. The reputational damage that 
IFCs can pose to elected officials may well be a vital tool in seeking to keep elected officials on course, 
but it also politicises the project. Where the assessment of an IFC counters a government’s position 
or accords with one party’s views, it is almost inevitable that offended parties will be quick to question 
methodologies and the independence of an IFC. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
In reviewing the rationale, form and function of IFCs, the claims of independence and transparency 
within the current configuration of IFCs, over what are inherently political questions and approaches, 
means that the work of IFCs may at best be considered laudable but naïve, and at worst, represent an 
ideological sleight of hand in attempts to project established interests into the future. The establish-
ment of IFCs have enabled the marshalling of the necessary expertise to make sense of the complex 
and uncertain realm of macroeconomics and policy making, but also reflect and help realise what are 
Forecasts used 
in budget 
Binding  
forecasts 
Comply or  
explain 
Formal consultation 
or hearings 
Can stall the 
budget  
process 
Public reports 
11% 
(4/37) 
5% 
(2/37) 
22% 
(8/37) 
49% 
(18/37) 
3% 
(1/37) 
97% 
(36/37) 
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described as technocratic tendencies in policy making - where politics is substituted for expertise. 
Expertise forms an important part of policy making, but the privileging of technical knowledge and 
expertise, unconstrained by political processes, is what characterises technocracy. Technocracy is 
most visible when individuals with technical expertise occupy the positions of government normally 
taken by politicians (McDonnell & Valbruzzi, 2014). More broadly, technocracy is also evident when 
democratic deliberations by elected officials are substituted for the application of the scientific method 
and specialised knowledge to address social issues and questions of policy making. The logic behind 
technocratic tendencies is that experts are able to establish what needs to be done. Such a tendency 
is evident in IFC’s remit to align popular opinion with realistic assessments as to what the future will 
and implicitly, should be, though admittedly the emphasis is on aligning the public and politicians with 
the ‘new realities’ of fiscal policy.   
The technocratic practices of IFCs can be seen as a legitimating practice and part of an increasing 
tendency to de-politicise policy making (Burnham, 2001). The rise of technocracy, at the expense of 
deliberative mechanisms, poses a number of challenges (Pastorella, 2015). Most notably, a monopoly 
of technocratic elites in policy making can lead to a reduced capacity to scrutinize or hold to account 
decision making and to make particular policies appear inevitable (Loye, 1978). Within this paper it is 
argued that the future is too vital to be entrusted exclusively to technocrats and a useful augmentation, 
if not rejoinder, to technocratic approaches is strategic foresight’s focus on systematically exploring, 
creating, and assessing alternative futures. The value of strategic foresight is found in its potential to 
extend the horizons of what are recognised as possible and plausible futures (Habegger, 2009; Wil-
kinson, 2016) and reassert the primacy of the future as a domain of the possible. Where orthodox 
planning may seek to assess different options in order to arrive at an optimum process and outcome, 
strategic foresight is most potent when not only seeking to extend the realm of possible futures, but 
also deepening understandings of how futures can be realised and the values and interests that sup-
port particular visions of the future (Inayatullah, 2004; Slaughter, 1995).  
Strategic foresight’s orientation to the future in policy making can not only able to maintain a com-
mitment to independence and non-partisanship, but also address a notable tension in the operation of 
IFCs. Rather than seek to provide a view from nowhere or promise a false sense of certainty, strategic 
foresight has the potential to consider a plurality of positions and thereby extend the menu of options 
for what could be done and the likely winners and losers of each position. This open approach to fu-
tures and policy making offers a rigorous and creative approach to highlighting the choices that are 
available, the anticipated outcomes of those choices and the interests and assumptions that those 
choices reflect. Given the foregrounding of the future in the work of IFCs, it will be interesting to see if 
and how strategic foresight can be used to further deepen and extend debates on fiscal policy. Though 
it should be noted that those who intend to project their current interests and status into the future 
may be reluctant to make use of strategic foresights potential to further enhance the capacity of policy 
actors to scrutinise policy proposals and articulate and extend what are deemed as possible and de-
sirable futures. 
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Abstract  
We explored the future of government workforces and assessed the implications for them of five crit-
ical issues: 1) do more with less, 2) do it with fewer people, 3) meet more and new demands for ser-
vices, 4) work with an aging population and aging workforce, and 5) do it all digitally. The research 
started with an exploration of Maine State Government’s future work and workforce in 2025, and was 
enhanced with an examination of how other governments are tackling these workforce issues. The 
results identified four significant outcomes for future government workforces plus five new roles: Par-
ticipatory Careerists, High tech-High Touch, Citizen Enablers, Knowledge Users, and Flexible Func-
tionaries. We concluded that new generations of government leaders who have an easy understanding 
of technology will use that understanding along with foresight to transform and manage complex gov-
ernment systems. We recommend a detailed workforce planning and talent development strategy to 
bridge the performance gap anticipated in 2025 and beyond.  
Introduction and Background 
Governments are heading into difficult waters in almost all countries, in part because most governance 
models are centuries out of date, inflexible, underfunded and rarely foresight-focused. As foresight 
consultants, we were fortunate to work with the State of Maine’s human resources commissioner who 
was willing to raise questions about the future of her state’s government workforce and its long-term 
engagement with the state’s citizens.   
In the US, state governments, positioned between the federal government and their city and local 
governments, have a long tradition of supporting their state’s economic development, investing in 
state university systems, boosting trade and foreign investment, etc. As budgets shrink, and less Fed-
eral money is available, state governments are leaving this work to their big cities. This matches a 
long-term demographic trend of people moving into cities, and all but abandoning small towns and 
rural areas. 
Maine, like many state governments in the United States, and similar sized governments worldwide, 
will need to reckon with specific realities over the next decade. Maine is the US state with the oldest 
population, with a median age of 44.6 years (United States Census, 2017). The state operates in na-
tional and global economies that are undergoing economic transformations. It can no longer rely on 
traditional mainstays of extractive industries and tourism; it needs new industries and businesses for 
a successful future. Finally, Maine faces a ‘new normal’ in society and commerce: the dominance of 
digital technology, digital processes and data-intensive fruits of their application. The work of fitting 
state systems and skill sets to digital realities is open-ended, because the technology is always evolving. 
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The primary research question driving the project’s structure was: What will the state government’s 
work, and correspondingly the workforce, look like in 2025? The client asked us to address an addi-
tional 17 questions identified in the flowchart below.    
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.Three Phase Framework for 17 Tasks 
 
From our engagement with the State of Maine and its future, we concluded there are 5 critical issues 
facing some, if not all, governments. These issues confront governments at this level with challenging 
conditions in the near and longer term:  
1. Do more with less (smaller budgets, part of a long-term conservative trend in the US) 
2. Do it with fewer people (combination of less money and tough recruiting climate) 
3. Meet more and new demands for services (greater responsibilities in a more complex society) 
4. Work with an aging population and aging workforce (most developed countries face aging 
population issues, and many government workers are on the edge of retirement. Maine’s sit-
uation is extreme in this respect) and 
5. Do it all digitally (there is no turning back from the digital revolution). 
Taken together, these new realities, along with other shaping forces, tell us about how Maine and 
the demands on its government’s 2025 workforce will change.  
19 
Material and Methods 
Our Approach 
The research approach used several futures methodologies: 1) a review of relevant information from 
our extensive database on the future of work, 2) a scan of external trends, 3) the completion of con-
versational Delphi interviews with key representatives from a wide cross section of organizations and 
individuals plus Maine State Government (MSG) staff, 4) the development of four scenarios depicting 
possible futures for the Maine State government, 5) the facilitation of a workshop with HR leadership 
to validate initial findings, and 6) the facilitation of a government leaders’ workshop to interpret find-
ings and consider future courses of action.  
Scanning Results 
The future of work is a broad topic. We reviewed ours, and others’, prior research on the future of 
work, examining broad issues and trends nationally and locally, as well as across industries and sec-
tors. From this review, we selected specific trends relevant to MSG’s future workforce and its relation-
ship with its citizens.  
Conversational Delphi Interviews (CDI) 
The client identified over 30 potential interviewees from inside and outside government including: 
academia, heads of government departments, legislators, community and business leaders, and MSG 
staff. In CDI, interviewees are asked to identify important changes they have observed over the past 
decade. They are then asked to identify changes they anticipate for the next ten years. The interview 
results were analyzed for patterns and themes that informed the next phase of the research--scenario 
development.  
Four Scenarios 
Four scenarios of possible conditions existing in the Maine of 2025 were developed, describing differ-
ent futures in which the state government’s workforce could be required to operate and serve the 
citizens. These stories explore “what if?” ideas about the future, and should not be taken for forecasts 
or predictions. 
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Figure 2: Scenario image: The Senior Civil 
Service 2025 Setting an international ex-
ample for an active and productive older 
workforce 
Image: Simon Adams, www.simon-
adamsart.wordpress.com  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Scenario image: Virtual Maine 
2025—Maine leaps forward into online 
government service, embraces technology 
to build more community, social focus 
Image: Simon Adams  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Scenario image: New Economy 
Maine 2025—A technically expert, 
younger government workforce backs a 
growing high-tech economy in the state 
Image: Simon Adams 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Scenario image: A Workforce Left 
Behind 2025—With fewer employees, 
government workers struggle to serve the 
state’s many and growing needs 
 
Image: Simon Adams 
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Results  
Work Implications for 2025 
Taken together, the foregoing creates new demands and expectations of the state government. 
Though the trend has been towards a shrinking government workforce, new demands could reverse 
that pattern, at least in some departments. At the core are demands for new services from MSG. 
Meanwhile, these trends and a wave of emerging technology align to drive evolving relationships be-
tween the State Government and the Maine citizenry-- more people will embrace digital life as the 
state uses technology to streamline work and reduce costs.  
Maine State Government services expected  
Broadly, the state’s evolving economy and population will raise the demand for services in five areas: 
 Supporting business and economic development 
 Serving an older population 
 Addressing the needs of new Mainers, including a more diverse population 
 Aligning services and regulation, permitting, taxation, and enforcement with the rise and 
growth of new kinds of businesses and industries. 
 Raising the digital competence of the State Government, and serving the citizenry with a cost 
efficient, effective suite of digitally-based services. 
Maine State Government Relationship and Digital Services   
Constituencies that the state government serves will demand access 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 
using multiple contact options. Many citizens will prefer to use mobile apps, and self-serve, automated 
systems, while others will expect legacy systems. The State Government will find itself choosing which 
services can be supported with technology, and which must employ human staff. Private sector cus-
tomer service experiences flavor the expectations citizens will bring to interacting with government. 
They will expect best of class approaches.   
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Broadening digital exchange in government 
Where there is potential for change, and/or pressure to further harness technology 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Broadening digital exchange in government. Source: Leading Futurists LLC. 
Workforce Implications for 2025 
The workforce of 2025 will span five generations – 18 to 75+ – by design, not by default. Workers will 
be expected to value learning, and be held responsible and accountable for using that learning to en-
hance and innovate. Technology will be both a means for getting work done and a familiar presence at 
work. Workers growing comfort with and inclination to use technology will make it a valuable co-
worker. Workers’ relationship with state government will be less defined by where how and when work 
is done.  Maine will influence, and be influenced by, a global economy that operates across borders 
and time zones thus requiring greater knowledge of other people and cultures.  
Workforce requirements for 2025   
The following describes 2025 outcomes implied for MSG’s fu-
ture workforce.   
 Lean/effective. 2025 state government workers’ capabil-
ities portfolios include: multi-disciplinary knowledge, in-
ter- and intra-personal skills, creativity and innovation, 
problem solving, self-directedness, and technological 
competence. These workers function well with continu-
ally changing work priorities and goals, moving into and 
out of stable, ad-hoc and virtual teams. Workers transi-
tion into and out of leadership roles, defined by task.    
Workforce requirement for 2025 
 Lean and effective workforce 
 Digital workers and data analysis  
 Age diverse work plan  
 Continuous learning and develop-
ment  
 Intelligent innovation and change  
 Employment relationships more 
flexible 
 Cultural fluency and global compe-
tencies 
 
Figure 7: Workforce requirements 
summary 
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 Digital workers and data analysis. Workers use technology seamlessly to interact with citizens, 
mastering devices connecting and engaging with the digital world. Workers retrieve, analyze, and 
use data to solve complex problems, and rely on data interpretation to predict and anticipate ser-
vices’ design and needs. Some workers design apps and/or systems, others manage or maintain 
the technology; still others teach other MSG workers about technology’s leading edge products 
and services adapted for use within state government. 
 Age diverse work plan. An age audit, completed in 2015, revealed an imbalance of workers’ ages 
with a significant skewing of workers beyond age 50+. A rebalancing plan has extended employ-
ment of retirement-eligible workers long enough to build a replacement workforce of younger 
workers. Educational programs shift attitudes and practices to support aging workers. Older 
workers lead and manage MSG legacy operations providing the time needed for HR to recruit, 
develop, and position the next wave of younger workers. The plan redefines primary working ages 
to 24-75+.  
 Continuous learning and development. Workers continually update technical and work 
knowledge, skills and certifications to keep up with evolving expectations and needs. Training is 
offered, accessed, and evaluated in a 24/7 environment with instant feedback on learning mas-
tery. Learning is captured, stored, and available for the government workforce through enterprise-
wide knowledge management systems. Learning mastery influences workers’ access to future 
assignments, job opportunities, and salary increases.  
 Intelligent innovation and change. Workers are responsible for using innovation to work smarter 
and better as shifting challenges reset priorities, resources and time. The flow of work is fluid, and 
change is anticipated and planned for in work allocation. Project management rests on multi-di-
mensional work efforts using rapid prototyping, simultaneous solutions, crowdsourcing and when 
necessary, the outsourcing of innovation to solve irregular or sustained problems. The pace of 
change is marked by continual, daily adaptations involving incremental changes, accompanied by 
irregular bursts of substantial transformations in work and workflow. Collaboration, within and 
outside of government, is critical for workers engaged in innovating and problem solving.  
 Employment relationship. Employment categories within the 2025 state government will range 
from full-time (includes essential, core, and operational) to part-time, including temporary, ad 
hoc, situational and seasonal. Regardless of employment category, MSG talent recruitment ef-
forts find and evaluate candidates for the right fit, placing greater emphasis on ‘potential to per-
form’ rather than on past performance.  
 Career path. Workers self-direct and self-manage their own career paths. Multiple options exist for 
career growth. Some paths lead to the leadership pipeline, other career options entail varied work 
experiences and opportunities designed to keep workers engaged rather than upwardly mobile. The 
government provides development options that align staff interests with the government’s work 
goals, thereby maximizing worker efforts that support meeting the goals and mission.  
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 Cultural fluency and global competence. Workers are aware of global current events and demon-
strate specific cultural competence about countries that Maine considers its trading partners. Of 
particular importance are Maine’s northern neighbors in Canada and Iceland. Within the US as a 
whole, Hispanic language and culture will be a larger force in many aspects of the US economy.  
Workforce Readiness in 2025 – Training and Succession Planning 
Workforce readiness in 2025 assumes workers demonstrate a cluster of important attributes: learner, 
interpreter, communicator, and connector for example. Workers will need to learn about emerging 
changes that affect their work, interpret the implications of the change for a wide audience, communi-
cate the relevance and importance of that change, and connect with appropriate social networks im-
pacted by the change. Workers will have to be knowledgeable operators within the regulatory, legal, 
and programmatic context of their work.  
Succession planning for Maine State Government will be critical and essential. Planning reduces risk 
by ensuring that no one person who retires or exits the organization can impair government operations. 
Planning also reduces cost. It is more cost effective to plan for a replacement than to hire in a crisis.  
Succession planning combined with planned workforce development ensures against work slow-
downs or interruptions, and serves as an effective recruitment and retention tool. Clear career paths 
and job development opportunities are desirable recruitment and retention strategies for both younger 
generations looking to initiate careers and middle-aged workers who want to invest in a longer working 
future.  
Discussion and Conclusions 
In our work with Maine State Government, the four scenarios depicted possible futures of a unique 
state government. When we step back from this view, and consider the future of government work-
forces as a whole, we have five basic conclusions. Caveat: The particular design and structure of US 
governments implies certain outcomes that might not be true for all government workforces every-
where else. 
Key Outcomes for Government in 2025+ 
 Smart Government - where government and citizens alike rely more on the understanding and 
effective use of digital technologies 
 Global Citizens-Local Government – government workers can work anywhere  
 Government needs new allies, cooperation - climate change driven migration may overwhelm 
single government systems as mass migrations of people move away from less hospitable cli-
mates to more desirable ones 
 New Relationships – a ‘shared’ enterprise as more Public Private Partnerships (3P’s) emerge to 
fund, build and operate functions, systems historically performed by government 
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 Universal Basic Income – may be a competitive advantage for governments, as they streamline 
diverse income and support systems no longer needed 
Key Implications for the Workforce 
 Anticipatory Careerists – Reinvent the concept of work, as it is experienced at ages 18 through 80 
with multiple entry and exit points throughout a career. However, issues of economic security will 
have to be resolved. 
 Citizen Enabler – if a future premise is that the role of government is to enable and facilitate a 
quality, healthy, safe lifestyle and not just provide basic services and a safety net – future gener-
ations will be more willing to let go of legacy concepts of government’s purpose, role, and opera-
tions. 
 High tech – High Touch – increased use of technology requires an equal measure of an ability to 
maintain the ‘human’ in interactions. Future workers will need the ability to interact, govern, im-
plement laws and connect with citizens in a digital world where government and citizens rely on 
technology. 
 Knowledge Users – a bifurcated workforce in which some users will need fewer skills and less 
knowledge as Artificial Intelligence and robotics assume higher cognitive tasks. Some workers 
will need more technical skills to leverage big data, and to make sense of data for decision-making 
and governing. 
 Flexible Functionaries – workers will likely become adept at operating in fluid organizational struc-
tures, with changing roles, shared leadership opportunities, and rotations into and out of ad hoc 
teams. 
 
The potential exists to transform government and its operations in the future. The digital revolution 
is radically reshaping all pre-Internet systems, as well as helping create post-digital workforces, such 
as those in the gig economy. Future e-governments will need to choose how much to automate, and 
to what degree they will use big data analytics and AI in operations and governing.  
There are likely to be fewer government workers. Specific jobs may give way to daily assignments 
or tasks, creating more fluid organizational settings of roles, responsibilities and leadership. Govern-
ment work in the future may be less about meeting citizens’ needs for services and governance and 
more about providing opportunities for engagement as volunteers or paid workers contribute to mak-
ing government work. 
In our research, we have come across government leaders (more commonly in city governments) 
who believe their ultimate goal is e-government driven by citizen engagement. There is an increased 
use of apps, smart traffic controls, mobile information on-demand, profiling and instant feedback. 
These services require a sophisticated and collaborative workforce united around one goal.  
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In 2025, the government workforce will likely be led by post-Baby Boom generations who are com-
fortable using technology to govern and operate in a way that serves citizens 24/7 with both technol-
ogy and the human touch.  
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Abstract 
The research discusses and outlines the possibilities of addressing the future challenges of welfare 
complexity by participatory instruments: involving the inhabitants and welfare service users in defining 
and visioning the future welfare by exercising the norms of deliberative democracy in municipalities. 
The aim of the study is to gather information about the possibilities and obstacles of the deliberative 
policy-making future in welfare services at the municipal level in Finland. One of the empirical parts in 
the research consists of a Delfoi-study of an expert panel with 37 participants representing the exec-
utive managers of 3rd sector organizations, the chairpersons of the municipal councils or welfare ser-
vice boards and the leading office-holders of municipal welfare offices estimated and discussed the 
projections of municipal welfare policy-making for the year 2030. The results of eDelfoi indicate that 
despite the approving attitudes towards more discursive administrative culture, the participative prac-
tices to function as a means of or policy-making in welfare services are not fully trusted. Future citi-
zens’ influence in welfare services was primarily seen channelled through consumerism. Increasing 
individualism and inequality was considered inhibiting the deliberative policy-making practices. 
Introduction and Background 
Welfare policies, in relation to other policies, should rest its preferences on citizens affected by them. 
However, these preferences are not generally sketched at any particular time or occasion beyond vot-
ing for national or regional delegates with legislative and representative accountability. Yet, the poli-
cies built upon electoral trust have the comprehensive and temporally extensive effects of the well-
being of those very citizens. This contradiction poses a dilemma not only for representative responsi-
bility but more broadly, the basis and legitimacy of the democratic policy-making process. (Thompson 
1988.) The call for refining and amplifying participation and is methods can be seen to have grown 
along with people becoming estranged from traditional, representative democracy and political deci-
sion making. Political activity and policy-making can presently be perceived as an isolated system 
apart from citizens. 
The ambition of the notion can be construed to pursue the embracing of participation beyond the 
representative politics. Since evolving from its classic form of “government”, governance extends over 
closed establishments and party politics to a wide range of decision-making by a variety of assem-
blages of diverse actors.  In the European Union context, the concept is alleged to restrain the “demo-
cratic deficit” by improving the legitimacy of the decision-making process in a multi-level structure of 
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the EU. (Magnette 2003) The White Paper on European Governance (COM 2001) names five princi-
ples to underpin good governance: openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coher-
ence. Inclusive, participative practices are stressed in the paper and the reinforcing of civic involve-
ment pronounced as the main objectives of the governance reform. 
In the context of welfare, the advantages of participative concepts are eminent especially approach-
ing an inevitable discrepancy between increasing demands of welfare services and respectively dimin-
ishing resources. Internationally observed there is a strong shift towards emphasizing service users’ 
perspectives in service planning and welfare policy decision-making (e.g. Martin 2008; 2011; Vigoda 
2002). The WHO (Jakubowski & Lister 2006) defines participation as an inseparable component of 
the governance in welfare services: “The definition of good governance entails a participatory process, 
responsiveness of governing institutions to the views and preferences of consumers and a consensus 
orientation”  
In Finland, there is a slow awakening to the significance of service users’ expertise of the services 
while the methods of public guidance are still sketching their outlines (Raisio 2010; Möttönen 2012). 
The shift is somewhat perceptible in documents concerning service planning and reforming; e.g. the 
Ministry of Social affairs and Health (STM) is framing customer orientation in its strategy as “an offset 
of developing services as well as a strategic choice aimed to shift emphasis towards preventative and 
achievable care”. Reforming of services is implemented through “the active participation of service 
users”, assigning the communities (municipalities, regions) to determine their means of citizen in-
volvement. Despite the efforts of Finnish ministries and public offices in developing citizens’ engage-
ment and municipal democracy (e.g. Open Government Action Plan 2015–2017), the experiments in 
participative policy-making have remained local and relatively small-scale. 
The research leans on the perception of the growing role of deliberative democracy in future gov-
ernance. The Finnish Institute of Deliberative Democracy (DDI) defines the conception of deliberative 
democracy as follows (translation): “Deliberative democracy provides answers to the challenges in 
representative democracy by strengthening democratic legitimacy and considering of the common 
good. Deliberation emphasizes reciprocity and appreciation of the diversity in opinions as well as in-
creases the informed opinion as a foundation for decision-making.” The Institute of the Languages in 
Finland has proposed that the term of Deliberative Democracy (suom. puntaroiva demokratia, 
keskusteleva demokratia) should be equivalent to “discursive democracy” in English, which empha-
sizes interactive and dialogue in decision making. 
Deliberative democracy theory is a normative theory focusing in objective of policy legitimation by 
means of communicative processes (Chambers 2003; Dryzek 2005). The conception rests upon the 
ideal of collective argumentation, emphasizing its participative (e.g. citizens, service users, inhabit-
ants) attributes.  By means of various deliberative arrangements (e.g. citizens’ juries or panels, delib-
erative polling) an equal discourse is reached. Ideally, after introductions given by various experts, 
exchanging the views and profound reflection of issue addressed, a conclusion, which all members of 
the deliberation can engage in, is reached and presented. (e.g. Raisio & Vartiainen 2015.)  
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Some interpretations of deliberative democracy do not comprehend a universal agreement as an 
essential requirement for deliberation to function in democratic purposes, albeit a quarter century of 
experimentations in deliberative practices have proven the publics’ ability to make sound choices. A 
significant outcome of deliberative democracy is the confidence in a fair process and of being heard 
despite the disagreement, or even exposing the underlying, fundamental conflicts and perspective dif-
ferences without the objective of consensus. (McAfee 2008; Mansbridge 2008.) 
The aim of the research is to gather information about experts’ conceptions of the true possibilities 
and obstacles of future deliberative democracy in welfare service decision-making at the municipal 
level in Finland, which is presently built on the so-called “dual model” of elective politicians making 
decisions based on the office-bearer prepared presentations. The research discusses and outlines the 
possibilities of addressing the future challenges of welfare complexity by participatory instruments: 
involving the inhabitants and welfare service users in defining and visioning the future welfare by ex-
ercising the norms of deliberative democracy in municipalities. The arrangement contrasts the prem-
ises of anticipatory thinking with contemporary administrative science discourse.  
Based on the results of a survey it is intended to compose a vision of the factors affecting discursive 
democracy development in the context of welfare decision making.  
Material and Methods 
The survey was implemented as an eDelfoi-survey in October–December 2015 in three periods, each 
active for two weeks. The survey was built of future assertions (claims), which were anonymously 
commented by experts (panelists). The first period consisted of six future claims based on the activity 
theory developed by Yrjö Engeström. After analyzing the comments from the first round, next asser-
tions were presented for the discussion. This was repeated for the last round.  
The panelists were asked to evaluate the probability and desirability of each assertion with a scale 
(seven-level Likert). In addition, the panelists were asked to justify the estimates or judgements ver-
bally after each claim and encouraged to question or challenge each other’s arguments. It was possible 
for the panelists to comment on other panelists’ remarks as well as to revise one’s own responses. A 
panelist could choose a suitable moment for responding, within the timeframe of two weeks. A panel-
ist also received a note to his/her e-mail once there is a comment made of his/her response in a con-
versation. 
The expert panel consisted of 37 participants representing Finnish 
 service users (the executive managers of non-profit, 3rd sector organizations) 
 political decision-makers (the chairpersons of municipal councils or welfare service boards) and 
 office-bearers (leading municipal welfare officials).  
All panelists had a substantial experience in welfare policy-making practices. The answers were 
anonymous and they panelists represented views as private individuals, not as organization represent-
atives. To secure the anonymity, the panelists of the 2 last groups were selected from different mu-
nicipals with no announced, cooperative affiliations or consolidations.   
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Results 
The basic principles of a SWOT-analysis were utilized in analyzing and structuring nearly 200 com-
ments of the first round to 61 variables and further to 19 themes. The preliminary results of the first 
round are demonstrated in Figure 1.  
 
  
 
Figure 1. Preliminary results of the first round analysis. Antecedents to and resultants of progression 
in participative decision-making practices.  
 
The panelist conversation embraced both current attributes and future prospects that were further 
categorized as positive (enabling elements and favourable prospects) and negative (inhibiting condi-
tions and unfavourable consequences). 
Considering the participative or deliberative policy-making development concerning current admin-
istrative attributes, few themes stood out: 
 technological skills and opportunities in current welfare reform as enabling elements, and 
 cultural stagnation and the lack of knowledge in participative practices as inhibiting conditions.  
The future prospects of the different participative decision-making practices were mostly seen to 
improve decision-making legitimacy and equity, when tokenism and inequality as well as the low qual-
ity of policies were seen as the unfavourable consequences. 
enabling elements (26) inhibiting conditions (86)
Technological skills, web coverage. Cultural inertia.
Strong (existing) representative system and 
incipient hearing practices.
Lack of PD knowledge.
Opportunities in municipal or legislative 
readjustment (welfare, regional and 
government reform).
Increasing inequality and consumerism in 
welfare services.
Experimental courage. Challenges in incorporating PD with current 
representative system.
Challenges in municipal readjustment or 
governing structures in general.
favorable prospects (45) unfavorable consequences (32)
Legitimacy improvement. Tokenistic participation.
More equitable and flexible resource 
distribution.
Unequal coverage of involvement.
Regenerating the modi operandi of council 
work.
The decline in political representativeness.
Increasing health empowerment. Socieltally poor decisions.
Reconcilement of complex welfare issues. Eroding liability.
(In I talic : Variables ov er the amount of 1 /4 or 1 /5 in its category .)
Antecedents to progression of participative decision-making practices. Reflecting current 
system, partly controllable by present day competences or circumstances.
Resultans of progression in participative decision-making practices. Future assosiated, partly 
nebulous or intangible.
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19 themes were further constructed into three main categories which were expanded in following 
rounds. Figure 2. illustrates the structuring of the iterative process.  
 
  
 
Figure 2. The iterative process of the first found themes/analysis. Topics discussed in round two 
marked with green and topics discussed in round three marked with blue colour.  
 
Emerging over the conversations in rounds two and three, the underlying issues affecting the future 
of deliberative policy-making practices were divided according to main categories: 
 Service outcomes: 
 Increasing, general inequality and individualism. 
 Public funding insufficiency or economic myopia. 
 Emphases on (health care) professionalism. 
Structures of involvement: 
 Systemic and attitudinal challenges. 
 Marginal involvement. 
Administrative interrelations: 
 The strong role of Finnish welfare reform and the role of the municipalities. 
 Increasing consumerism in welfare services. 
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Discussion and Conclusions 
In spite of the general, increasing appetite for participative arrangements, the concept of participation 
is restrictedly comprehended. Being widely understood and loosely outlined, an increasing number of 
procedures to enable involvement are used and developed, ranging from straightforward polls to com-
plex deliberative arrangements. (Rowe & Frewer 2005). The interpretation of good governance from 
the participative perspective has developed Finnish municipal counselling bodies and policy planning 
processes in order to meet the manifold claims of participation and minority representation. Despite 
the various efforts developing public governance to meet those exigencies, the experiments in partic-
ipative policy-making have remained local and relatively small-scale. 
The preliminary results of eDelfoi research presented here show that regardless of strong trust in 
technological preparedness and the structural opportunities in the extensive Finnish welfare reform 
well in progress, the cultural inertia and unawareness generate attitudes inhibitory of participative 
decision-making practices progression. Even though the resultants in advancing the participative prac-
tices were considered influential to decision-making legitimacy as well as the very central idea of wel-
fare services, equal and flexible resource distribution, there were reservations about the inclusion of 
participation. Some of the panelists were also concerned with the deteriorating validity as well as the 
liability of the decisions reached by means of participative practices.  
Several undercurrents affecting the future development of deliberative progress in decision-making 
were discernible in the conversations. Increasing consumerism in welfare services in tandem with the 
public funding insufficiency were emphasized, collectively proliferating general inequality and individ-
ualism.  
The present and extensive efforts to rearrange future welfare services in Finland highlight the de-
sideratum of policy-making discussion. Regardless of the recently revised Local Government Act, 
which enables the municipalities to develop a range of participative activities and regulates the inhab-
itants’ right to take part in them, it does not ensure the implementation of the law in local welfare 
policy.  
It is stated that the past Finnish health care reforms have so far failed to meet their objectives due 
to the disconnection between issues addressed and the challenges of the society (Vartiainen 2010). 
The current evident and harsh disrespect of the citizens’ initiative regarding the health care reform 
demonstrate the lack of dialogue in policy-making and justification, as well as the insufficiency of the 
present practices in citizens’ involvement. According to this research, the signals of weakening uni-
versalism and equity – the very essence of the Finnish welfare system – have harmful effects on the 
development of deliberative practices in welfare decision-making. Yet, diminishing of these values 
creates a demand for a high quality dialogue of our future welfare policies and goals.  
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Abstract 
Around the world, private companies are increasingly participating in peacebuilding activities. Many 
scholars, politicians, and business leaders are enthusiastic about what they now call “business for 
peace. However, the results to date of corporate involvement in peacebuilding have been mixed, par-
ticularly in the extractives sector. Current single-factor explanations for the successes and failures of 
“business for peace” do not reflect the sheer complexity of peacebuilding contexts. This paper pro-
poses an alternate conceptual approach rooted in complex systems theory and global governance lit-
erature to disentangle the dynamic web of agents, rules, norms, and activities involved in foreign-
owned mining and peacebuilding, drawing on literature from complex systems theory and global gov-
ernance. This paper does not engage in futures forecasting, but rather engages the complexity of the 
present and illustrates how complex systems approaches can inform and improve the effectiveness of 
public and private governance activities. 
Introduction and Background 
Around the world, private companies are become increasingly involved in peacebuilding activities. 
Many scholars, politicians, and business leaders are enthusiastic about what they call “Business for 
Peace.” Myriad initiatives are emerging, such as the United Nations Global Compact, Sustainable De-
velopment Goals, and Business and Human Rights, which advocate the positive impact companies can 
have if they link efforts with governments in peacebuilding (Honke 2014; BHR 2015; UNGC 2013, 
2015a, 2015b). To date, however, the results of corporate involvement in peacebuilding are unclear, 
particularly in the extractives sector where the often adverse environmental and social effects of min-
ing activities are well documented and have received high pubic attention (ICMM 2015; Rustad et al. 
2012). Research on the increasing involvement of private companies in other areas of social policy 
suggests that the expanded role of private companies in governance activities outside their traditional 
business sphere (such as peacebuilding) expands their influence in society (Bailey et al. 2015; Jacques 
2016; Ong 2006, 19). At the same time, scholars also emphasize that recent emergence of norms for 
corporate conduct (such as corporate social responsibility, the “social license to operate,” and Busi-
ness and Human Rights) have begun to fundamentally impact companies’ business strategies (Davis 
& Franks 2014; Dashwood 2012; Prno & Slocombe 2012). One of the key challenges underpinning 
policy and planning discussions is the fact that the current single-factor explanations for the successes 
and failures of “business for peace” cannot capture the sheer complexity of peacebuilding contexts. 
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A first step towards overcoming this challenge is to develop a conceptual framework that can better 
capture the various direct and indirect ways in which mining operations and peacebuilding activities 
may be interconnected. This paper presents a framework rooted in complex systems theory, com-
prised of three key elements. First, interconnections between mining and peacebuilding are conceptu-
alized as occurring within the broader dynamics of a “social-ecological system,” drawing on the work 
of Berkes et al. (2003). Second, focusing on the “social” side of this social-ecological system in further 
depth, the dynamics of society (i.e. social systems) are conceptualized in terms of three dimensions: 
Structural, Attitudinal, and Transactional, drawing on the work of Ricigliano (2012). Third, “mining” 
and “peacebuilding” are conceptualized as complex systems in themselves, which are comprised of 
various Structural, Attitudinal, and Transactional elements. A closer examination of mining operations 
and peacebuilding efforts is undertaken to identify their various structural, attitudinal, and transac-
tional elements. All together, the utility of this framework is that it provides a starting point for identi-
fying linkages between mining and peacebuilding, as well as a tool for synthesizing research from di-
verse fields on various aspects of these enterprises. 
Material and Methods 
Social‐Ecological Systems 
The concept of “Social-Ecological Systems” emphasizes the reality that social life relies materially on 
the environment (Berkes et al. 2003, 3; Escobar 2008).1 At the same time, society also materially 
impacts the environment, for example, through the over-consumption of certain resources, pollution, 
or other environmental transformations (e.g. clear cutting). By putting in place measures for collective 
action, society can also sustain, conserve, or restore ecosystem services, for example, through creating 
rules and norms, organizations and other collectivities to motivate (or compel) transformations in be-
haviour (Berkes et al 2003). Social-Ecological Systems can be understood as comprised of “Social 
systems” and “Ecological systems,” which are interconnected and interdependent. Social systems can 
be understood as the enduring series of relationships, patterns of activity, and ideational that produce 
and reproduce collective social action (Giddens 1985, 2425); ecological systems refer to the self-
regulating communities of living organisms and abiotic materials of the earth (Ash et al. 2010, xi; 
Berkes et al 2003, 3). 
                                                            
 
1 For example, societies rely on the earth for food (through agriculture, raising livestock, fishing, or hunting), fresh 
water, and other material resources like timber, minerals, and metals. Broader ecological dynamics like the cli-
mate also impact material aspects social life, for example, by affecting agricultural yields, the prevalence of dis-
eases, or the frequency and impact of major weather events (Ash et al. 2010, xi, 4-5, 128–29). 
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The proposed conceptual framework considers the broader social-ecological context in which min-
ing and peacebuilding activities are taking place in each case. Then, the framework considers the spe-
cific ways in which mining and peacebuilding activities rely on and impact the social and environmen-
tal spheres. Finally, the framework considers whether, and to what extent, interconnections between 
mining, peacebuilding, and the social and environmental spheres may alter the broader social-ecolog-
ical context, or whether mining or peacebuilding activities themselves may be altered by these inter-
connections, as illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. Linkages between Mining, Peacebuilding, and the Broader Social-Ecological System.  
Social Systems: Structures, Attitudes, and Transactions 
Although social systems and ecological systems are interdependent, social systems contain other 
unique elements, such as norms, beliefs, and values, which do not have an equivalent in ecological 
systems (Westley et al. 2002, 107). These unique elements are relevant to social-ecological system 
dynamics, thus need to be included into conceptualization work. Ricigliano’s (2012) “SAT Framework” 
considers three relevant and interlinked dimensions of social systems: Structural, Attitudinal, and 
Transactional. The “transactional” dimension concerns the capacities, behaviours, and activities of 
“agents,” as well as the series of interactions that occur among “agents.” The “attitudinal” dimension 
concentrates on various perceptions, beliefs, values, and goals held by “agents.” The “structural” di-
mension focuses on the enduring web of rules, norms, and institutions that characterize societies. 
“Agents,” for the purposes of this framework, refer to collective organizational units and sub-units 
(rather than individual persons), such as businesses and business sub-units, government depart-
ments, or NGOs, and are the ones undertaking transactions, holding attitudes, creating and being 
bound by structures. 
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Unfortunately, Ricigliano (2012) does not propose any specific mechanisms through which the 
Structural, Attitudinal, and Transactional dimensions are interconnected. Based on an analysis of his 
work, and drawing on the work of Giddens (1985), the following mechanisms are proposed: 
 Attitudes to Transactions  Perceptions, experiences, beliefs, values, and goals motivate and 
shape activities, capacities, and interactions of Agents. 
 Transactions to Attitudes  Agents reflect on their transaction experiences, which shape their 
perceptions, beliefs, values, goals, motivations, and strategies.  
 Transactions to Structures  The enduring nature of repeated activities and interactions create 
and sustain structures.  
 Structures to Transactions  Structures provide a “setting” for activities and interactions, and 
enable particular behaviours of Agents, while constraining others.  
 Attitudes to Structures (via Transactions)   The perceptions, experiences, beliefs, values, and 
goals of Agents motivate and shape their activities and interactions. These transaction expe-
riences in turn shape and reinforce their perceptions, beliefs, values, goals, motivations, and 
strategies. The enduring nature of this iterative process creates and sustains structures.  
 Structures to Attitudes (via Transactions)  Structures embody a particular set of perceptions, 
beliefs, values, and goals, because the “Agents” that created such structures were motivated 
by a particular set of attitudes. In doing so, however, those structures filter out other values, 
goals, and attitudes. In enabling certain behaviours and constraining others, structures also 
influence and reinforce certain perceptions, beliefs, values, and goals through their experi-
ences in that structural setting.  
 
In addition, Ricigliano (2012) does not consider his SAT Framework as part of a broader social-eco-
logical system or how the social elements of his framework may be linked to the environment. Based 
on an analysis of his work, and drawing on the work of Berkes et al. (2003), it is proposed that social 
systems, as captured by the SAT Framework, are linked to environmental systems through the trans-
actional dimension, as follows:   
 (Social) Transactions to Ecological System Dynamics  Certain transactions in the social 
sphere may consume and/or transform environmental resources. The type, quantity, and rate 
of resource consumption and/or transformation in these transactions may alter the integrity 
of the individual resource and/or broader dynamics of the ecological system of which the re-
source is a part. 
 Ecological System Dynamics to (Social) Transactions  The integrity of individual resource 
and/or broader dynamics of the ecological system of which the resource is a part may impact 
the quality and/or quantity of resources available for consumption in social transactions. The 
quality and/or quantity of resources available may impact the capacity of agents in those 
transactions or the outcomes of those transactions, which may have subsequent effects 
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throughout a social system on structures, attitudes, or other transactions, for example, in af-
fecting the ability of transactions to sustain structures, or by resulting in different experiences 
that may alter attitudes. 
Taking the SAT Framework and social-ecological systems together, the proposed conceptual 
framework considers the social side of social-ecological systems in further depth in terms of Struc-
tural, Attitudinal, and Transactional dimensions, and provides a more specific mechanism  through 
transactions  that connect social and environmental systems. It also provides specific mechanisms 
that connect Structures, Attitudes, and Transactions within a given social system. The final missing 
element in the conceptual framework involves conceptualizing mining operations and peacebuilding 
efforts as complex systems. In the following discussion, mining and peacebuilding are each examined 
in order to unpack their structural, attitudinal, and transactional elements and to consider the ways in 
which they rely on and impact the environment.  
Mining as a Complex System 
Mining concerns the extraction of specific substances, such as gold, from the earth. It is a physical and 
highly technical endeavour. As such it is highly dependent on a number of environmental resources, 
such as water, stable ground, and the minerals to be extracted. At the same time, mining has major 
impacts on the environment: through the depletion of resources such as water, production of waste 
and pollution, and transformation of landscapes (Rosa & Sanchez 2016). Mining operations also have 
a significant social dimension as the various technical activities require concerted efforts among a variety 
of agents such as investors, managers, and labourers, guided by a common set of goals, values, and ideas, 
and held together through various social structures, such as rules, contracts, and relationships.  
On a structural dimension, mining relies on a variety structures to coordinate the various activities 
and transactions involved in creating and sustaining a mining operation, which can be conceptualized 
on three levels: operational management, financial management, and strategic management. At the 
operational management level, agents involved in mining operations are organized and bound by a 
variety of structures such as employment/service contracts or operating policies and standards, which 
stipulate performance expectations and other terms and conditions (Azapagic 2004; Botin 2009, 
192193, 226227, 229234; Dunning & Lundan 2008, 101). These operational management struc-
tures are shaped by broader financial management structures concerning the planning, financing, ap-
provals, and ongoing regulatory requirements associated with the business venture as a whole (Aza-
pagic 2004; Botin 2009, 225, 231, 233; Sloan 1983, 13). These financial management structures are 
shaped by broader strategic management structures concerning inward-facing global enterprise-wide 
corporate governance, outward-facing global market strategy and supply chain governance, and out-
ward-facing global partnership, stakeholder relations, and strategy (Azapagic, 2004; Boege & Franks 
2012; Botin 2009, 3840, 4547, 181, 188189, 227; Chen et al. 2015; de la Vergne, 2014, p. 6667; 
Ietto-Gillies 2012, 12; Nair et al. 2009; Poulton et al. 2013; Sloan 1983; UNCTAD n.d.).  
39 
Underlying the activities and structures involved in mining operations at the operational, financial, 
and strategic management levels are a set of assumptions, perceptions, values, or attitudes. Six key 
attitudinal aspects have been identified as relevant: purpose, role, interests, conduct, internal unity, 
and external clash. “Purpose” refers the general reason why a given structure or set of structures exist, 
which is often synonymous with the overarching objective or goal they seek to achieve. “Role” refers 
to how a given agent or structure understands itself in relation to the overarching objective, which is 
often synonymous with identity and/or how it believes it contributes to the overarching objective. 
“Interests” broadly reflects the values and/or priorities of a given agent or structure, which is often 
synonymous with what it believes is the most important in relation to achieving the overarching goal 
and could be a substantive item or condition to be achieved or avoided, a process-related considera-
tion, a grievance to be addressed, or something else. “Conduct” refers to expectations about appro-
priate behaviour and/or process-related considerations that shape the way by which a given agent, 
structure, or set of structures can or should achieve their goals. “Internal unity” refers to the extent 
that members of a given structure or set of structures share the same attitudes (e.g. about their pur-
pose, roles, interests, and conduct). “External clash” refers to the extent that external stakeholders 
(that are not necessarily part of common efforts to achieve a certain goal) share the same attitudes 
(e.g. purpose, roles, interests, and conduct). In particular, this examination will focus on A) the extent 
that attitudinal differences exist as part of mining operations, and between mining operations and ex-
ternal partners and stakeholders, and B) the extent that attitudes change (converge or diverge) 
through interactions among mining and peacebuilding structures and transactions. 
On the transactional dimension, mining operations involve a variety of different activities at the op-
erational, financial, and strategic management levels, which require various material and informational 
inputs, create outputs, and involve the exchange of information, materials, and other relationships.1 At 
the operational level, this includes five general activities: mechanical construction and maintenance, 
ore extraction, ore processing, waste management, and operational monitoring (Botin 2009, 36; de la 
Vergne 2008; EC 2009). At the financial level, this includes five general activities: business planning, 
project financing and marketing, regulatory compliance, reporting and communications, and issue 
management (Botin 2009, 34). At the strategic level, this includes three general activities: corporate 
governance, market strategy, and stakeholder relations (Botin 2009, 34). Each of these activities can 
be thought of as involving four main transactions: inputs, outputs, work, and exchange. “Inputs” are 
pre-requisite things (information, materials, skills) that need to be obtained in order to begin perform-
ing a given activity; “outputs” are things (waste, finished products) that result from the activity, which 
include outputs that are both intended and unintended (e.g. failures, accidents, by-products, or other 
                                                            
 
1 The activities differ at various stages of the “mine lifecycle” (Exploration, Project Planning and Approvals, Mine 
Development, Mine Operations, and Mine Closure; Botin 2009, 3; de la Vergne 2014; EC 2009). For the pur-
poses of this conceptual framework, only the activities and transactions that occur at the “Mine Operations” 
stage will be considered. 
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adverse consequences); “work” are the actual tasks performed as part of the activity; and “exchange” 
are the relationships and interactions involved in performing those tasks. Each of these transactions 
can be thought of as intersecting with the social system, environmental system, or both. 
As noted earlier, mining operations have a significant environmental dimension, primarily through 
the transactional dimension and at the operational level through the following mechanisms: 
 Mining relies on resource inputs (e.g. minerals, water) into various operational activities, such 
as construction and maintenance, or ore extraction and processing; 
 These resource inputs are potentially also inputs relied upon by other users, and their con-
sumption in mining may alter the integrity of the resource, and by extension, consumption 
patterns.  
 The outputs of mining operations may also affect the integrity of environmental resources, 
which may alter the integrity of resources relied upon by other users or the dynamics of the 
ecosystem as a whole.  
 Mining is affected by broader ecosystem dynamics, such as the stability of the ground, which 
impacts the functioning of mining infrastructure and equipment, and by extension, the feasi-
bility of mining activities; 
However, it is important to emphasize that other structures and transactions (informed by a partic-
ular set of attitudes) at the operational, financial, and strategic management levels of mining opera-
tions may influence the way in which mining transactions at the operational level rely on and impact 
the environment. The overall quantity or rate in which a resource like water is consumed could be the 
result of a (structural) goal-setting exercise at the financial management level or the enterprise-wide 
(attitudinal) prioritization of profit over environmental sustainability. In this regard, the environmental 
effects associated with mining are more appropriately understood as an emergent property of the 
systemic dynamics of the mining enterprise as a whole.  
Peacebuilding as a Complex System 
Peacebuilding is a multidimensional process that seeks to transform societal structures in regions af-
fected by conflict in ways that will support non-violent social interactions and prevent future violent 
relapses (Bruch et al. 2016; Lederach 1997). The goal of peacebuilding, broadly, is to achieve “peace,” 
defined here as the absence of widespread conflict likely to endure on an ongoing basis (Paris 2004, 
56). Peacebuilding involves a range of different agents in a variety of activities aimed at transforming 
the dynamics of conflict by addressing both the “root causes” of conflict as well as the “consequences” 
of conflict on society (Busumtwi-Sam 2004). Conceptually, “root causes” can be understood the orig-
inal motivations that led to conflict, and could include “grievances,” or the substantive, interpersonal, 
and/or attitudinal issues or needs around which collective (violent) action was originally motivated 
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and organized.1 Root causes could also include “opportunities,” or the enablers that made collective 
(violent) action possible.2 These various root causes of conflict can be either internal to a given societal 
context or driven externally (e.g. spillover from a neighbouring country or politics driven by a regional 
power; Busumtwi-Sam 2004). In addition to addressing root causes, there are also a number of con-
sequences of conflict on society that make of efforts to rebuild societies and create the foundations 
for a peaceful society more challenging.3 Although peacebuilding is primarily concerned with social 
relations, scholars have begun to recognize the relevance of the environment in this work, for example, 
as a foundation for livelihoods disrupted by conflict, or as a source of revenue providing opportunity 
for conflict.   
Peacebuilding scholars and practitioners have identified various “theories of change” that stipulate 
causal mechanisms by which peacebuilding activities are assumed to contribute to peace (Allen Nan 
2010). In the discussion below, these mehcanisms have been reconceptualized in terms of whether 
they intend to target the root causes or consequences of conflict through structural, attitudinal, or 
transactional means in order to distinguish potential causal linkages between mining operations and 
peacebuilding efforts.  
A significant part of peacebuilding is to create, transform, strengthen, or supplement the various 
rules, institutions, and other societal structures that determine how power, resources, programs, and 
services are distributed, how decisions are made, and how interests are represented as part of efforts 
to address the root causes and consequences of conflict (Ricigliano 2012, 35). A global cast of agents 
are involved such efforts,4 which target a variety of different structures at the national, regional, and 
                                                            
 
1 Examples of grievances include procedural justice issues or inequalities (i.e. concerns about inadequate repre-
sentation, participation, and/or say in relevant decision making institutions or processes), distributive justice 
issues or inequalities (i.e. concerns about inequitable distribution of power, resources, benefits, or costs), iden-
tity (i.e. restrictions on forms of self or group expression), structural violence (i.e. institutionalized forms of dis-
crimination, delegitimization, repression, denial, along other bases), among others (Busumtwi-Sam 2004). 
2 Examples of opportunities include political will (i.e. willingness to accept the costs and consequences of col-
lective action), organizational capacity (i.e. the administrative, financial, and/or technical means to plan, organ-
ize, and coordinate collective action), and/or resources (i.e. access and control of critical resources such as 
money, land, infrastructure, equipment, weapons, etc. to carry out collective action; Busumtwi-Sam 2004). 
3 These consequences include political consequences such as eroded capacity or legitimacy of governance insti-
tutions to deliver basic programs and services to citizens or maintain law and order. They could also include 
social consequences such as the breakdown of social institutions, social ties, and inter-group trust; widespread 
trauma and suffering and destroyed collective identities, culture, and differentiation; or destroyed livelihoods. 
They could include economic consequences such as the breakdown of local, regional, and national economies, 
ranging from the physical destruction and/or fundamental changes in access and control of key economic re-
sources (e.g. infrastructure, land, capital, and other natural resources) necessary to support production and ex-
change; the loss of labour (e.g. from death or emigration), disruption of livelihoods and/or poverty; or prolifera-
tion of illicit economic activities (e.g. trafficking and black markets). They could include consequences for law 
and order and personal security. The various root causes and consequences may be linked to various degrees to 
the environment, for example, as a source of livelihoods, power, or opportunity. 
4 Agents could include national, regional, local, and foreign governments, as well as former combatant groups, 
International Organizations (such as the United Nations, World Bank), Regional Organizations (such as the Or-
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local levels. Some of these efforts are part of a centrally-organized “top-down” effort, while other ef-
forts may be part of a cumulative series of decentralized, largely isolated, “bottom-up” initiatives (Al-
lan Nan 2010).1 Another important element of peacebuilding efforts is aimed at transforming percep-
tions, ideologies, beliefs, and other attitudes held by various societal groups about themselves, to-
wards others, and about peace as part of efforts to address the root causes and consequences of con-
flict (Ricigliano 2012, 35). Although these efforts involve similar agents, and follow similar top-down 
or bottom-up strategies as structural peacebuilding efforts, the emphasis is slightly different (Allan 
Nan 2010; Rustad et al. 2012).2 The efforts, activities, exchanges, and other transactions that take 
place among key agents affected by conflict as part of peacebuilding efforts are themselves an im-
portant component of peacebuilding efforts by equipping societies with the skills, capacity, and rela-
tionships to address the root causes and consequences of conflict (Ricigliano 2012, 35). The same 
agents and top-down or bottom-up approaches are used for activities in the transactional dimension, 
but with a diferent emphasis on building specific capacities and relationships (Allan Nan 2010; Rustad 
et al. 2012).3 
                                                            
 
ganization of American States or the African Union), international, foreign, and domestically-based NGOs work-
ing on various sectors or policy areas, collectives of domestic citizens, and now increasingly the private sector 
(de Conning 2008; Ricigliano 2003).  
1 Examples of peacebuilding efforts targeting societal structures aimed at addressing the root causes of conflict 
include the establishment of peace agreements (e.g. ceasefire, power sharing, peace process), the establishment 
of transitional justice institutions (e.g. Truth & Reconciliation, International Tribunal), the creation or amend-
ment of governance structures (e.g. constitutional change, monitoring, peace inst.), or introduction of economic 
instruments (e.g. embargoes; Allen Nan 2010). All of these institutions embody a different set of attitudes and 
are intended to help to change societal goals, expectations, and priorities, and in doing so, guide activities. In 
doing so, the hope is that the change in priorities, and by extension the change in activities, will help to transform 
societal dynamics, and in doing so, either directly resolve grievances or create confidence that they will be re-
solved. Examples of structural peacebuilding efforts targeting the consequences of conflict include the creation, 
amendment, or strengthening of governance structures (e.g. power sharing, democratization, capacity building, 
policy reforms, security sector reform), creation of supplementary structures for direct provision of programs 
and services (e.g. humanitarian relief, development, reconciliation, security, peace-keeping/monitoring), or cre-
ation, amendment, or strengthening of media structures (Allan Nan 2010). Similarly, these institutions are in-
tended to guide activities, and in doing so transform societal dynamics resulting from conflict that make pece-
building more difficult.  
2 Examples of peaccebuilding efforts targeting societal attitudes aimed at addressing the root causes of conflict 
include the implementation of transitional justice processes (e.g. Truth & Reconciliation, International Tribunal); 
implementation of new/amended governance structures (e.g. Constitutional change, monitoring, peace inst.); 
Mutually hurting stalemate; engagement of elites or spoilers (e.g. grassroots mobilization, elite political engage-
ment); and public engagement, and communications (Allan Nan 2010). Though some these activities overlap 
with structural peacebuilding activities, the point of emphasis is that the intent of these activities is to send a 
signal about changing societal dynamics to encourage a change in attitude. Examples of attitudinal peacebuilding 
efforts targeting the consequences of conflict include engagement of elites, spoilers (e.g. reconciliation, build 
trust); new, amended, strengthened media structures; supplementary structures for direct provision of security 
(e.g. peace-keeping, monitoring); individual change, public attitudes; common identities; trauma healing; culture 
of peace; building trust (e.g. community-based peacebuilding, building bridges among groups); reconciliation 
(Allan Nan 2010). Again, the point of emphasis is on targeting activities towards changing attitudes.  
3 Examples of peacebuilding efforts targeting transactional dimensions of society aimed at addressing root 
causes include the peace negotiations process (e.g. ceasefire, power sharing, peace process); transitional justice 
process (e.g. Truth & Reconciliation, International Tribunal); process of creating or amending governance struc-
tures (e.g. participation); process of engaging elites or spoilers (e.g. dialogue, governance structures); process 
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As noted above, peacebuilding is largely oriented towards transforming social systems. However, 
scholars have begun to recognize the relevance of the environment (Lujala & Rustad 2012; Jensen & 
Lonergan 2012; Unruh & Williams 2013; Weinthal et al. 2014; Young & Goldman 2013; Bruch et al. 
2016). In these discussions, “the environment” is regarded as:  
 A provision (e.g. minerals extracted through mining) that has social (economic) value and can 
be leveraged as an instrument (e.g. source of revenue, source of power) to achieve a number 
of social ends (e.g. to support peacebuilding and development efforts, or further conflict, or to 
maximize status as part of the transition) (Lujala & Rustad 2012); 
 A provision (e.g. land, water) that sustains the livelihoods and well-being of many communi-
ties, which may be adversely impacted (e.g. through environmental degradation, over exploi-
tation) by the activities associated with conflict and/or peacebuilding (Bruch et al. 2009); 
 A policy area or forum for building trust and rebuilding social ties (Bruch et al. 2009; Conca et 
al. 2005); 
The literature to date has been ad hoc, and has focused on only one of the above relationships (or 
an aspect of it), meaning that other relevant environmental linkages exist that have not yet been iden-
tified. Nevertheless, this serves as a starting point for identifying and tracking social-environmental 
linkages associated with peacebuilding and possible linkages with mining.  
Results 
To sum up the discussion thus far, to better capture the causal interconnections between mining and 
peacebuilding activities, the conceptual framework proposed for this examination consists of three 
key elements:  
 Social-ecological system - mining and peacebuilding are conceptualized as occurring within 
the broader dynamics of a “social-ecological system” (Berkes et al. 2003).  
 “SAT Framework” - Focusing on the “social” sphere in further depth, the dynamics of social 
systems are conceptualized in terms of Structural, Attitudinal, and Transactional dimensions, that 
interconnect with ecological systems through the transactional dimension (Ricigliano 2012).  
 “Mining” and “Peacebuilding” as Systems - “Mining” and “peacebuilding” are conceptualized as 
systems in themselves, comprised of various Structural, Attitudinal, and Transactional elements.  
                                                            
 
of multi-track diplomacy; and economic instruments (e.g. embargoes; Allan Nan 2010). The point of emphasis 
is that, just as important as the outcome of these activities, the process of bringing former combattants together 
to interact, build understanding, and build capacity is itself an important element in peacebuilding. Examples of 
transactional peacebuilding activities targeting the consequences of conflict include the process of creating or 
amending governance structures (e.g. participation), the process of engaging elites or spoilers (e.g. reconcilia-
tion, build trust); the processes of trauma healing, creating a culture of peace, building trust (e.g. community-
based peacebuilding, building bridges among groups), and reconciliation; social service delivery (e.g. by govern-
ment, third party); economic development support; reconstruction, restoring, and maintaining environmental 
integrity (Allan Nan 2010). Again the point of emphasis is that the act of bringing people together and building 
capacity to do peacebuilding is itself helpful.  
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Altogether, the framework enables a more complex perspective of the social and environmental 
dimensions of peacebuilding and how they may impact, and be impacted by each other both directly 
and indirectly, as illustrated below in Figure 2.   
 
 
  
Figure 2. Conceptual Framework. 
There appear to be four general pathways by which mining and peacebuilding activities could be 
interconnected: 1) directly (as part of “business for peace” initiatives), 2) indirectly through interac-
tions with the social system and its dynamics (which can be further broken down into dynamics among 
Structures, Attitudes, and Transactions), 3) indirectly through interactions with the ecological system 
and its dynamics. Moreover, given the interdependence between the social and environmental sys-
tems, any/all of the above-mentioned causal pathways have subsequent interactions throughout the 
social-ecological system, providing a fourth general pathway.  
Discussion and Conclusions 
This paper has taken up an emerging policy issue, namely, the increasing involvement of the private 
sector in peacebuilding—Business for Peace. A key challenges in ongoing policy and planning discus-
sions is the fact that much of the research and analysis to date has focused on a limited set of consid-
erations, which are difficult to reconcile from one argument to the next, and have resulted in a number 
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of narrowly focused and largely ineffective policies.1 As a first step towards overcoming this challenge, 
this paper presents a conceptual framework rooted in complex systems theory intended to better cap-
ture the various direct and indirect ways in which mining operations and peacebuilding activities may 
be interconnected. The framework conceptualizes mining and peacebuilding as occurring within the 
broader dynamics of a “social-ecological system.” Focusing on the “social” side of this social-ecologi-
cal system in further depth, social dynamics are conceptualized in terms of Structural, Attitudinal, and 
Transactional dimensions, and mechanisms are proposed for connections between each of these di-
mensions and for connections between social and ecological sides of the broader system. Finally, 
“mining” and “peacebuilding” are conceptualized as complex systems in themselves, which are com-
prised of various Structural, Attitudinal, and Transactional elements. All together, the framework pro-
vides a starting point for identifying linkages between mining and peacebuilding more systematically, 
and provides a more comprehensive view to inform policy and future-oriented analyses.  
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Abstract 
This paper discusses the flaws and omissions of the traditional method of lawmaking, which is pres-
ently used by governments, and the new field of scientific lawmaking. The structure, function, and 
governmental role of the science of laws are presented.  The advantage of scientific lawmaking, as 
compared to traditional lawmaking, is that it will bring the full resources of science to bear upon the 
solution of societal problems by means of laws.  The history of success of all fields of science suggests 
that the expansion of science to encompass laws and lawmaking will also be successful. The discus-
sion includes ongoing projects of the science of laws, future directions, and the projected impact of 
the science of laws.     
Introduction and Background. 
The scientific process (“scientific method”) is the means by which reliable knowledge of the structure 
and mechanics of observable phenomena in the physical universe is derived. As knowledge grows, the 
scientific disciplines of engineering, which apply accumulated knowledge to the advancement of tech-
nology, are able to solve increasingly complex problems. The process of science requires high levels 
of scholarship, integrity, and quality, and the result of the dynamics of science is the optimistic sce-
nario whereby knowledge grows, current problems are being solved by ever-improving means, and 
problems of the next higher order of complexity are in the process of being solved.   
There is one major field of human endeavor that is the exception to the scenario of advances in 
scientific knowledge, technology, and problem-solving expertise: the laws of government.  The laws of 
government may be counted among the most important works of humankind; they address the most 
significant problems of society and they have a direct effect upon the human rights, living standards, 
and quality of life standards of every person.  However, in contrast with the experience of science, laws 
have been less than successful in their goal of solving (solving, mitigating, or preventing) societal prob-
lems.  Despite the annual production of millions of laws by national and regional governments and the 
expenditure of substantial resources under the authority and direction of laws, serious problems of 
war, privation, abuses of human rights, and poverty, etc., remain unsolved.   
Material and Methods 
To determine what can be done to improve the performance of laws and thus enable governments to 
satisfy their public benefit obligations, an investigation into laws and the lawmaking process was con-
ducted (Schrunk, 2005, 2349). The investigation was focused on the federal and state governments 
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of the United States (See United States’ Congress and California legislative processes).  An investiga-
tion into the potential role of science in the creation and evaluation of laws was also conducted 
(Schrunk, 1997, 4447; Schrunk, 2000, Schrunk, 2005, 6191; Schrunk, 2008; Schrunk, 2010; 
Schrunk, 2011; Schrunk, 2012). 
Results 
The results of the investigations disclosed that the traditional method of lawmaking (“the legislative 
process”) is seriously flawed and incapable of satisfying the problem-solving needs of government.  
The results also indicated that the performance of laws can be improved by expanding science to en-
compass laws and the lawmaking process.     
The traditional method of lawmaking, which is used, in various forms, by all governments to create 
laws, is a relatively simple process (Schrunk, 2005). It begins when someone comes up with an idea 
for a law of government. The idea is transcribed into a written petition (“bill”) which is then presented 
to a legislative assembly. After being evaluated by the legislature and, often, modified through debate 
and compromise, the final version of the bill is voted upon by the legislature. If the legislature / gov-
ernment approves the bill it is added to the government’s body of enforceable laws. The next bill is 
presented to the legislature and the lawmaking process is then repeated.  The traditional method thus 
operates as an open feedforward control system whose input consists of ideas and whose output is 
new laws as shown in Figure 1.  
 
   
 
Figure 1. Traditional lawmaking. The traditional method of lawmaking is a simple feedforward control 
system whose output is a continuously growing body of laws.  Note that this process can operate in-
definitely without reference to societal problems.      
 
Although the traditional method appears to be a reasonable means for creating laws of government 
through deliberation, debate, and compromise, it has the following fatal flaws and omissions:   
 It does not require societal problems to be defined1 
 It does not assign priorities to problems for solution  
 It does not require laws to have a statement of purpose in terms of a measurable outcome  
                                                            
 
1 It is impossible to solve a problem that has not been defined.   
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 It does not require law designers to have design expertise1  
 It does not require the creation of a model for each law-design  
 It does not require a full accounting of the multiple costs of laws  
 It does not require a full accounting of the risks and side effects of laws  
 It tolerates design defects and “intentional vagueness” in laws  
 It tolerates the inclusion of “pork barrel” and other special interest provisions in laws  
 It does not require law designers to have knowledge of the subject matter; it is primarily based 
upon ideology, anecdotes, and opinions  
 It does not require a citation of references and data bases  
 It does not require a competent and thorough quality assurance (QA) program that periodically 
evaluates the outcome of laws, or a regular mechanism for the repeal of laws that have been found 
to be less than useful to the citizenry  
 It incorporates no regular, competent mechanism for improvement of the performance of laws  
 
The aforementioned defects of the traditional method render it to be completely unacceptable as a 
problem-solving process of government. In fact, it is not a problem-solving process; its purpose, as 
depicted in Figure 1, is to make laws, not to solve problems.  In addition, as noted, it is lacking or defi-
cient in relevant knowledge, design expertise, ethics, and cost-risk analyses. The result is that the laws 
it creates are frequently defective, vague (often by design), unnecessary, or harmful. Also, since the 
traditional method does not evaluate the outcomes of laws, it fails to identify and repeal outmoded, 
ineffective, redundant, purposeless, and harmful laws whose continued enforcement wastes govern-
ment resources to the detriment of the people. As legislatures enact more laws with each legislative 
session, the size, cost, and complexity of the bodies of laws increase but societal problems remain 
unsolved, and governments are compelled to enforce laws selectively in violation of the rule of law.   
To solve the problem of the dysfunction and ineffectiveness of bodies of laws, a new science, the 
science of laws, was created by the author at the Science of Laws Institute in 1995 (www.scienceo-
flaws.org). Laws are designed as intended useful tools and they have a significant impact upon the 
physical universe, which is the domain of science; they are therefore eminently suited for inclusion 
within the purview of science. The promise of the science of laws is that it will bring the full resources 
and strengths of science, of knowledge, expertise, integrity, and quality to bear upon the solution of 
societal problems by means of laws. The science of laws has two co-equal branches: the creative sci-
ence, or engineering discipline, of laws and the investigative science of laws.  
Creative Science of Laws The creative science of laws develops, accumulates knowledge of, and 
applies engineering best practices and design methodologies to the solution of societal problems by 
                                                            
 
1 There is no university curriculum that is dedicated to the field of law-design; there is no body of scholarship in 
law-design; no school of higher education currently offers a PhD degree in law-design engineering.   
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means of laws (Schrunk, 2000; Schrunk, 2005; Schrunk, 2011; Schrunk, 2012; Gottfried, 2017, 24; 
Madachy, 2017, 1224).  The engineering design process requires inputs from a wide range of schol-
arly fields such as sociology, law, statistics, business, and economics; it is the ultimate example of 
multi-disciplinary engineering1.  By creating just and efficacious laws, the creative science of laws will 
enable governments to satisfy their problem-solving public-benefit obligations.  One of the first steps 
for the engineering discipline of laws is to establish quality design (QD) standards (Schrunk, 1997, 
4447; Schrunk, 2005; Schrunk, 2010) that require law designers to observe knowledge-based best 
practices for the creation of each new law, such as:  
 
 Identify/analyze a societal problem that needs to be solved 
 State the priority of the problem and the goal of the law 
 Create a model of the law based on relevant data and ethical codes  
 Test and refine the model for maximum efficacy 
 Document all sources, methodologies, and observations 
 
When the final design of the prototype law (“bill”) has been completed, it will be submitted to a 
legislative assembly for a vote of acceptance (enactment) or rejection.  If the bill is enacted into law, 
it will be added to the government’s enforceable body of laws and will then be subjected to periodic 
reviews of its performance by a quality assurance (QA) program.   
In addition to creating new laws, the engineering discipline of laws will conduct a quality improve-
ment (QI) program to enhance the structure and performance of existing laws following periodic QA 
evaluation. QI standards are the same as QD standards. By this means, the laws of government will be 
constantly upgraded and improved, by the engineering process2, in their ability to satisfy the problem-
solving purpose of government.   
Investigative Science of Laws The purpose of the investigative branch of the science of laws is to 
derive reliable knowledge of 1) the mechanics (“cause and effect” mechanisms) of laws and 2) meth-
odologies for the measurement and analysis of laws. It regards every law of government to be an in-
complete experiment of human behavior3. Each law has a hypothesis (that it will produce a desired 
societal outcome) and that hypothesis is tested (i.e., the experiment is carried out) when the law is 
enforced. By measuring and analyzing the results of law enforcement, the investigative science of laws 
derives knowledge of the mechanics of each law, and of systems of laws, and the store of scientific 
                                                            
 
1 To meet the future need for law design engineers, new college curricula to the PhD level will need to be devel-
oped. Law-design engineering will be closely allied to software and systems engineering disciplines.   
2 The Rule of Engineering: Change is always characterized by improvement.   
3 Traditional lawmaking is an incomplete experiment of human behavior because it does not measure, analyze, 
and record the results of the experiment, i.e., of law enforcement.   
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knowledge of the structure and function of laws thus grows over time. With this knowledge, govern-
ments can avoid the mistakes of the failed laws of the past, and law design engineers can create more 
effective and just laws in the future. Significantly, the investigative science of laws will be the basis of 
a comprehensive quality assurance (QA) program of laws.   
Quality Assurance of Laws Unless a government measures the outcomes of its laws, it is “flying 
blind.” That is, a government cannot know if its laws have accomplished anything of value for the pub-
lic unless it utilizes a reliable process for assessing the outcomes of laws. Therefore, each law must 
undergo a periodic (e.g., every ten years) quality assurance (QA) evaluation to confirm that it is “nec-
essary and proper” for the wellbeing of the public.    
A major contribution of the investigative science of laws is that it will be the basis of a quality as-
surance program for laws. The QA program will employ empirical (i.e., scientific) methodologies to 
measure, analyze, and document the problem-solving outcome of each law, including its costs, bur-
dens, and impact upon the human rights, living standards, and quality of life of the public (Schrunk, 
2010).   
A determination of the net benefit of each law will then be made (the net benefit of a law is the 
difference between its problem-solving benefit and the sum of its costs, risks, restrictions, and other 
burdens).  If the QA program determines that the net benefit of a law is positive, the law will be referred 
to the legislature for affirmation and continued enforcement. All other laws will be recommended for 
repeal by the legislature. By leading to the repeal of non-productive laws (e.g., outmoded, ineffective, 
conflicting, duplicative, harmful, and unenforced laws) the QA program will more than pay for itself 
(Crosby, 1979) and the bodies of laws of government will then consist of the minimum number of laws 
that efficaciously satisfy the purpose of government, i.e., that are useful to the wellbeing of the public.   
Policy Making versus Lawmaking The use of science for lawmaking will lead to a separation between 
“policy making” and “lawmaking.” The role of legislators (members of a legislative assembly of gov-
ernment) will change from that of “lawmaker” to “trustee” (of the people), whose purpose is to 1) 
discuss the great issues of the day and formulate, through debate and deliberation, priorities and goals 
for government action, i.e., to “set policy,” and 2) assure, through the enactment and repeal of laws 
and the maintenance of quality standards for laws, that the body of laws always and optimally serves 
the purpose of government1.   
However, in their roles as trustees of the people, legislators will not be lawmakers, for two reasons.  
First, the position of trustee will be a full-time position, and trustees will not have the time to design 
laws.  Second, the requirements for being a qualified designer of laws (e.g., PhD in law-design engi-
neering) are far beyond the typical general-knowledge background of popularly elected legislators.  
                                                            
 
1 For democratic governments, the purpose of government is to secure the rights and liberty of the people, the 
citizenry (Schrunk, 2005, 109-113).   
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Thus, legislators will set policy, but will assign, by competitive bidding or other responsible method, 
the design of laws to qualified law-design institutions and engineers (“creative scientists”).    
The Scientific Control System of Laws The creative and investigative sciences of laws will act syn-
ergistically with the legislature to create a science-based feedback control system for the govern-
ment’s body of laws.  By its incorporation of quality standards (QD, QA, and QI) for the creation, eval-
uation, and optimization of laws, the lawmaking process will be self-correcting in the direction of op-
timum outcomes in terms of the rights and liberty of the people (Figure 2).  
  
 
 
Figure 2.  Scientific Lawmaking Science-derived quality programs for laws (QD, QA, and QI) will 
transform the lawmaking process into a problem-solving feedback control system that is self-cor-
recting in the direction of optimum problem-solving outcomes for the public. (compare to Figure 1).  
 
With each cycle of the scientific lawmaking process, the sophistication of engineering design and 
evaluation methods will improve, reliable knowledge of the mechanics of laws will increase, the size 
of the bodies of laws will be kept to a minimum, and the performance of laws will improve in terms of 
effective and just problem solution, cost-efficiency, and safety in the best interests, i.e., rights and 
liberty, of the public.   
Status of the Science of Laws: Web Site The web site (www.scienceoflaws.org) of the Science of 
Laws Institute includes discussions of lawmaking, quality programs, and the creative and investigative 
sciences of laws, as well as the peer reviewed on-line Journal of the Science of Laws.  It also includes 
a data base of abstracts of scientific abstracts of the mechanics of laws from the past two centuries 
up to year 2006.  The data base comprises approximately 1800 abstracts.   
Status: Annual Conferences  The science of laws has held three annual scientific conferences at the 
University of California San Diego (UCSD) in conjunction with the systems engineering society (IN-
COSE) of San Diego, California. Presentations of scientific works related to the science of laws are 
given at the conferences and peer-reviewed papers are published in the Institute’s on-line Journal of 
the Science of Laws.  The fourth annual conference is scheduled for November, 2017. 
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Status: Ongoing Projects The Science of Laws Institute is engaged in a review of critical parameters 
(e.g., problem definition, purpose statement, cost and risk analyses, citation of references, name of 
law-designer…) of California Legislative Bills (year 2017).  The goal of this effort is to identify the fac-
tors that should be included in quality design standards for laws. This work is scheduled for completion 
later in 2017 and the results will be presented at the annual science of laws conference.  The published 
work may become the basis of an ISO 9000 standard for the design of laws generally.    
Status: Future Projects  The following Science of Laws projects are planned: 
 Update the knowledge data base of scientific abstracts of the mechanics of laws 
 Mine the data base to discover which laws or groups of laws tend to increase or decrease societal 
problems 
 Expand the data base to include abstracts of outcomes research methodologies 
 Expand the data base to include abstracts of engineering design methodologies that are applicable 
to law-design 
 Develop a Systems Engineering Working Group dedicated to the advancement of the science of 
laws 
 Begin experimentation with the creation and simulation of law-design models 
 Coordinate with universities for the development of college degree programs, to the PhD level, for 
the science and engineering of laws 
 
Projected Future Impact The science of laws will apply, for the first time, the full resources of science 
to the solution, by means of laws, of serious societal problems (war, poverty, privation, abuse of human 
rights…).  It holds the promise, based on the record of success of all other fields of science, of improving 
the human condition by enabling governments to create and maintain a rule of law that always and 
optimally serves the safety and wellbeing of the public.  
Conclusion 
The traditional method of lawmaking, which is used as the lawmaking process of governments, is a 
prolific lawmaking process that increases the size and complexity of the bodies of laws of govern-
ments.  However, the traditional method is flawed as a problem-solving process, and it has been less 
than successful in the solution of societal problems.  A new science, the science of laws, has been 
established by the expansion of science to encompass laws of government and the lawmaking process.  
The new science of laws holds the promise of improving the performance of governments by bringing 
the full resources of science to bear upon the solution of societal problems by means of laws.   
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2. METHODS AND METHODOLOGY  
 OF FUTURES RESEARCH 
Critical Futures of Aging in Society  Enabling Futures of Intergenerational 
Knowledge Creation 
Nourhan Hegazy 
MDes Strategic Foresight and Innovation, OCAD University 
Abstract  
Our relationship with younger and older generations in our lives can facilitate our need for personal 
care, material security as well as our search for identity and belonging. Yet as rising demographic de-
pendency in the West is projected to increase economic pressure on the working age, it reinforces 
negative narratives such as “aging is a burden”. In an attempt to re-frame such narratives, Sohail Ina-
yatullah’s Causal Layered Analysis was used to deconstruct a projected trend of rising demographic 
dependency in Canada revealing a rigid system of age specialization that is depicted through the met-
aphor of an “assembly line of aging“.  However, as changes in demography, lifestyle and lifespan con-
tinue to transform generational expectations, „the meandering river of aging“ is described as an alter-
native metaphor that aims to challenge this status quo.  
Introduction and Background 
Understanding relationships between generations lies at the heart of society’s contemporary dilem-
mas and is a phenomena that links a variety of fields and issues [Biggs, 2007]. While in the past, 
mapping life-stage characteristics has been the concern of generational studies, changes to lifespan 
and lifestyle have blurred generational roles creating a need for alternative approaches to understand-
ing aging [Biggs, 2007].  
Furthermore, in contrast to traditional societies where the death of an elder was similar to the burn-
ing down of a library [Helman, 2005, p. 56], today, the elder’s role is changing as youth more readily 
access knowledge freely and absorb technology at a quicker rate. This is especially significant consid-
ering that our potential to develop ideas sustainably is influenced by how we use networks [Howkins, 
2009], therefore connecting knowledge across generations becomes an important consideration for 
developing sustainable societies for the future. 
Yet as rising demographic dependency in the West is projected to increase economic pressure on 
the working age, it reinforces negative narratives such as “aging is a burden”. Therefore, this study 
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addresses the following inquiry: How might we enable futures of intergenerational knowledge creation 
through re-framing aging narratives?  
Material and Methods 
Literature that discusses ‘Generations’ was gathered from the domains of Sociology and Social Ger-
ontology and an environmental scan captured trends and emerging issues from a variety of sources 
and applied it to a critical futures methodology. Critical futures is part of an emerging field in Social 
Foresight and is a methodology that was originally developed by Richard A. Slaughter. Critical futures 
studies recognizes that the present is a consequence of a dominant narrative or a “status quo” [Ina-
yatullah, 2005]. Its objective is to “un-define the future” through challenging predictive approaches 
and moving past cultural assumptions often based on dominant industrial paradigms originating in the 
West [Inayatullah, 2005]. In doing so, it uncovers deeper layers about the future by questioning the 
nature of “time, rationality and agency [Inayatullah, 2005]”.  
A post-structural approach attempts to question trends and events that appear at the surface. 
Building on Slaughter's work, Inayatullah [2005] developed a tool called Causal Layered Analysis 
[CLA] that allows these deeper layers of cultural reality, world view and metaphor to emerge. Decon-
struction, genealogy, distancing and re-ording knowledge are among the elements introduced by Ina-
yatullah [2005] when conducting post-structural futures research. CLA links mythic and metaphorical 
dimension with other levels of analysis by acknowledging that “individuals, organizations and civiliza-
tions see the world from different positions—horizontal and vertical [Inayatullah, 2005, p. 6]”.  The 
four dimensions of the CLA -as proposed by Inayatullah [2005] are discussed more deeply below. 
a) The Litany 
The first layer is the litany which includes quantitative trends and issues as they appear in mainstream 
media such as news. Fisher [2003] developed the term “litany” which refers to the clichés and stere-
otypes we live in every day. Described by Slaughter as ‘pop futurism’, litany is the most visible form of 
reality and was later adapted as the first layer of CLA by Inayatullah [Ramos, 2003].  
b) The Causes and System 
Beneath the litany, social and systemic causes question the quantitative data presented by considering 
various economic, cultural, political and historical factors [Inayatullah, 2005]. It uses technical expla-
nations and academic analysis to explore the role and interests of actors. It also draws relationships 
between the various factors to show complexity and contradictions. 
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c) The Worldviews 
Beneath the social and systemic causes lies the worldviews revealing the deeper discourses that are 
reinforcing the system [Inayatullah, 2005]. For instance, one may explore various mental models that 
may lead to a re-framing of the issue such as economic, social or cultural.  
d) The Metaphors and Myths 
Finally, the deepest layer reveals metaphors or myths which represent the “unconscious, often emo-
tive, dimensions of the problem [Inayatullah, 2005, p. 7]”. It is concerned with evoking visual images, 
emotional responses and uses more open language. It is what Inayatullah refers to as the “root level 
of questioning [Inayatullah, 2005, p. 7]”.  
At each level of the CLA, solutions varying in complexity exist (Inayatullah, 2017). For example, 
while litany level solutions lead to simple short-term solutions, systemic and worldview changes are 
much more complex and long-term (Inayatullah, 2017). Metaphor or Myth solutions require new 
memories to be created and collective narratives to be told (Inayatullah, 2017).  
Therefore, CLA seeks to integrate these four levels of understanding and solution finding. It is 
through the application of the CLA, that new and alternatives narratives can emerge considering that 
“the way in which one frames a problem changes the policy solution and the actors responsible for 
creating transformation (Milojevi I. and Inayatullah, 2015, p. 157)”. CLA seeks to challenge conven-
tional framings of issues and to reveal underlying assumptions in order to deepen the future and the 
solutions that will shape it (Milojevi I. and Inayatullah, 2015).  
Results 
Through the application of CLA, two metaphors were developed: 1) The assembly line of aging which 
represents the status quo and 2) The meandering river of aging which represents a forgotten yet 
emerging paradigm of aging. Therefore, the CLA was conducted twice. First it placed trends at the 
litany and de-constructed them down to a metaphor. Second it challenged the metaphor and moved 
back up the ladder to question the litany. In the first attempt, an assembly line metaphor was revealed 
to represent a dominant narrative or ‘status quo’. Next, an emerging paradigm of aging is introduced 
through the meandering river, which is argued to open up a rigid system of age segregation. Figure 1 
below summarizes this process.  
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Figure 1. 
A Status Quo 
More objective, the assembly line of aging is based on a linear model of organization intended to reg-
ulate needs across the life course and to maintain social security in life stages where individuals are 
likely to need it most. However, it also limits the freedom to pursue alternative choices and reinforces 
stereotypes in the case the rules do not fit. The following section first begins by describing the litany 
or the quantified trends, then moves to reveal their systems, world views and metaphors.  
Litany- Projected Rise of Demographic Dependency 
An article in the Globe and Mail titled “Boom, Bust and Economic Headaches” published on Nov. 8th 
of 2015 highlighted how succession planning remains to be a significant challenge as the population 
continues to age and paints a dystopian scenario for the future. The demographic dependency ratio is 
an economic indicator that describes this socio-economic relationship between those typically not in 
the workforce referred to as dependents and the working age population [StatCan, 2011]. 
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The demographic dependency ra-
tio uses a formula to measure the 
pressure on a productive popula-
tion through dividing the number of 
youth and seniors by the working 
age to generate the youth, senior 
and total demographic depend-
ency per 100 working age persons. 
The data in Figure 2 reflects both 
past observations as well as future 
projections. While observed data 
reflects what is perceived to have 
taken place in the past, projected 
data reflects an estimate of what 
might happen in the future. As the 
baby-boom generation that fol-
lowed World War II continues to 
retire, the data projects that there 
will be a decline in work force par-
ticipation [StatCan, 2011].  
 
System and Causes - Age Segregated Social Structure 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that the demographic dependency ratio does not include young 
people or seniors who are active in the workforce, nor working-age people who are inactive [StatCan, 
2011]. Therefore, it is based on age rather than employment status reflecting a population age struc-
ture. This population structure is described as “age segregated” organizing life stages into generic 
units and following a linear chronology of: a) Education, b) Work, c) Leisure. While this age structure 
appears to be natural at the surface, it has only become common practice with the growth of bureau-
cratic and industrial systems [Riley and Riley, 2000; Kohli, 2007; Uhlenberg, 2000]. This evolution is 
part of a capitalist model which focuses on individuals as separate units and chronologizes life course 
stages [Kohli, 2007]. 
Worldview - Monochronic time, Individualism, Materialism 
This “chronolization” of the life course [Kohli, 2007] represents a cultural model of time which is 
hugely influenced by intellectual and religious thought in the Western world for many centuries. The 
Figure 2. 
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anthropologist Edward T. Hall [1983] described this form of time as “monochronic”. In this view, time 
considered as linear and tangible, dividing the life course into three chronological periods of pre-work, 
work and post-work [Helman, 2005]. This is linked to the overall aim of an industrial culture which is 
greater productivity in a shorter time frame and at a cheaper cost [Helman, 2005]. Furthermore, as 
time and work became more connected, watches and calendars became more commonly owned. 
 
A Medical Anthropologist, Helman [2005] raises questions about the relationship between cultural 
concepts of time and human longevity by recognizing how the experience and meaning given to old 
age is different across cultures. In contemporary society, an emphasis is placed on youth, beauty and 
independence as well as on the ability to be productive [Helman, 2005]. Therefore, the elder’s role is 
changing as youth more readily access knowledge freely and absorb technology at a quicker rate. 
Metaphor - The Assembly Line of Aging 
Similar to watches, factories represent important symbols of industrialization, emerging with modern 
economic and social systems based on standardized mass production and consumption. In the man-
ufacturing process, assembly lines are used to increase production and efficiency. So what does all 
this have to do with the experience of aging? May the assembly line serve as a metaphor for the ex-
perience of an age segregated structure?  
For the purposes of exploring this metaphor, let us consider the assembly of a car. Assume that the 
assembly steps are to install the engine, install the hood, and install the wheels and only one of these 
steps can be done at a time. Moving in a linear fashion similar to a factory’s assembly line, what if we 
are to replace the assembly of a car with the assembly of the life course? The steps in the assembly 
line are to install education, install work, and install leisure and only one of these steps can be done at 
a time. Therefore, an age segregated structure mass produces age specific roles and activities [ex. 
education, work, leisure] within quantified durations [ex 019, 1964, 65+] ready for consumption by 
individuals in society. 
To take the assembly line of aging metaphor further one may compare between what is happening 
to the car industry today as a way to understand what is happening to the life course. An industry that 
is experiencing extreme disruption with the emergence of Uber, a biking culture, driverless cars and 
heightened awareness of climate change? Similarly, the life course is, too, experiencing disruption, as 
work becomes more autonomous, care becomes more distributed, and technology creates new forms 
of interaction.  
2) An Emerging Paradigm 
The Meandering River of Aging describes an image of the future where an emerging model of aging 
challenges the assembly line. More subjective, the process of aging is customizable and activities be-
tween age groups are more likely to become shared. Driven by a need to embrace both life and death, 
62 
it values free time for self, family and friends over the desire for materialism. This section first begins 
by describing the metaphor then moves up the CLA ladder to discuss the world views, systems and 
litany.  
The Metaphor - The Meandering River of Aging 
In their book Social identities Across the Life Course, Hockey and James [2003] describe the Life 
course to be “Less as the mechanical turning of a wheel and more as the unpredictable flow of a river 
[Hockey J. and James A., 2003, p. 5-6].” The mechanic turning of a wheel provides another reference 
to the assembly line metaphor while an unpredictable river provides an alternative metaphor to ex-
plore further. In contrast to an assembly line, rivers almost never flow in a linear fashion, instead they 
twist and turn along paths, moving unpredictably as they obtain nutrients by changing their course -
called meandering it is how rivers renew themselves. 
The Worldview - Polychronic Time, Collectivism, Human Centered 
In contrast to how life is experienced in more monochronic societies, in more polychronic societies life 
is experienced as continuous, often wandering like the flow of a river [Helman, 2005]. Polychronic 
time is characterized as cyclical, intangible, and experienced as a “point” at which life activities con-
verge [Hall, 1983]. Polychronic societies tend to emphasize the importance of people and the “com-
pletion of tasks only when the time is right” [Helman, 2005, p. 55]. This cyclical view of human expe-
rience is often expressed through concepts such as reincarnation in Asian religions [Helman, 2005].  
The System- Age Integrated Social Structure 
In agricultural or craft based communities, generations predominantly lived and learned together un-
der one roof -in some parts of the world they still do. In these more traditional societies elders played 
an import role of care giving and children were expected to work in the field or to care for their 
younger siblings as “time devoted to work was considered as intrinsic to childhood as it is to adult-
hood [Helman, 2005, p. 55]”. In these more traditional societies, the death of an elder is similar to 
the burning down of a library as “knowledge, skills, wisdom and mastery of local technology accumu-
late in later years of life making elders the repositories of inherited wisdom [Helman, 2005, p. 56]”. 
In contrast to how knowledge and experience is acquired today, in these societies experience is 
orally transferred from one generation to the next and elders are considered to be the “repositories of 
wisdom [Helman, 2005, p. 56]”. However, although there are lessons to be learned from the past, 
moving forward in to the future, its important to recognize that knowledge and wisdom exists in dif-
ferent ways across age and that establishing grounds for which older and younger generations may 
equally learn from one another in a contemporary context is key. This is also made more complex, as 
63 
ones choice of vocation is liberated from ancestry and families have become more heterogeneous in 
nature.  
The Litany - Emerging Weak Signals of Demographic Interdependency 
The process of environmental scanning revealed weak signals indicating that age integration and op-
portunities for converging activities between old and young are slowly emerging. Weak signals in-
cluded senior homes opening up in universities and schools opening up in senior homes, social media 
used for purposes of intergenerational engagement, the integration of economically active seniors into 
entrepreneurial practices as well as the rights of future generations being discussed in contexts of 
climate change. Figure 3 aims to visualize a framework for such emerging intergenerational networks. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. 
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Discussion and Conclusions 
Both metaphors represent a tension between how we perceive and identify with aging internally or 
‘subjective aging’ as opposed to how society imposes an externally constructed view of what aging 
implies for our lives or ‘objective aging’. The assembly line of aging described an image of the future 
where an industrial model fails to adapt to the needs of its people. Viewing age groups as objective 
numbers, it is driven by the standardization of activities across life course stages. In contrast to this, 
more subjective, the meandering river of aging opens up the system creating opportunities for more 
choices to pursue alternative roles throughout the life course, however, it raises questions as to how 
this may preserve and secure different needs across the age spectrum. Creating opportunities for more 
meaningful contributions across the life course may lead to a pro-active aging narrative as well as 
increase knowledge sharing between generations.  
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Abstract 
Do we hear the voice of children and young when developing our society? The research project “Young 
people’s images of the future 2067” focuses on bringing forth youth’s dreams and hopes for the future, 
and based on those desires to construct proposals for policymakers. A participatory future camp 
method is used to challenge high school and vocational school students to ponder on future issues. 
Based on future camp material a survey with six different futures images is designed and respondents 
rate them according to probability and desirability. It is found out that the future camp method can be 
used both for encouraging futures thinking and gathering data of future related values and thoughts.   
Introduction and Background 
Challenges in Finnish society, such as population aging, globalization, climate change, and labor mi-
gration require reforming and diversifying the structures of the society (e.g. Dufva et al. 2017). Ac-
cording to Kettunen (2015, 167–168), future anticipation should be more citizen-oriented and more 
democratic by providing people a genuine opportunity to be included in the discussion on Finland's 
future, and thus help to find solutions for developing the society and maintaining good quality of life. 
How can especially young people’s conceptions about the future prospects of Finland be observed and 
taken into account? In what ways can the society promote civic participation of young people? These 
questions in mind, a research project “Young people and their future images of 2067” was planned. 
The project is part of Finland’s 100th anniversary festivities in the city of Hämeenlinna, where the focus 
of the celebration is on developing a good future for our children by bringing forth young people’s 
views of possible and preferable futures. 
The research aims to find out what kinds of desirable images of the future young people aged 16–19 
years have related to housing, livelihoods and lifestyle. The target is also to study, what possible ob-
stacles young people see in societal or private level when thinking about realization of different future 
images. Research seeks to encourage young people to actively think and express their viewpoints re-
lated to future and to learn to consider alternative future images. The participatory aspect is applied 
in different ways during three phases of the project. First, it is experimented how a tool called future 
camp can be applied to gather young people’s views about the topics in question and to promote fu-
tures thinking in a participatory atmosphere. Second, a survey is conducted where young people are 
asked to evaluate six different future images that are created based on the material from the first 
phase. Teenagers are also challenged to ponder factors that might prevent desirable futures to come 
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true. After the research material is analysed and reported, a group of young people is invited to use 
these research results to pick up issues they see important and to get their views out in the open in a 
seminar, which is organised by Hämeenlinna in November 2017. 
Material and Methods 
The research material was collected in two phases. The first phase consisted of seven future camps, 
which were organized in late 2015 and early 2016 across Finland in high schools, vocational schools 
and in one adult education college. The purpose of future camps was to gather images of the future 
from young people. The images of the future provide a basis for understanding youth aspirations and 
hopes for the future, as they guide people’s choices and are one of the reasons for future come true 
(Rubin 2000; Bell 1997; Masini 1993).   
Future camp combines personal futures approach, scenario approach and future-oriented guidance 
approach. This framework has been created in FFRC as a participatory process together with academic 
researchers, career counsellors, entrepreneurs and students. Future camp is a tool created especially 
for young people to build stepping stones for unknown future, as well as to focus on individual capac-
ities to approach the desired future. Future camp is meant to support teenagers in imagining their own 
possibilities along with reflecting individual thinking and decision making. (Ahvenainen et al. 2014 and 
2015; Jokinen et al. 2015.) In this project future camp was developed further and tested to function 
also as an interaction based foresight method that is suitable for gathering research data.  
The camp sites were chosen by geographic distribution of the school location and by different re-
gional types, such as cities and rural areas. One of the camps was organized only for adolescents at 
risk of becoming marginalized. A total of 208 teenagers participated in the future camps, where they 
imagined and described their own dreams and expectations of future for example by writing, drawing, 
voting and building with Lego bricks. Each camp was identical and consisted of four activity points that 
had different content supporting participants’ futures awareness. These activity points addressed 
thinking and values related to future, work and livelihood, housing, and Independence Day in 2067. 
After the tour of future camps was completed, the collected research material was organized and then 
analysed by using methods of classification and thematization. 
Based on the analysis of future camp material, researchers constructed six positive future images 
depicting life in the 2050s. Writing the future descriptions was a delicate process, since the effects of 
used words were carefully considered. Every description had also three photographs attached, which 
were meant to inspire the reader but not to limit their thoughts or lead them in any particular direction. 
The future images focus on aspects of lifestyle, housing, and work. They were applied in an online 
survey that was constructed in the second phase of collecting the research material. The survey was 
sent to selected educational establishments in late 2016 and early 2017 and young people both in 
vocational schools and high schools evaluated the ready-made future images, reflected the desirability 
and probability perspectives of the images and then described their own dream future. The survey 
participant schools represented different parts of Finland and approximately 520 of all answers were 
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analysed for this project by using method of thematization. Among respondents there were about 270 
males and 250 females. The data analysis from both phases was carried out on a grounded theory 
basis, in order to retain young people's own experiences and defined meanings in the research focus. 
Results  
According to the results of future camps, young people's images of the future are rather conservative 
and they are based on the ideal of welfare society and values of the surrounding society. The images 
of the future emphasize traditional views of happy family and good life. Among these young people, 
the dream is to live with family members in a detached house that is located near the city and its 
services in Finland, some country in Europe, the United States or in a sunny and warm destination 
abroad. The homes are preferably located close to nature and water. In these future images people 
commute by ecological car and also good public transport is very important.  
High income is expected in young people's dreams based on camp results and over half of the par-
ticipants considered international career attractive. Many emphasized interesting work content and a 
good working atmosphere as important criteria for a satisfied working life. Both paid labour and entre-
preneurship were considered to be somewhat or fairly important as career criteria. Based on the camp 
data, young people see their own future in a very positive light, but national and global development 
is overshadowed by rising unemployment, increasing impacts of climate change and progressive num-
bers of refugees. This is based on the experience that personal future can be more easily influenced 
than Finland’s or global development. Future camps were organized within a period of time, when un-
employment numbers and refugee crises were actively discussed in the media and it may have had 
some impact on teenagers' outlooks of future prospects.  
Fairly similar elements were emphasized in the survey results as in future camps. In the survey, 
every respondent assessed the desirability and probability perspectives of the future images and many 
of them also elaborated their thoughts in the open-ended questions attached in all of the future im-
ages. The results of average desirability and probability of the future images can be seen in figure 1. 
According to the results, the most desirable future image is number two, where people live spaciously 
in the waterfront. In this image, home is located in a convenient driving distance from hobbies, work 
and other services. The family members live with their pets in a big detached house with a lot of space 
and nature around them. The house is equipped with smart technology and adults’ working life is very 
flexible. This futures image is also seen as the most probable amongst young people answering the 
survey questions (figure 1).  
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Figure 1.The desirability and probability of the future images. 
In figure 1 the estimates of desirability are always greater than probability. Kuhmonen et al. (2014, 
55) also found out in their study that the desirability of future images is greater than the probability 
and they state, that it is based on the possible obstacles or on the fact, that the images are not consid-
ered personally realistic. In this project the future image number three, where people live in a private 
community outside the society is seen the second most desirable but not very likely to be the future 
lifestyle. Many of the respondents think that this future image is unrealistic and feeling of social isola-
tion as well as economic issues are the most commonly reported obstacles. 
In the open-ended questions attached in each of the future images young people were asked to 
mention what they liked in the future image and what they found as possible obstacles for realization 
of the image. The thematization of the answers revealed that same themes could be seen both as 
attractive or unfavourable attributes depending what were the values and preferences of the respond-
ents. For example, the future image number five Active metropolis, got numerous comments regarding 
living in the city centre and while for many young people it was a positive feature, there were equally 
many who expressed that they do not wish to live in that way in the future.  
The findings of the future camp and survey material are encapsulated accordingly: the favourable 
image of the future for the participants includes significant relationships and a possibility for commu-
nality, a variety of housing options in different phases of life, easily achievable services and meaningful 
work tasks and sufficient income. In addition, possibility to live out ecological or international lifestyle 
is valued and smart technology is seen to be part of everyday life in many occasions in the future. 
Proposals for policy makers are made based on these notions. 
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Discussion and Conclusions 
The views of the young people in this research resemble results gathered from the Finnish youth in 
other researches (e.g. Seppälä 2008; Myllyniemi 2016; Limnéll & Rantapelkonen 2017). According to 
previous research on young people’s images of the future, the youth consider their own future more 
positively than the future of the society at large and this is argued to base in the notion that the youth 
feel they can affect their own future but not that much the future in national or global level (Eckersley 
1999; Rubin 2000; Hicks & Holden 2007). The results of this research correlate with former research 
in this respect.  
In the project, the focus was on positive images of the future only. This choice was motivated by 
former research observations that working with positive images of the future may encourage the sense 
of hope and possibilities regarding the future (Rubin 2000; Lombardo 2010). When young people’s 
thinking is the subject of the research, it is to be taken into consideration that the choice of the research 
method may affect the results as the mindset of the youth is a complicated process and, during the 
years of youth the futures thinking is still developing and social relations and the surrounding society 
influence on it (Nurmi & Nuutinen 1987). Keeping this in mind, two methods, future camps and a sur-
vey, were used in order to reach youth’s thoughts.  
In this research the future camp is used as a method both in order to gather research material and 
to encourage young people to ponder on different aspects of possible futures. It is a good method to 
promote young people´s participation in the development of our society. Future camps can increase 
access to decision-making, as well as increase influence and voice of young people.  It is also a good 
tool for young people helping them to focus on individual capacities to approach the desired future, 
imagining own possibilities and reflect individual thinking, as well as decision making patterns. Future 
camp is a suitable method for data gathering but also demanding for both organizers and participants 
when implemented in detail. Therefore, as new technology develops and becomes more consumer 
friendly, one way to facilitate camps could be to apply virtual reality elements in some form. Virtual 
reality could both lighten the practical activities of the camps as well as provide more imaginative ways 
for participants to explore the future images in different contexts. The development work with the 
future camp method continues in the FFRC. 
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Abstract 
AXIOM is an approach for modeling and analysis of complex systems based on expert-sourced data. 
It proposes a systems modeling language and a computational process to extract information of higher 
analytical value from a model built using the language. AXIOM can be placed in the family of cross-
impact analysis techniques, and it proposes solutions for several practical problems associated with 
systems modeling using the established cross-impact techniques. This paper presents the AXIOM 
modeling language primitives, outlines the computational process and shows how the evaluated AX-
IOM model can be used for analysis of the modeled system. 
1. Introduction 
This paper describes the AXIOM approach for complex systems modeling and analysis. Modeling is 
generally defined as creating an approximation of the real world or a portion of reality (Sokolowski and 
Banks, 2009, 3). Such approximations or models can then be used in simulation of the real system 
they represent. Simulation is done to improve understanding of the real system, test how the system 
behaves under different conditions, and study the effects of changes, thus supporting planning and 
decision-making. International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE) (2017) defines a system as 
a “collection of elements that together produce results not obtainable by the elements alone". Systems 
thinking entails understanding the parts of reality under analysis as a set of components, that are log-
ically connected abstractions of some real world objects or phenomena (Checkland, 1999, 99). 
Systems modeling is therefore a process of representing reality using a modeling language which 
defines the available types components, and the logical connections and relationships between them 
for building the representation. The process of trying to capture the essential aspects of a system or a 
problem domain can as such be a useful learning experience (Checkland, 1999). However, as the com-
ponents and their relationships and connections are modeling inputs, the analysis part of system mod-
eling and analysis must derive its added value from a process of performing some kind of evaluation 
or simulation on the model. This process aims at revealing the emergent properties of the system 
itself, which can be difficult to observe by just looking at the system components at the lowest level of 
aggregation (Checkland, 1999, 99103). The emergent properties are systemic, reflecting how the 
components and their connections function as a system.  
Modeling a system involves abstracting the real system components and aspects into the model 
components and drafting the structure of their relationships, using the constructs available in the mod-
eling language. The modeling process relies on a theory of the system, which guides the framing of the 
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system, the inclusion or exclusion of components, and the aggregation level. Systems modeling does 
not necessarily go beyond this conceptual level representation of the system. In order to be able to 
perform evaluation of the model or use it for simulation, the relationships between the components 
should be valuated in some more formal logical or mathematical form. If such a form is not developed, 
the analysis that can be done on the basis of the system model remains more or less intuitive and 
heuristic: there is no transformation that can be done on the model to reveal the systemic “emergent 
properties".  
The typical way of defining the relationships or connections between the components of the system 
model is to acquire a sufficient amount of quantitative data (Sokolowski and Banks, 2009) from sta-
tistics or empirical measurements on the modeled domain, and to derive a mathematical expression 
for the relationship on the basis of this available data. This data-driven approach obviously requires 
that the modeled components and relationships a) are quantifiable, and b) data about them is or can 
be made available for the modeling. The requirements of highly data-driven modeling can lead to omis-
sion of many important and interesting aspects of the system in modeling, or systems for which em-
pirical data is not readily available not being subject to analysis with a systems modeling approach. 
For some systems, empirical data can be an impossibility: especially modeling employed in foresight 
and futures can deal with phenomena that do not yet exist and therefore can have no hard data avail-
able about them.  
In lieu of empirical or statistical data, the system knowledge and understanding of knowledgeable 
people or experts of the modeled domain can be used in the process of formal valuation of the rela-
tionships between the model components. Cross-impact analysis approaches are a family of tech-
niques to model systems based on expert-sourced information. The cross-impact approach goes be-
yond a conceptual-level model of a system, enabling, depending on the technique, some form of model 
evaluation or system simulation, aimed at extracting information about the emergent properties of the 
system. Tapping into expert-sourced data enables systems modeling in a theory-driven way, grounded 
in expert judgment and understanding: Cross-impact methods as modeling and analysis approaches 
fall in between empirical data-driven computational models and argumentative systems analysis, and 
they exhibit a high degree of disciplinary heterogeneity and focus on expert-sourced “soft" system 
knowledge (Weimer-Jehle, 2006). While a number of cross-impact techniques exist, there are barri-
ers for adoption of the cross-impact approach, due to impracticalities in the modeling languages, in-
transparent documentation and lacking software implementations. AXIOM is a novel cross-impact 
approach, which proposes solutions for practical problems in existing cross-impact modeling tech-
niques, with the aim of creating a clearly more feasible approach for systems modeling based on ex-
pert-sourced data. It also aims at providing output of more analytical value from the cross-impact 
modeling effort. AXIOM is transparently documented and implemented as free software, and is a 
ready-to-use tool for theory-driven systems modeling and simulation. 
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2. Cross-impact approaches 
Cross-impact analysis has a long history in systems analysis and various foresight applications (Agami 
et al., 2010; Bañuls and Turoff, 2011; Bañuls et al., 2013; Blackman, 1973; Bloom, 1977; Brauers and 
Weber, 1988; Burns and Marcy, 1979; Choi et al., 2007; Dalkey, 1971; Godet et al., 1991; Godet, 1976; 
Godet et al., 1994; Gordon, 1969, 1994; Gordon and Hayward, 1968b; Ishikawa et al., 1980; Jackson 
and Lawton, 1976; Jeong and Kim, 1997; Kane, 1972; Kaya et al., 1979; Martino and Chen, 1978; Mitroff 
and Turoff, 1976; Nováky and Lóránt, 1978; Pagani, 2009; Thorleuchter et al., 2010; Turoff, 1971;Wei-
mer-Jehle, 2006). The original motivation for the development of the approach was to complement 
the Delphi method by introducing analysis of interaction between elements of a given system (Godet 
et al., 1994; Gordon, 1969, 1994; Gordon and Hayward, 1968b). Recent research has focused mainly 
on application of the approach (Alizadeh et al., 2016; Blanning and Reinig, 1999; Chander et al., 2013; 
Choi et al., 2007; Gorane and Kant, 2013) and there has not been much methodological development. 
In spite of the methodological discussion, barriers exist for utilization of the cross-impact approach in 
modeling and research: many cross-impact techniques are not very transparent in their documenta-
tion and lack software tools and implementations. 
Cross-impact analysis could be described as an analytical technique for studying a system, and par-
ticularly interaction within it. A system is seen to consist of several components, states, events and 
forces that are partially dependent on each other and therefore have influence on each other. The 
objects are modeled as system descriptors. System descriptors are referred to by different terms by 
authors of different cross-impact techniques. Gordon (1994) uses the term event, Godet et al. (1994) 
speak of hypotheses, and Honton et al. (1984) use the term descriptor. The influence the objects of 
the modeled system have on each other are given a model representation as impacts. Impacts can be 
represented as conditional probabilities (Godet et al., 1994; Gordon, 1994), references to probability 
adjusting functions (Honton et al., 1984; Luukkanen, 1994; Panula-Ontto, 2016), impact indices (Go-
det et al., 1994; Kane, 1972; Panula-Ontto and Piirainen, 2017), or simply a boolean indicator of inter-
action of some kind (Godet et al., 1994, 83).  
The aim of cross-impact analysis is to extract information about the indirect and systemic interac-
tions between the system components on the basis of the information on direct interactions. In a sys-
tem with more than a few components, the indirect interactions can effectuate over a complex web of 
mediating components. Accounting for the effect of these interaction webs can reveal surprising and 
counter-intuitive relationships between the system components: seemingly unrelated components 
can be important for each other in a systemic way, and conversely an important direct impact of a 
component on another may be cancelled out or reversed by the systemic effects. 
The inputs for cross-impact analysis include the system descriptors, their direct interactions and 
the valuations of properties for the descriptors and interactions. Typically this input data is provided 
by people with expertise considered relevant for the modeled system or topic. Technically one expert 
who supplies all the input data is enough to perform the analysis. Normally, however, there are several 
experts, and the facilitation of the expert process to supply the input data is of central importance for 
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the cross-impact modeling exercise. The expert inputs can be collected in a Delphi-like expert panel, 
via a questionnaire, or some combination of these. This paper presents a cross-impact modeling lan-
guage and a computational technique for processing the built cross-impact model and extracting in-
formation from it; it does not propose a particular solution for the use of experts in the cross-impact 
modeling. However, the questions of expert selection, model building, facilitating expert group work 
in model valuation and other processual details are very important for the modeling undertaking. For 
discussion of these aspects of cross-impact modeling see e.g. Alizadeh et al. (2016); Blanning and 
Reinig (1999); Enzer (1971); Godet et al. (1991, 1994); Linstone and Turoff (1977); Seker (2015). 
The existing cross-impact techniques vary greatly in terms of their inputs, computational process 
and outputs, but they can be grouped into three categories based on the analytical output they pro-
duce. The categories and the specific techniques in these categories are  
 
1. Structural orientation 
 MICMAC (Godet et al., 1991, 1994) 
 ADVIAN (Linss and Fried, 2010) 
 EXIT (Panula-Ontto and Piirainen, 2017) 
 KSIM (Kane, 1972) 
 
2. Morphological orientation 
 Cross-impact balances approach (Weimer-Jehle, 2006) 
 BASICS (Honton et al., 1984) 
 JL-algorithm (Luukkanen, 1994) 
 
3. Probability orientation 
 Gordon's technique (Gordon and Hayward, 1968a; Gordon, 1994) 
 SMIC (Godet et al., 1991, 1994) 
 AXIOM 
 
The structurally oriented approaches focus on the impact network structure, and derive their ana-
lytical added value from revealing the indirect impacts between system descriptors and relating them 
to the direct impacts in some way. The most used technique in this category appears to be the MIC-
MAC (Godet et al., 1994) approach, which is a computational approach based on matrix multiplica-
tion, and a part of a larger analytical approach Godet calls “structural analysis". A derivative of MIC-
MAC has been also proposed Linss and Fried (2010). The KSIM approach (Kane, 1972) is quite differ-
ent from the other cross-impact approaches listed, but can, with reservation, be placed in the struc-
turally oriented group of approaches. The structurally oriented techniques require fewer inputs than 
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the other approaches, and provide a faster and easier modeling process, but the analytical output is 
more abstract and less actionable. 
The morphological orientation of cross-impact analysis enables identifying logical, probable or con-
sistent states for the system. A system state can be understood to be the combination of particular 
states for the system components. It can also be thought of as a scenario. This utility of cross-impact 
analysis overlaps morphological analysis (see Ritchey, 2006). Some morphologically oriented cross-
impact techniques deal with probabilities explicitly and some do not. Documented approaches in this 
category are the cross-impact balances approach (Weimer-Jehle, 2006), BASICS (Honton et al., 
1984), and JL-algorithm (Luukkanen, 1994). BASICS and JL-algorithm could also be seen as probabil-
ity-oriented techniques, but their implementations output only probabilities for system states, their 
added value being of the morphological type. 
The probability-oriented approaches explicitly deal with probabilities and therefore require that the 
system descriptors or their possible states are assigned initial or a priori probabilities. Additionally, 
they require some expression of how the probabilities of the system descriptors are adjusted during 
the evaluation of the cross-impact model. This can mean defining a conditional probability matrix (Go-
det et al., 1994; Gordon, 1994) or referencing probability adjustment functions (Honton et al., 1984; 
Luukkanen, 1994; Panula-Ontto, 2016). The basic output of the model evaluation is a new set of prob-
abilities for the system descriptors, the a posteriori probabilities, which are the probabilities when the 
emergent, systemic effects have been factored in. The modeling phase of the probability-oriented ap-
proach to cross-impact analysis is more difficult and time-consuming than in the other orientations, 
but this approach offers the greatest analytical possibilities. This approach is the most suited for sim-
ulation-type analysis with a cross-impact model, and can be used for testing effects of changes in or 
interventions to the system. The probability-oriented approaches can be also used for delivering sim-
ilar analytical outputs as the structural approach and the morphological approach. The best-known 
techniques in this group are Gordon's method (Gordon, 1969; Gordon and Hayward, 1968a; Gordon, 
1994) and SMIC (Godet et al., 1991; Godet, 1976; Godet et al., 1994). AXIOM is also in this category. 
3. Advantages of the AXIOM approach 
As stated in Section 2, AXIOM is a probability-oriented cross-impact approach, and the probability-
oriented approaches in general have the greatest analytical possibilities among the different varieties 
of cross-impact methods. What are the advantages of AXIOM in comparison to other probability-
oriented approaches? AXIOM combines the strengths of several documented cross-impact tech-
niques in order to create a general systems modeling tool that is feasible, flexible and makes analyti-
cally powerful. The combination of the best features of various approaches makes AXIOM a recom-
mendable method for use in crossimpact modeling. The advantages of AXIOM, in comparison to other 
probability-oriented cross-impact approaches, are the following: 
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1. Model valuation in AXIOM is relatively easy. For the probability-oriented cross-impact ap-
proaches, valuation refers to the task of assigning initial (a priori) probabilities for the system de-
scriptors and defining conditional probabilities for them or expressing the interactions between the 
descriptors in some other way. The impact valuation phase in AXIOM is decisively easier when com-
pared to cross-impact methods which represent interactions as conditional probabilities (such as Gor-
don's method or SMIC). The cognitive cost of providing a large number of conditional probabilities is 
very high for the expert valuators. The conditional probability valuations are needed for all ordered 
pairs of hypotheses in the model, even when the model valuators would conclude that there is no 
direct interaction between the hypotheses. For example, the conditional probability valuation P(A|B) 
= P(A) might violate the probability axioms, so no "default" conditional probability value exists: all 
interactions have to be valuated. The valuations have to comply with the probability axioms, and as 
the number of hypotheses grows, simply finding a compliant valuation solution might become difficult 
(at least without a help of a computer program specifically designed for this purpose). In this difficult 
valuation process, the qualitative-nature understanding of the experts about the interactions in the 
modeled system might get distorted in the attempt to find an acceptable valuation solution, changing 
the focus from modeling the system in the best way possible on the basis of expert knowledge into a 
sudoku-like number-placement exercise.  
2. AXIOM is suited for cross-impact models with a large number of components. Cross-impact 
techniques which represent the interactions as conditional probabilities are not well suited for con-
structing system models with a large number of components. The cognitively expensive valuation 
phase heavily limits the practical number of components in the model. Godet et al. (1994, 149) actually 
recommend that the number of hypotheses should not exceed 6.  
Modeling systems with such a small number of hypotheses is very limiting. In a system model with 
a handful of components represented by hypotheses, if those hypotheses are detailed and concrete, 
many relevant factors and driving forces are left outside the cross-impact model. Conversely, if the 
hypotheses are loaded with a lot of content so that each hypothesis represents many factors and driv-
ing forces simultaneously, the abstraction level of the hypotheses gets very high. This high abstraction 
level will make the model valuation difficult and ambiguous. The interpretation of results is likely to 
suffer from the high abstraction level and drawing concrete policy recommendations on the basis of 
the model might turn out difficult. Either way, practical and useful cross-impact modeling is very diffi-
cult if the nature of the cross-impact technique per se limits the number of model components.  
As the object of interest in cross-impact modeling is the impact network of the modeled system, 
the limitations on the number of components in cross-impact models also limit the interestingness of 
the analysis. In a system model of few components, the impact chains cannot be very long. If the ability 
to investigate higher-order interactions, long impact chains and complex systemic effects is an im-
portant motivation to do cross-impact analysis, the cross-impact modeling technique should definitely 
support this aspiration. 
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3. AXIOM primitives have comparatively high modeling power. AXIOM statements have multiple 
possible values (called options), unlike Gordon's method or SMIC. It is easy to make the case that the 
multi-valued AXIOM statements are a better solution than separate boolean hypotheses for con-
structing useful and relevant cross-impact models. Boolean hypotheses can, to some degree, be used 
to model mutually exclusive system states akin to AXIOM options, but they are much less convenient 
and error-prone in modeling as they require the exclusiveness to be explicitly defined through condi-
tional probabilities. Additionally, boolean hypotheses cannot model the exhaustiveness of AXIOM op-
tions: there is no mechanism to ensure that the probability distribution of a supposedly exclusive and 
exhaustive set of boolean hypotheses will remain valid during the model evaluation. 
AXIOM also has a statement property called timestep. The timestep property makes it easy to 
model passage of time in the cross-impact model. Incorporating temporal aspect to cross-impact 
modeling is a feature of AXIOM that greatly increases its power to model real systems compared to 
methods that do not offer a mechanism to model time. Providing a way to model time makes it easier 
to construct models from the perspective of modeling interventions: today's decisions can be modeled 
to take their effect on the future states of the system in a very convenient and natural way instead of 
providing means to only model a system with a single temporal space where events happen and sys-
tem states take place without any temporal structure.  
4. AXIOM provides more analytical possibilities. In Gordon's method and Godet's SMIC method, 
especially the process of studying the effect of interventions and policy actions on the modeled system 
is, compared to AXIOM, cumbersome (although this might be more dependent on the implementation 
than the method). Modeling interventions requires changes to the cross-impact model and possibly 
redefinition of the conditional probabilities. The AXIOM method offers tools to design the simulation 
of interventions cleanly in the model building phase, and the focus of the analytical outputs is from the 
start in the effects of the different intervention sets, which makes it easy to extract practical policy 
recommendations. In addition to this, a number of further analytical outputs can be easily extracted 
on the basis of the AXIOM computation.  
 
Above-stated strengths of the AXIOM approach, the freely available implementation, and the trans-
parent documentation of the computation details make AXIOM a strong candidate for a general cross-
impact modeling approach. 
4. AXIOM modeling language, concepts and model evaluation 
Any modeling approach has a modeling language associated with it, meaning a set of modeling prim-
itives or building blocks to describe the characteristics of the real-world system that is being modeled. 
The building blocks for an AXIOM model are statements and their possible values called options, and 
impacts between the options. There are, however, a number of other important concepts that are also 
discussed in this section. Figure 1 presents an entity-relationship model of the important concepts of 
the AXIOM approach. 
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*a) Statement is evaluated to an option in a single configuration 
*b) A configuration in an iteration has a single option for each statement in the model; the a posteriori probability 
of each option is the rate of occurrence of the option in configurations in the iteration. 
*c) An iteration can have options as active interventions 
 
Figure 1: ER model of the AXIOM concepts. 
Statements represent system aspects or components that can have a state. They roughly corre-
spond to what Gordon (1994) calls events, Godet et al. (1991) call hypotheses and Honton et al. (1984) 
call descriptors. AXIOM statements can have two to unlimited possible states (called options) 
whereas events or hypotheses in Gordon's or Godet et al.'s approaches only have a binary state (true 
or false) when evaluated or a state of being undetermined before evaluation. A statement should have 
a) a unique, identifying label b) a description detailing what they represent in the model c) a set of 
options d) a timestep value (explained in timestep definition), and e) a flag for whether the statement 
is to be treated as an intervention (explained in intervention definition). The options under a statement 
should be exclusive and exhaustive. Exclusiveness means that only one option can be evaluated to be 
the state of the statement (instead of more than one option being "true"). Exhaustiveness means that 
the options should cover the possible states of the component or aspect of the real system that cor-
responds to the AXIOM statement. This is rarely possible in practice. Selecting the most relevant pos-
sible states for an AXIOM statement is a part of framing of the model. Models in general can never 
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cover all parts and details of the modeled system. They should focus on covering the pertinent and 
essential parts, aspects and features of the modeled system, in order to be useful (if the model is as 
complex as the reality, its usefulness is questionable). 
Options represent the different possible states a system component modeled as an AXIOM state-
ment can have. Every option in an AXIOM model has a) one statement the fall under, b) identifying 
label, c) a description of what they represent, d) an immutable a priori probability e) a mutable, ad-
justed probability valuation, and f ) a (possibly empty) set of impacts directed to other options in the 
model. The immutable a priori probability is the initial, expert-sourced probability valuation of an op-
tion. The a priori probability is interpreted as the probability of the option to become true, as estimated 
when no other information about the system or its state is available; the a priori probability valuation 
is given in a context where the states of the other statements are unknown. The mutable probability 
valuation might change during model evaluation, as impacts in the model are realized or take place. 
The set of a priori probabilities and the set of mutable probabilities under a statement both form a 
probability distribution, meaning that the sum of values in both sets of probabilities must equal 1 at all 
times. The AXIOM options are flexible and can model the possibilities of the modeled system in vari-
ous ways. It is possible that the different options under a statement embody a very clear and atomic 
value or fact about the system, such as a number or a percentage, or a single boolean fact. It is also 
possible that the options represent a big group of connected details, or a mini-scenario. These different 
uses can be combined in the same model unproblematically. 
Impacts are probability-changing influences between options. Impacts have an owning option and 
a target option. Impacts are realized when their owning option is evaluated to be the state of the state-
ment it falls under; when an option is known to be true, its impacts ensue. Impacts, when realized, 
change the probability of their target option in some way. In AXIOM, the exact amount of probability 
adjustment is determined with probability adjustment functions (defined later). Any option o in an 
AXIOM model can have zero to nm  no impacts, where nm is the number of options in the model and 
no is the number of options under the statement the option o falls under. This is because there can be 
no need to adjust the probability of options that are under the same statement as the owning option 
of the impacts; the owning option of an impact is already evaluated to be the state of its statement 
upon the time of realization of any impact. 
An impact points to a probability adjustment function, that map the mutable, adjusted probability 
of the target option to a new adjusted probability value. The new probability value of the target option 
now reflects the valuation of the target option's probability when new information has become avail-
able (as the owning option is now known to be true). The probability adjustment functions have 
names, which can be indices: a set of names of probability adjustment functions could be {“ 3"," 2"," 
1"," +1"," +2"," +3"}. Probability adjustment function "3" could refer to a significant negative change 
in probability, while "1" could refer to a slight negative change in probability. "+3" could refer to a 
significant positive change in probability. What is a significant positive change in probability means 
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different things in different contexts. A very improbable event or descriptor state might see its proba-
bility going from 0.00001 to 0.00100, making it a hundred times more probable but still having a very 
low probability. On the other hand, a probable event or descriptor state might have a probability of 
0.8; Its probability cannot see a hundredfold increase. A strong positive change in its probability 
means a reduction in its uncertainty, and the adjustment must be no bigger than a part of the remaining 
0.2 probability, that the probable descriptor will not be true. This kind of contextual probability adjust-
ment is achieved by using probability adjustment functions: In AXIOM, the impact an option (when 
true) will have on the probability of some other option is expressed as a reference to (or as a name of) 
a probability adjustment function. This approach avoids the need to define a conditional probability 
matrix. The difficulties of using a conditional probability matrix in expressing the interactions in the 
cross-impact model has been discussed in Section 3. The probability adjustment function approach is 
an easier and more flexible way to express the cross-impact interactions. 
 
 
Figure 2: Examples of AXIOM probability adjustment functions 
 
Probability adjustment functions map probability values into new, adjusted probability values. In 
AXIOM, the named probability adjustment functions are used to contextually change the probabilities 
of options. They can be freely defined by the analyst. The adjustment functions need to have a domain 
and range of [0, 1]. Figure 2 presents the graphs of four probability adjustment functions. 
However, the probability adjustment functions should adjust probabilities in a way that is easy to 
understand and coherent from the perspective of the model valuators. For this reason, there are rec-
ommended properties the functions should have, in order for them to provide a clear and understand-
able way for the expert valuators to express interactions within the AXIOM model. 
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 They should be symmetric about the line y = x + 1 
 Should have the property y(x0) < y(x1) when x0 < x1 
 Should have the property y(x) > x if the name of the function implies positive (probability-in-
creasing) impact, and the property y(x) < x if the name of the function implies negative (prob-
ability-decreasing) impact. 
 
The probability adjustment functions in Figure 2 have this property. These recommendations can 
be disregarded by the modeler(s) if some functions not conforming to these requirements is seen as 
useful in the model valuation.  
When the adjusted probability of an option of an AXIOM statement is changed according to the 
used probability-adjusting function, the probabilities of the other options under the impacted state-
ment must be adjusted too. We can call the probability adjustment of the option that is the target of 
the impact primary probability adjustment and the probability adjustment of all the other options un-
der the impacted statement secondary probability adjustment. The secondary probability adjustment 
is necessary because the probabilities of the options of a statement form a probability distribution and 
the sum of the probabilities of the options must always be equal to 1. 
The primary and secondary probability adjustment are performed so that the probability of the im-
pacted option is changed according to the probability adjustment function pointed by the impact, (pri-
mary adjustment) and the probabilities of the other options change so that their summed probability 
is equal to the complement of the new adjusted probability of the impacted option and the probability 
share each of these other options gets out of that summed probability is equal to their share of their 
summed probability before the probability adjustment (secondary adjustment). When the other op-
tions under the same statement as the impacted option is have their probabilities adjusted in this way, 
the total sum of the probabilities of all the statement's options remains equal to 1. 
Timestep is a property of an AXIOM statement. It defines the temporal position of a statement in 
relation to other statements in the model. In model evaluation, the statements with the lowest 
timestep are evaluated before statements with a higher timestep value. Statements that have the same 
timestep value are evaluated in random order. In other words, in AXIOM model evaluation, statements 
are evaluated in groups of statements that share a timestep value. This makes it possible to simulate 
a system with temporal depth: events or descriptor states to take place in the near future can influence 
the descriptors that lie further in the future. A policy implemented in the next four years might have 
an impact of a particular economic scenario being true in the next four year period. Timesteps can be 
years, but they can also simply be ordinal numbers of the time categories (however they are defined 
in the actual model building), only their ordering as numbers is significant from the point of view of 
model evaluation. 
Statement evaluation means assigning a state for an AXIOM statement, or setting one of the state-
ment's options as its value. This is done probabilistically, with each option of the statement having a 
probability equal to its current adjusted (mutable) probability of being selected as the state of the 
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statement. When a statement is evaluated to a state (one of its options) all the impacts of the state 
option ensue or "take place". 
The probabilities of the target options of the ensuing impacts are adjusted according to the proba-
bility adjustment functions associated with the ensuing impacts. After this, the statement is evaluated 
and has a known state.  
Model evaluation means evaluating all of its statements. As explained in the timestep definition, the 
statements are evaluated in time categories, from lowest (earliest) to highest (latest), and statements 
in the same time category are evaluated in random order. During the model evaluation process, as 
more information about the state of the system becomes available, the probabilities of options in yet 
unevaluated statements are adjusted to reflect the effect of the newly available information. After 
evaluation of every statement, the model now has a state, as it now has a value for each of its state-
ments. This combination of values is called a configuration: Model evaluation produces a configura-
tion. For full details on the model evaluation, AXIOM algorithms pseudocode and a full example of an 
AXIOM model evaluation are presented in Panula-Ontto (2016). 
Configuration is the result of the model evaluation. The information content of a configuration is a 
set of options, one option for each statement in the model. The options in the configuration are the 
options evaluated to be the states of each of the statements in a single model evaluation. A configu-
ration can be understood as a scenario for the modeled system. As the model is evaluated multiple 
times, the resulting sets of configurations or iterations are used to derive a posteriori probabilities for 
the model options and other higher-order information. This is discussed in Section 5. 
Intervention statements are treated in a special way in the model evaluation. Any statement can be 
flagged as an intervention statement in AXIOM model construction. They are not evaluated in the 
normal probabilistic way as non-intervention statements. In a single model evaluation, an intervention 
statement will have a predefined state; their state is determined when the model evaluation com-
mences. Other details of the model evaluation are the same: the impacts of the predetermined options 
of the intervention statements take place when the intervention statement is taken up for evaluation. 
The states of the intervention statements change only between different iterations. 
The function of intervention statements is that they can model policy actions, strategic options 
available to actors in the system or some other intervention-type aspect of the system. They provide 
an easy way to study the impacts and systemic effects of the different options available for the real-
world component or aspect that the intervention statement represents. 
Iteration is a list of configurations. A single model evaluation produces a configuration and several 
consecutive model evaluations produce an iteration. The utility of iterations is to be able to calculate 
the frequencies of different model options from a set of configurations with identical characteristics. 
Identical characteristics means same interventions, same model valuations and same model compo-
nents. The frequence of occurrence of each option in an iteration is the a posteriori probability of that 
option.  
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The number of configurations in an iteration is not defined in the AXIOM method. The more model 
evaluations (and resulting configurations) the less the randomness of the Monte Carlo process effects 
the option frequencies. This is why a high number of configurations is recommended. For iterations 
that will be used for extracting final results to be analysed, at least 106 configurations are recom-
mended. This recommendation is for calculating the a posteriori probabilities of individual options. If 
the idea is to compute a probability for a morphology or "partial scenario", i.e. the frequency of con-
figurations that contain a specific set of options, the number of configurations should be even higher. 
Iteration set is simply a set of iterations. The utility of an iteration set is to enable comparisons 
between the outputs of different model setups. The different model setups most commonly mean a 
different intervention combination (see intervention statements) but can also mean different a priori 
probability and impact valuations and inclusion and exclusion of different statements and options. 
When the model has flagged intervention statements, the AXIOM software implementation will au-
tomatically create an iteration set containing an iteration for each intervention combination derivable 
from the flagged intervention statements. This facility makes it straightforward to investigate how al-
ternative policy actions modeled by the options of intervention statements affect the a posteriori prob-
abilities of other model options.  
The definitions of the concepts of the AXIOM approach outline the AXIOM modelling language and 
the computation process of AXIOM. The full description of the process is detailed in Panula-Ontto 
(2016), with pseudocode for the algorithms and a step-by-step computation example provided. 
5. Output and analysis 
 
 C D 
Figure 3: A conceptual system model. 
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Figure 3 presents a conceptual model of an economic system and a strategic decision-making prob-
lem framework. The (hypothetical) real system is modeled using AXIOM primitives: Statements, rep-
resenting social policy, economic policy, economic growth, economic structure, and labour market 
aspects in the system; Options, describing possible states for the modeled system aspects, or sub-
scenarios for the system aspects; and impacts, representing the influences that different subscenarios 
(AXIOM options), if realized, have on the likelihood of other subscenarios being realized. In the con-
ceptual system model of Figure 3, economic policy subscenario A influences the probability of labour 
market subscenarios B and C, while economic policy subscenario B influences the probability of labour 
market subscenario A. The model valuations (a priori probabilities and impact valuations) are not pre-
sented in the conceptual model. For purposes of the example, let's assume an expert group has per-
formed the model valuation and the model can be evaluated with the AXIOM computation process. 
Statements "Social policy" and "Economic policy" represent policy interventions to the system. Both 
statements have two options. Assuming these two statements are aged as intervention statements, 
there are four possible combinations of interventions to investigate. Table 1 presents an example of 
the basic output of AXIOM. The table presents the a posteriori probabilities for the different model 
options of the conceptual system model presented in Figure 3. The second column displays the a priori 
probabilities. The third column presents the a posteriori probabilities in a case where no statement is 
treated as an intervention statement. These probabilities have the systemic interactions and higher-
order impacts factored into them. 
 
Table 1: AXIOM iteration set consisting of five iterations, one without active interventions and four 
iterations with different intervention combinations. 
 
 
Columns 47 in Table 1 present the a posteriori probabilities of the model options under different 
intervention combinations. Column 4 presents the a posteriori probabilities assuming a combination 
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of social policy A and economic policy A; column 6 the a posteriori probabilities under a combination 
of social policy B and economic policy A. If the subscenario A for economic growth would be desirable, 
its probability would be maximized under a policy combination of social policy B and economic policy 
B (column 7). Similarly, if labour market subscenario B would be particularly undesirable, its probabil-
ity would be minimized under social policy B combined with economic policy A (column 6).  
A posteriori probabilities for individual options under different assumptions and policy combina-
tions are easy to read from this output. The analyst may however be interested in more complex ques-
tions, such as what kind of policy mix would maximize (or minimize) the likelihood of a particular 
system morphology. Such morphologies in the case of the example model could be "Economic growth 
A" and "Labour market B" (GA  LB) or "Economic growth B" and not "Labour market C" (GB   LC), 
or perhaps something more complicated such as (GB  GC)  (SA  (SB  LC)). The AXIOM iteration 
object is suited for calculating probabilities of such morphologies and performing various frequent 
itemset mining operations that might be of use for the analyst.  
 
Table 2: Using AXIOM iteration object to compute probabilities of system states as frequencies of 
morphologies. 
 
 
Table 2 displays an iteration of 20 configurations, frequencies of different individual options within 
these 20 configurations, and frequencies of three example morphologies. 20 configurations is obvi-
ously insufficient to derive the a posteriori probabilities from the occurrence frequencies, but the prin-
ciple is the same in an iteration of any number of configurations.  
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6. Software implementation  
AXIOM is implemented as a Java program, and it can be downloaded from 
https://github.com/jmpaon/AXIOM.  The GitHub page provides basic instructions for use and links 
to more resources on AXIOM. 
7. Discussion 
The AXIOM approach proposes a new modeling language and a computational process to extract 
information of higher added value from a system model built with that language. The rationale for a 
new probability-oriented or simulation-oriented cross-impact approach is illustrated in Section 3 by 
pointing out practical difficulties of modeling systems with the primitives available in Gordon's cross-
impact approach and SMIC and proposing improvements, that have been incorporated into AXIOM 
approach. Section 4 discussed the AXIOM modeling language primitives, the computational process 
and how the evaluated AXIOM model can be used for analysis of the modeled system. 
As a general systems modeling approach, the best fitness of AXIOM lies in high-level systems mod-
eling where expert understanding of the system could be seen as the best source of information. For 
some modeling domains, the approach of using expert-sourced data is obviously not the best ap-
proach. For instance, technical systems with well-known limits and clearly measurable relationships 
and characteristics, the AXIOM modeling language, while a possible approach, is not a natural fit. Ap-
proaches like AXIOM can, however, offer tools to model systems from a very different perspective 
and attempt to incorporate aspects of the system that would be difficult or impossible to model using 
a more traditional datadriven approach. Combining theory-driven modeling and data-driven modeling 
in the same modeling framework provides interesting possibilities and warrants further experimenta-
tion, study and methodological development. 
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Abstract  
Despite the role that concept of consistency plays in qualitative scenario construction methods like 
Cross-impact balanced analysis (CIB), inconsistency investigation could be still important when it 
comes to discovering complex dynamics or biased expert opinions. However, for CIB method there is 
no way to investigate scenarios independent of their consistency qualities. This paper aims to propose 
an alternative technique to fill this gap. It utilizes inconsistency correction algorithms existing in CIB 
method to form a scenario network that can be analysed further to explore inconsistent scenarios. 
Introduction and Background 
Concept of “consistency” has been used widely as one of the central pillars of scenario planning pro-
cess when it comes to define quality criteria for a good scenario construction practice. Consistency 
has mainly been defined along with the notions like plausibility that denotes “something makes sense 
and is coherent in itself” (Kosow 2015), and understood “as a safeguard against arbitrariness of sce-
narios. It is a substitute for empirical validation, which is not possible and not appropriate with respect 
to scenarios because their object is not accessible in the present and because they do not claim to be 
or to become true” (Kosow 2015). 
More practically, consistency/plausibility stands at the heart of intuitive scenario construction 
techniques (Derbyshire & Wright 2016), and tries to keep the generated scenario narratives within 
the boundaries of being believable and reasonable. Thus, the outcome would be few plausibly formed 
scenario narratives. On the contrary, there exist so called “exploratory” scenario techniques that tend 
to explore the whole possibility space of the future, thus generate numerous possible scenarios (Davis, 
Bankes, & Egner 2007). In this family of methods exist both quantitative modeling approaches which 
suppose that mathematical heart of the models ensures the consistency, also qualitative-systematic 
methods (like cross-impact balanced analysis) that construct qualitative scenarios for the whole set 
of possibility space. Here, consistency check is crucial to divide scenarios based on their degree of 
plausibility.  
Thus, it could be said that the concept of consistency still play a significant role in both type of 
scenario approaches, but its role differs from mainstream intuitive scenario narrative generation exer-
cises to more formal-explorative methods. For the latter, what matters more is a kind of summarizing 
the possibility space into few number of scenarios due to practical reasons. Consistency together with 
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criteria like diversity, policy relevance or embedding surprises (Trutnevyte, Guivarch, Lempert, & Stra-
chan 2016), are among tools that enables the researcher to extract subsets of scenarios for further 
analysis.  
However, the concept of consistency has its rivals within the academic community too. Consistency 
testing has been criticized for assuming that the future would remain consistently within the bounda-
ries of historical trends, thus ignore the possibility of surprising, and currently inconsistent situations 
(Postma & Liebl 2005). Accordingly, this group of literature call for recognizing the importance of 
inconsistency in the scenario construction process, as a chance to “examine complex interaction of 
existing dynamics, or unfolding of potential new dynamics” (Mahony 2014), and explore the possibility 
of co-occurrence of trends and counter trends, as characteristics of complexity of future (Mahony 
2014). From this point of view, “presenting extreme or seemingly implausible future conditions inten-
tionally, with an explanation of how they could in fact arise, can contribute to several of the major 
purposes of scenarios, e.g., shaking up habitual thinking and broadening expectations of what future 
developments are plausible” (Parson et al. 2007).  
Besides what have been discussed above, the scenario methods that use the expert opinions as their 
basis, the inconsistency would mean more than potential complexity, but rather result of dissidence 
of opinions, biased views or wrong judgements. Meaning that consistency is primarily is a measure to 
show how well the scenario corresponds to the metal models of its generators (Weimer-Jehle 2006) 
and tells less about the trustworthiness of these mental models. It is especially the case when scenar-
ios are resulted from a workshop with different participants, and the chance to reach a consensus and 
mutual understanding is less. Inconsistencies in this case are not a sign of implausibility per se, thus 
there seems to be a need for a further look into inconsistent scenarios and recycling them instead of 
discarding them altogether. 
The purpose of this paper links directly to the discussion above. Cross-impact balanced (CIB) (Wei-
mer-Jehle 2006) analysis is a qualitative method that generates large number of scenarios for all pos-
sibility space based on expert judgements on mutual impacts of the system drivers. Until now, in clas-
sical CIB studies only scenarios with highest degree of consistency have been taken into account 
(mainly very less than 1% of total generated scenarios). The scenario selection in this method is simply 
done through ranking scenarios based on their degree of consistency, and choose from the top of the 
list accordingly. Excluding some exceptions, studying inconsistent scenarios has not been part of CIB 
studies until now, and there is no method of scenario selection which is independent of consistency 
ranking to identify what inconsistent scenarios (among many) could also be selected for further in-
quiries.  
So, the aim of this paper is to take a step towards introducing a technique that can distinguish be-
tween CIB generated scenarios based on a measure other than internal consistency, so that a chance 
for both looking at inconsistent scenarios as spaces for possible surprises, and possibility of twisted 
combinations of mental models of the expert is provided. As the goal of the paper is more to present 
the technique, only demonstrator examples are presented, and not a complete case study. 
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The paper will proceed as follows. Right after introduction a short and condensed description of CIB 
method is presented, because understanding the method and its terminology is necessary to grasp the 
technique this paper proposes. Later, the suggested technique is explained and accompanied by some 
example of its potential performance. And, finally a discussion of the usefulness of the method would 
be explained before the concluding remarks.  
Cross‐impact balanced analysis 
Cross-Impact Balanced analysis (hereafter CIB) is a member of cross-impact analysis method family. 
The cross-impact analysis method was first introduced in the field of technology foresight to analyze 
the interdependence between important factors in the process of technology development, which links 
such process into the relevant underlying political, social and technological arenas (Gordon & Hay-
ward 1968).  
The very basic idea behind Cross Impact analysis method is to decide upon the mutual impact be-
tween the main factors concerning stability or change of a specific phenomenon. It is usually done 
through expert judgements which are gathered in a “cross-impact matrix”. However, different mem-
bers of this method family differ in the use of judgements and analysis algorithms (Gerhard Fuchs et 
al. 2008). In this sense, CIB is specifically designed to analyze qualitatively, and semi-quantitatively 
(Schweizer & Kriegler 2012) defined interaction networks. 
These interdependencies can schematically be shown as a network of nodes and arrows (Gerhard 
Fuchs et al. 2008). While arrows showing direct linkages, nodes representing descriptors in CIB 
method. Descriptors are “the most important factors which have a significant direct or indirect influ-
ence on the object of the examination” (Weimer-Jehle 2006). Each descriptor has specific develop-
ment variants, meaning that different possible development path of these descriptors, leading to dif-
ferent states in the target year of the analysis have to be taken into account. These can be ordinal (e.g., 
low, medium, and high currency exchange rate) or non-ordinal (e.g., government run by party A, party 
B, or party C) (Gerhard Fuchs et al. 2008). Descriptors and their variants are usually chosen based on 
expert judgement or literature research (Weimer-Jehle 2006). 
While identifying system descriptors and their variants, next step is to form cross-impact matrix. It 
contains decision over mutual influences of descriptors which are gathered through expert judge-
ments or literature (Weimer-Jehle 2006). To this end, experts are asked to answer this question for 
each pair of descriptors: “if the only piece of information about the system is that Descriptor X has the 
state x, will you evaluate this due to the direct influence of X on Y as a hint that Descriptor Y has the 
state y (promoting influence, positive points assessed) or as a hint that Descriptor Y has not the state 
y (restricting influence, negative points assessed)?” (Weimer-Jehle 2006) Usually a continuum of 
integers is used to capture expert judgements (+3 for highly promoting, -3 for highly restricting), how-
ever CIB algorithm does not exhibit this limitation (Weimer-Jehle 2006).  
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Following this step, CIB generates so called ”consistent scenarios”. Meaning that if we have sum of 
n for descriptor variations, 2n configuration of these variations exist (scenarios). What CIB algorithm 
does is to check if for any given scenario all the consisting factors are internally consistent with each 
other (not contradicting) or not. To this end, as the descriptors are normally influenced by several 
others in a given scenario, all influences have to be combined. This is done simply by summing up the 
numbers in the matrix columns (see figure 1), this follows the principle of compensation and the result 
is called impact balances (Weimer-Jehle 2006). Then, because there is a double role for each de-
scriptor: as source of influence and as target of influence being posed by other descriptors, there 
should be a match between these two. “Scenarios that do not contain contradictions between both 
perspectives are then accepted as valid” (Weimer-Jehle 2006) for the purpose of consistency check. 
Accordingly, the algorithm, compares the descriptor states of any randomly chosen scenario, with 
those descriptor states having the highest impact balances. When there is a mismatch, it means that 
“the combined influences of the given scenario promote another scenario different from itself and is 
therefore not self-consistent” (Schweizer & Kriegler 2012). Inconsistency scores are calculated from 
this difference. “It is defined as the maximum difference between the impact balance score for the 
target scenario state and the given scenario state that can be found across all descriptors” (Schweizer 
& Kriegler 2012). Consistent scenarios have the inconsistency score of 0. 
 
 
Figure 1.cross-impact matrix. (Schweizer & Kriegler 2012) 
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An example is shown in figure 1. The chosen scenario in the picture (highlighted rows) is incon-
sistent, because for the descriptor “energy structure” (Mix abbreviation) the chosen variant “carbon 
intensive” (HC in the picture) is not receiving the highest impact comparing to its alternative state 
“balanced structure” (B in the picture).  
Material and Methods 
As explained in introduction, the aim of the paper is to introduce a technique in order to investigate 
the inconsistent CIB scenarios regardless of their consistency degree. Meaning that an alternative 
ranking of the scenarios is needed to decide upon the importance of scenarios. For this purpose, “suc-
cession analysis” -a side tool of CIB analysis- is suggested as a basis for the purpose of this paper.  
Succession analysis and scenario network 
There are two ways for identifying consistent scenarios in CIB. Either by enumeration of inconsistent 
scenarios, or by correcting the inconsistencies under certain algorithm, in order to generate consistent 
scenarios. The latter approach that needs more computational effort, is called succession analysis 
(Weimer-Jehle 2006). Taking the example of figure 1, succession is done through correcting the only 
inconsistency of the chosen scenario, meaning that one should change the descriptor state “C inten-
sive energy structure” to the more supported state “Balanced structure” (Mix: HC to Mix:B in the ma-
trix). The result of this correction is a new scenario which is called “successor”. The successor could 
be a consistent or inconsistent scenario. In case that successor is inconsistent, the succession process 
could continue to either reach a consistent scenario or end up in a cycle of inconsistent scenarios 
(Weimer-Jehle 2006). 
 In classical CIB, succession analysis plays only a side role to provide more information about some 
specifically selected scenarios. But the idea in this paper is to perform a succession analysis for all 
possible CIB scenarios. The result could be presented in a network format, where each scenario is 
connected to its successor. For each CIB analysis, there could be a scenario network around each con-
sistent scenario. The shape of the network depends on the cross-impact matrix structure and the suc-
cession algorithm (meaning what inconsistencies, and to what degree should be corrected in each 
step). Figure 2 shows a sample scenario network, to give an idea that how the distribution of scenarios 
around the fully consistent center could look like (graph is extracted from the matrix in Figure 1). 
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Figure 2. Succession network. The central node (bigger green) is a consistent scenario. Rest are in-
consistent. Red nodes are scenarios containing ”very low carbon intensive structures” assumption. 
By having such network, the nodes (scenarios) have a new quality other than those they possess 
after the CIB analysis (like consistency value, number of inconsistencies, etc.) which is related to their 
network position. For example, the importance of each scenario could be assessed by considering the 
number of direct network connections (graph edges) it receives (identifying network hotspots), or in 
more advanced stage, by considering its connection and distance from the other network hotspots 
(e.g. eigenvector centrality in network analysis terms). This new assigned quality to the scenarios en-
ables us to distinguish between scenarios by another criterion which is to some extent independent of 
consistency ranking of the scenarios. The weights assigned to the scenarios in the network is more a 
function of their position that is directly related to the structure of cross-impact matrix and succession 
algorithm.  
As stated before the edges of the graph show a succession step, thus denotes a correction in the 
assumptions used to create the scenarios. Accordingly, the scenario network provides the researcher 
with two main types of information: network hotspots, and the most important corrections in the net-
work (the edges that connects the network hotspots are representing the more important assumption 
corrections). In short, forming the network of successions, and using network characteristics is the 
alternative way of ranking scenarios.  
In the next section few insights from an example would be presented. The cross-impact matrix for 
this example is presented in figure 1 and was adopted from (Schweizer & Kriegler 2012). The succes-
sion analysis for all scenarios of that matrix was performed.  
Results 
The demonstrator CIB study stated above was done based on IPCC scenarios in order to assess the 
consistency of its scenario narratives. There were 10 fully consistent scenarios resulted from this 
study. This section will try to show how employing the above presented technique could bring new 
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insights, besides the classical information resulting from CIB method (e.g. consistent scenarios, incon-
sistency degree of scenarios, etc.), especially regarding the inconsistent scenarios, which are 1718 sce-
narios out of the total 1728. For this purpose, a succession network for each of the 10 consistent sce-
narios was created and analyzed, however due to the nature of this paper, only some insights were 
selected for presenting the potentials of the technique. 
A simple impression of the network could be extracted by looking into the network hotspots (the 
most referred successor scenarios). Table 1 shows 10 main hotspots and their respective CIB charac-
teristics:  
 
Table 1. Network Hotspots. 
Rank Scenario ID 
Number of  
succesions leads 
to this scenario 
Consistency value 
Number of  
inconsistent  
assumptions 
1 444 61 -6 3 
2 16 44 -6 4 
3 453 44 -6 1 
4 447 37 -6 1 
5 193 34 0 0 
6 15 31 -6 4 
7 1308 26 -4 2 
8 192 25 0 0 
9 157 21 -9 2 
10 337 21 -2 1 
 
As the table 1 shows, it is clear that there is an independence between the consistency as the main 
criterion of CIB and the network position of successor scenarios. 8 out of 10 fully consistent scenarios 
(highlighted in the table) are not among the most referred succession network destinations, and the 
rank 1 is a kind of implausible scenario (-6 consistency score) which is normally is not taken into ac-
count in normal CIB analysis. Also, there seems to be no relation between other CIB qualities like num-
ber of inconsistent assumptions or total inconsistency score with network qualities. The position of a 
scenario in a succession network more than anything could be understood as a result of the cross-
impacts network, and the algorithm used to correct the inconsistencies. This means that, the im-
portance of a network position is an indicator that shows that how easily an inconsistent scenario 
could be corrected under certain algorithm. Thus, the more a scenario is on the periphery of the net-
work (there are lesser number of scenario that are resulted to them after correction), the harder to 
correct it, and this is regardless of its inconsistency degree. The farthest nodes could contain only with 
1 slightly inconsistent assumption (-1 inconsistency) but the correction of this assumption might need 
several steps, while on the contrary a highly inconsistent, but closer to center scenario could be cor-
rected in one go. In this sense, the network hotspots are worthy of a closer look, because they are 
results of more number of corrected assumptions, thus are specific cross-impact structures. This 
could provide a chance of re-assessing the scenario located at hotspots either simply regarding the 
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credibility of their impact judgements which were gathered before and reconsider them, or to go one 
step further and look at the paths under which a consistent scenario is resulted, and to pursue correc-
tion types and their frequency.  
For instance the figure 3 shows the hotspots around scenario 453 (rank 3 in the table 1)1. The cor-
rected assumptions for each step is also presented by abbreviations (figure 1 can help to understand) 
until we reach the consistent scenario no.1317. As the figure shows, high inconsistency of scenario 453 
is rooted in an inconsistent assumption that does not fit plausibly with others. First thought would be 
to look whether the related scenario assumptions are well argued, whether there existed different ne-
glected judgements for related cross-impacts (for example different opinions during the expert work-
shop) or even there might exist opposing theories or evidences in the scientific community for that 
particular impact judgement. For the example above, the inconsistency of scenario 453 is due to the 
assumption that carbon intensive structures are an obstacle against global environmental agreements, 
thus a global policy in this sense makes the scenario inconsistent (supplementary data for (Schweizer 
& Kriegler 2012)). However, one might argue against this, and points examples such as Paris agree-
ment, that has been to some extent successful to include carbon intensive energy structures too, to 
meet the goals of the agreement.  
 
 
Figure 3.Succession network for main hotspots and related assumption corrections 
This way by identifying some relatively more important assumptions, the possibility of a sort of 
sampling for an in depth reconsideration of cross-impact matrix could be provided. Judgements re-
garding these assumptions could be examined against broader body of evidence or literature.  
Discussions  
The succession network technique is a step towards investigation of inconsistent scenarios in CIB 
studies. It provides an opportunity to select handful of inconsistent scenarios out of many for further 
analysis, in order to discover potential misjudgments regarding the impact network or possibility of 
                                                            
 
1 Out of the scenarios presented in the table 1, rank 1 and 2 fall  in a circle of uncorrectable assumptions, thus 
were not considered. 
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surprising constellations of trends. It serves the primary purpose of this paper which was to pick sce-
narios from a quality different from consistency ranking. However, it can be argued that a succession 
network has more to say, if it is used in a way to reflect on present knowledge rather than discovering 
the future. To make this point, a typology of future knowledge orientation developed by (Grunwald 
2014) could be employed. 
 
Table 2.Major properties of the three modes of orientation (Grunwald 2014) 
 
 
Mode 1 Mode 2 Mode 3 
Approach to the 
future Predictive: one future 
Look for a corridor of 
sensible futures Open space of futures 
spectrum of  
futures Convergence as ideal Bounded diversity Unbounded divergence 
Preferred  
methodology 
Quantitative,  
model-based 
Quantitative or qualita-
tive; participatory Narrative 
Knowledge used Causal and statistical knowledge, laws 
Models, knowledge of 
stakeholders 
Associative knowledge, 
arguments 
Role of normative 
issues Low Depends on case High 
Orientation  
provided 
Decision-support,  
optimization 
Robust action  
strategies 
Self-reflection and con-
temporary diagnostics 
 
Grunwald presents three modes of orientation provided by future knowledge, which is summarized 
in table 2. Mode 1 is the one common in most of the modeling practices. There a single future is as-
sumed which is being predicted through quantitative models that have a causal structure in their back-
ground. In mode 2 we have a limited diversity of futures or scenarios which are produced either by 
quantitative or qualitative methods. Here plausibility or sensibility is a measure to limit the whole pos-
sibility space in order to give robustness to our strategies. And finally mode 3 which is an open space 
of different futures in the format of narratives. In this mode a kind of relativism exist which gives no 
superiority to any future narrative. Instead Grunwald argues that mode 3 is a suitable place for self-
reflection and a democratic dialogue about the assumptions we use to shape our future. This diversity 
lets us to become aware of our contemporary world and values (Grunwald 2014).  
In this classification, CIB method in its classical approach is an example of mode 2 that goes from a 
relatively open space to a bounded convergence using the notion of consistency, which extracts hand-
ful of sensible futures through employing existing expert/stakeholder knowledge. In fact the succes-
sion network is a technique that can reverse the transition from mode 3 to mode 2 that takes place in 
a conventional CIB practice. It makes possible for the researcher to make use of large body of incon-
sistent futures constructed as a knowledge repository to provide what Grunwald calls a hermeneutic 
basis of the present (Grunwald 2014) to be used for better decision making. It means that we use the 
diversity that CIB generates in a way that brings us more clarity about ourselves and the discursive 
nature of our knowledge structures. In other words as Grunwald states: “if projections of future are 
interpreted in a way that makes clear why we aggregate certain current ingredients to specific futures 
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and argue dedicatedly about them, then we have learned something explicitly about ourselves which 
to date has only been an implicit part of societal reality” (Grunwald 2014).  
This approach specifically matters for CIB, because the basic ingredients of the process-judge-
ments- are highly discursive/value oriented components, thus the resulted consistent picture might 
be highly distorted consequently. Put it differently, the concept of consistency in CIB method could be 
understood as discursively constructed through agents and materials (experts and literature) pre-
sented within the process, thus a deconstruction could reveal something more about the nature of 
such shaping forces. This is where a succession network could play a role. It lets the researcher to turn 
the consistency from a final product of the method, to more procedural, being formed in stepwise 
correction process. And these processes are the hermeneutic materials for the self-reflection of the 
researcher. 
As an example let’s return to the case of IPCC scenario mentioned before. For the descriptor ”energy 
structure” 4 variants has been designated. Primarily the study leaves the chance for the future energy 
systems to be “very low carbon intensive structures”, however, when it comes to final products of CIB 
study, there is not such descriptor state among any of the 10 consistent scenarios (nor low carbon 
intensive structures). The question that can be posed here is, ”how such consistent mental models 
(scenarios) are formed that do not contain this specific descriptor state?” The fact that a specific trend 
(here very low carbon intensive structures as an example) does not fit in the plausible pictures of 
future we make, could have different implications. ”Is this element fundamentally non-retractable to 
the other elements of this mental model?” Or under certain, minimum adjustments of other elements 
is a plausible picture still assumable? These are the questions that could be answered through the 
succession network. Considering the case above, the respective succession network shows that sce-
narios containing the “very low carbon intensive structures” are totally at the periphery of the network 
(red nodes in figure 2). Meaning that there is no other scenario to be resulted towards them after the 
correction (no graph edge enters these nodes), or in other words, these scenarios are among the hard-
est correctable in the network. Regarding the second assumption (low carbon intensive structures), 
there are some scenarios at the absolute periphery, and the rest are at the second correctable position. 
Connecting to what is discussed above, this example could show how the mental model behind this 
example did not consider any chance for plausible futures with very low carbon intensive energy struc-
tures, thus exclude them in the first place and look for the sensible pictures among others. This can 
have many reasons behind. This might be due to a disproportioned study design that did not consider 
relevant aspects for such futures to be presented plausibly, or might be due to kind of discursive, thus 
channelized mindset that cannot imagine future pictures outside of a certain range of carbon intensity. 
In any case, the succession network provides the opportunity to observe this process of correction and 
exclusion transparently to be able to derive conclusions regarding the relevant importance of different 
assumptions when it comes to construction of consistent pictures of the future. This results could be 
inspiring for the study conductors. For example, in order to pose new question to the scenario group 
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that stimulates their creativity in a different, less considered direction, or to add new voices with dif-
ferent point of views to the group, or to change the study design and add new elements and de-
scriptors. This is the merit of scenario succession to provide a kind of mind map which already exist 
behind the CIB study transparently, that could be improved of better understood and justified. 
Conclusion 
CIB method is highly bound to the concept of consistency to ensure its final products are plausible. 
However, for the scenario methods generally and CIB specifically, the concept of consistency should 
be treated cautiously, because inconsistencies could be due to uncovered complexities or wrong and 
biased views. Succession analysis as a side tool of CIB method could help to generate succession net-
works to give CIB scenarios a new quality: their network position. This new quality helps us to investi-
gate the inconsistent CIB scenarios to find out what are the more important (under this new quality). 
Important inconsistent scenarios could be re-assessed separately regarding their inconsistency 
sources, or in a network to know under which process the consistent scenarios are being made. The 
succession network acts as a tool for the researcher to explore more the existing knowledge, dis-
courses and values shaping them. The result is a better awareness of the assumption set we develop 
to discover the future.  
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Abstract  
Managers utilizing scenario planning for strategy development may be surprised to learn that scholars 
in futures studies, an area responsible for research on foresight techniques, generally do not know why 
scenarios work. For more than a decade, scholars have prefaced their scientific communications by 
conspicuously bemoaning the lack of theory to support scenario methodology. This presents manag-
ers, scholars, and scenario planning facilitators with a paradox. Concern over insufficient theory and 
methodological chaos within the scenario planning literature is well known, but not so well known that 
the claim no longer requires frequent rendition (which the authors demonstrate); moreover, this gap 
in the literature has yet to be bridged despite repeated calls dating back to the 1970s. They conclude 
that although this concern is not unreasonable, it also serves a number of secondary, collateral func-
tions. Ultimately, rehearsing the claim that there is insufficient theory to support scenario methodol-
ogy acts as a readymade justification for adopting theory from outside of future studies and for devel-
oping one methodological typology after another; counter intuitively, both moves appear to deprive 
scenario planning of precisely the foundational theory and shared methodological toolkit scholars 
claim it desperately needs. 
Introduction and Background 
Managers utilizing scenarios to inform their decisions and facilitate strategic action may be surprised 
to learn that scholars in futures studies generally do not know why scenarios work. If a scholar were 
to examine the conduct of scientific inquiry within futures studies, then one of the most readily appar-
ent patterns in the field would be revealed by observing that – for at least a decade now – scholars in 
futures studies have initiated their scientific communications (i.e., articles and books) by voicing con-
cern over the paucity of theory needed to support scenario methodology. Oddly, it appears that there 
is no greater point of consensus in futures studies than the reality that there is no scholarly consensus 
with regard to the application of theory to support scenario methodology. 
In this context, what strikes the authors is the consistently unresolved character of this now formu-
laic element of scientific account making in futures studies. After all, this gap in the literature has yet 
to be bridged despite repeated calls dating back to the 1970s. That said, rather than accept these 
claims as statements of fact or reject them as illegitimate or unrealistic portrayals of the field, the 
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authors remain neutral – at least provisionally – with regard to the veracity of these now commonplace 
accounts in futures studies. Thus, they inquire about the consequences of leaving this concern unre-
solved for so long, and, in so doing, foreground a number of covert or collateral functions that these 
claims appear to serve. Thus, the chief aim of this paper is to examine and understand – rather accept 
and repeat or reject and deny – the claim that scenario methodology lacks sufficient theory. 
In what follows, the authors provide background literature framing what they referred to as an “un-
resolved” concern in futures studies. The authors conclude that while this unresolved concern is rea-
sonable, it also serves a number of secondary functions. In exchange for voicing this concern scholars 
release themselves from responsibility to resolve it, even provisionally, thus freeing scholars to adopt 
theoretical commitments untethered from past research in futures studies. Alternatively, because of 
the repetitiveness of the concern over time, the authors speculate on the ritualized quality of the con-
cern and consider whether or not voicing it has become a signal among members of the field actively 
publishing. Ultimately, rehearsing the claim that there is insufficient theory to support scenario meth-
odology acts as a readymade justification for adopting theory from outside of future studies and for 
developing one methodological typology after another; counter intuitively, both moves appear to de-
prive scenario planning of precisely the foundational theory and shared methodological toolkit schol-
ars claim it desperately needs. 
Materials and Methods 
This section utilizes intensive literature review as a methodology for systematically identifying evi-
dence of (oft repeated) claims made in the futures studies literature. We contend that the origin of 
the claim (i.e., that scenario methodology lacks theory) hinges, in larger part, on an older and more 
general discussion in the history of futures studies regarding the appropriate use of systematic meth-
ods for forecasting. Editorial comments from Volume 1, Issue 1, of Futures frame the field for the reader 
as having deep-seated problems with methods, and, in this set-up, the implicit message is that the 
(specifically plural) futures concept will help to resolve methods problems. As of 1969, while the field 
“is at present in the formative stage,” the origins of interest in the “futures [concept] has arisen be-
cause of the need for systematic methods of dealing with the enormous number of variables that must 
be taken into account when forecasting” (Editorial 1969, 2). 
Overcoming uncertainty and establishing confidence in futures research and practice, the editor 
claimed, will only be possible if “forecasters” work “according to disciplined methods” and clearly 
communicate these systematic methods to outside constituencies, for example, “managers and gov-
ernment officials” who will “come to depend more and more on professional forecasts” (p. 3). Since 
then managers and government officials have come to depend on strategic planning and scenario 
methodology. Still, the aspirational title of the editorial (i.e., “Futures—Confidence from Chaos”) 
seems never to have fully materialized, and this remains the case, despite the considerable growth of 
scenario planning as an offshoot of forecasting (Slaughter 2002). It appears that the problem with 
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methods was, in effect, inherited baggage, passed-on during the development of scenario planning 
from its origins in forecasting. 
The foundational concern over “chaos” with regard to methodology dates back further than this 
inaugural editorial piece. The so-called father of scenario planning, Herman Kahn (1973, 146, as cited 
in in Aligica 2004, 80), openly claimed that “human societies are [so] complicated [that they are] 
beyond scientific generalization” during the early 1960s, hence, Kahn’s early thinking was primarily 
shaped in the crucible of planning practices rather than founded in scientific theory to support the 
enterprise. This has had a lasting impact. It appears that with rare exception almost every major shift 
in the field of scenario planning amounts to a transition in practice that is not met with a corollary 
opportunity to develop theory to justify or, at minimum, explain that transition. Scenario planning, in 
academia and in practice, seems to be an applied field of research driven by practice, and, thus, tends 
to emphasize “who is doing what” whenever a survey history of the field is crafted. To this end, the 
authors review examples of the claims. 
Results 
In demonstrating our results, the authors would be remiss not to note that, in futures studies, the new 
century began with two separate scholarly assessments of scenario planning that characterize the 
field as overrun by “methodological chaos” (Martelli 2001) and bereft of theory (i.e., Chermack 2002). 
Both claims have now become formulaic. Also, please note that because of the repetitive nature of the 
claim under study, this section will also be repetitive -- too repetitive for some readers. The authors 
acknowledge this drawback; it is unavoidable given that they aim to demonstrate rather than merely 
state the repetitiveness. 
Some scholars claim that the field was overrun by methodological chaos. Martelli’s “Scenario build-
ing and scenario planning: State of the art and prospects of evolution,” published in 2001 by Futures 
Research Quarterly (now Futures), contains the proverbial lightningrod statement on methodology in 
futures studies. After surveying scenario practitioner-facilitators and then hosting a panel-discussion 
among them, Martelli (2001) states that “methodological chaos” characterizes scenario planning in 
practice. The “methodological chaos” claim is perhaps the most well cited of its kind, picked-up by 
numerous authors. Problems associated with methodological chaos, Martelli (2001, 57) claims, “stem 
from the same identical theoretical and practical approach to the study of the future,” that is to say, 
stem from this hybrid, practice-based research field. In 2005, Bradfield et al. (2005, 795) echoes and 
extends Martelli’s claim, stating that the “literature reveals an abundance of different and at times 
contradictory definitions, characteristics, principles and methodological ideas about scenarios.” Con-
sider Bradfield et al.’s (2005, 795) claim in its full context: “Scenario Planning has been around for 
more than 30 years and during this period a multitude of techniques and methodologies have devel-
oped, resulting in what has been described as a ‘methodological chaos’ which is unlikely to disappear 
in the near future ... This is reflected in the fact that literature reveals an abundance of different and at 
times contradictory definitions, characteristics, principles and methodological ideas about scenarios. 
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It has been suggested that a pressing need for the future of scenarios is amongst other things, to re-
solve the confusion over ‘the definitions and methods of scenarios.’” 
As we shall see, Bradfield et al. (2005) are not alone. The abundant repetitiveness of Martelli’s 
concern regarding chaos echoes year after year in the futures studies literature. By 2013, for example, 
the concern is starting to appear as though it is a taken-for-granted matter of fact; according to Dusza 
(2013, p. 137): “Over the past 30 years, the methods of scenario planning were described so diversely 
that we may call it a “methodological chaos.””  
Typologizing the scenario planning process is occasionally identified as a solution to the issue. Thus, 
academics have sought to wrangle the chaos by systematizing methods into various typologies, ac-
cording to Gordon (2013, 88), who writes: “Since the rise of scenario planning as a mainstream plan-
ning tool, many academic authors have attempted to determine a classificatory system or “typology” 
of scenario work, to bring order to the methodological “chaos” of contested definitions and justifica-
tions perceived in the field.” 
Ramirez et al. (2015, 71) note that “several efforts” to resolve methodological concerns “have been 
undertaken:” “Because scenario planning developed as a practitioner-led domain in a great variety of 
settings, many different practices, methods, techniques and tools have been proposed and used. Social 
scientists have made scenario planning practices an object of study and have found that many of these 
practices contradict others in terms of both their ontological assumptions and their epistemological 
orientations, leading to what Martelli (2001) referred to as “methodological chaos”. Several efforts to 
distinguish, compare, and classify the variety of scenario planning practices and their theoretical and 
philosophical underpinnings have been undertaken.” 
Bradfield et al. (2016, 60) state that “paucity of theory” is the source of confusion: “Scenario plan-
ning has been around for more than 50 years and during this period a multitude of techniques and 
methodologies have developed, resulting in what has been described by Martelli (2001) as ‘method-
ological chaos’. The literature reveals an abundance of different and at times contradictory definitions, 
characteristics, principles and methodological ideas about scenarios. The consequence, according to 
Khakee (1991), is that ‘few techniques in futures studies have given rise to so much confusion as sce-
narios’ ... This ‘confusion’ results from the fact that there is a paucity of theory underpinning the use 
of scenarios as a means to consider the future, leading Chermack (2002) to conclude that ‘the status 
of theory development in the area of scenario planning is dismal’ ... This is equally true of futures stud-
ies in general, which Miller (2006) contends, lacks a coherent and commonly accepted foundation 
when compared to other well-established academic disciplines.” 
No matter how often the concern over methodological chaos is repeated, the issue still boils down 
to a single passage by Martelli (2001, 63): “intuitive logic is strictly connected with the expert or group 
of experts who work on the scenario, the techniques are assembled in the most varied way, and con-
sequently it is hard, if not impossible, to check the validity of the particular approach adopted from a 
scientific point-of-view. This difficulty is certainly compounded by the fact that most of the scenario 
studies concerned remain the property of a client company or governmental agency and are therefore 
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not subject to that "peer review" which is, in the long-run, the only method to ascertain the validity of 
a technique or set of techniques and the scientific reliability of a researcher (but this is generally true 
of all methods used in scenario building and planning).” Thus, if practice-based scenario work remains 
essentially private without a blind peer review system in place to shape practice, then the scenario 
method is unlikely to become more scientific and, therefore, less chaotic in form and function. It fol-
lows, therefore, that one of the greatest points of scholarly, academic consensus in futures studies 
with regard to the scenario method is that there is no consensus in futures studies with regard to the 
status of the scenario method, which the authors repeatedly demonstrated with quotations from ex-
tant, relevant literature. 
Still other scholars claim that the field is bereft of theory. Shortly after Martelli’s (2001) critique, 
Chermack (2002, 25) assessed the status of theory in scenario planning and concluded that it was 
“dismal.” Chermack’s review of major contributions to scenario planning revealed analytical emphasis 
on practical application at the expense of explicit theoretical considerations and moderate evidence 
that scholars even occasionally conflated “method and theory” (Chermack 2002, 26). In an inextrica-
bly related claim, Martelli (2001, 68) also characterizes Peter Schwartz’s (1991) seminal text, The Art 
of the Long View, as theoretically “flimsy;” implicating that without theoretical support, Martelli (2001, 
68) states, the approach cannot and “does not really tell [readers] much about how to build scenarios 
and use them in strategic planning.” On balance, however, Bishop et al., (2007, 5), after an analysis of 
two dozen scenario techniques, concluded that: “As consultants and organizations have come to rec-
ognize the value of scenarios, they have also latched onto one scenario technique ... as the default for 
all their scenario work. That technique is the Royal Dutch Shell/Global Business Network (GBN) ma-
trix approach, created by Pierre Wack in the 1970s and popularized by Schwartz (1991) in the Art of 
the Long View and Van der Heijden (1996) in Scenarios: The Art of Strategic Conversations. In fact, 
Millett (2003, …) calls it the ‘‘gold standard of corporate scenario generation.”” A decade later, 
Ramirez and Wilkinson (2014, 251) suggests that the technique put forth by Schwartz (i.e., the 2x2 
matrix) may be a case of “mistaken identity;” although Schwartz worked as Shell’s head of scenarios, 
the 2x2 matrix was far from Shell’s only or standard planning methodology. 
As a secondary element of methodological chaos, concern over the lack of theoretical support for 
scenario planning remained essentially dormant after being voiced by Chermack (2002). Recently, 
however, there is evidence of renewed scholarly interest in the underpinnings of scenario planning. 
Predictably, these scholars lament the state of theory in the field. 
To begin, the authors provide Chermack’s (2002, 26) original language: “This focus on practical 
application and development can certainly be appreciated as the refinement of these methods has, in 
some cases, produced agile organizations that seem to be able to anticipate change. One need only 
look at [Shell’s] success with scenarios to see this impact. On the other hand, some scenario projects 
have resulted in remarkable failure and there has been little effort in searching for the cause. The 
greatest danger in this situation is atheoretical application.”  
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Bradfield (2008) acknowledges Chermack’s (2002, 26) concern over “atheoretical application,” 
thus, linking the field’s practice-orientation to method with its lack of theoretical undergirding; Brad-
field (2008, 198-199) writes that: “according to Khakee (1991) ... “few techniques in futures studies 
have given rise to so much confusion as scenarios” ... This confusion may be explained by the fact that 
unlike other long-range forecasting methods there appears to be no solid theoretically based founda-
tion underpinning scenario techniques. As a number of writers have noted, there is in fact “a paucity 
of systematic research” (Kuhn & Sniezek, 1995, …), leading Chermack (2002) to conclude that “the 
status of theory development in the area of scenario planning is dismal” ... This is explained by the fact 
that the growth in popularity of scenarios has happened for practical reasons rather than theoretical 
ones, the consequence of which is that “theoretical research and sophisticated tools have been ne-
glected in favour of multiple applications” (Godet, 1990 …).”  
Bradfield et al. (2016, 60-61) return to essentially the same language in (February) 2016, stating: 
“[t]he consequence, according to Khakee (1991), is that ‘few techniques in futures studies have given 
rise to so much confusion as scenarios’ (…). This ‘confusion’ results from the fact that there is a paucity 
of theory underpinning the use of scenarios as a means to consider the future, leading Chermack 
(2002) to conclude that ‘the status of theory development in the area of scenario planning is dismal’ 
(…). This is equally true of futures studies in general, which Miller (2006) contends, lacks a coherent 
and commonly accepted foundation when compared to other well- established academic disciplines. 
Godet (1990) notes that the absence of a theoretical underpinning for scenario planning is because 
the growth in popularity of scenarios has happened for practical reasons rather than theoretical ones, 
and as a result ‘theoretical research and sophisticated tools have been neglected in favour of multiple 
applications’.” 
However, this time, Bradfield et al. (2016, 6061) provide further development of the issue, impli-
cating a conflict of interest associated with practitioners and their retrospective accounts as well as a 
conflict of interest, echoing Martelli’s (2001, 63) concern over a lack of peer review, with regard to 
objective judgment of the effectiveness of the scenario method; they write that: “[c]onfirmation of this 
comes, firstly, from Hodgkinson and Healey (2008, …) who note that most of the scenario literature 
comprises ‘retrospective accounts of practising advocates . . . [and] individuals with significant vested 
interests in the phenomena of study’; and secondly Tetlock (2005), who suggests that ‘Scenario con-
sultants should not, of course, be the final judges of their own effectiveness. When pressed for proof, 
the consultants have thus far offered only anecdotes, invariably self-promoting ones’.” 
Apparently, methods in the field are based on practice rather than theory. Scholars and practitioners 
may encounter a sizable conflict of interest when their objective, empirical understanding of the effec-
tiveness of scenarios and scenario methodology come into steady contact with their role as scholarly 
or professional advocates (or both) for scenario planning. Even as evidence of theoretical advance-
ment accumulates. 
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Discussion and Conclusion 
 
While the scenario method shapes contemporary strategic management practices in large organiza-
tions, managers undertaking scenario planning may be surprised to learn that scholars generally do 
not know why scenarios work. As has been demonstrated, scholars in futures studies, especially ex-
perts in scenario planning, routinely preface scientific communications by reiterating confusion, inter-
nal to the field, with regard to the absence of shared definitions, lack of theoretical underpinnings to 
support the scenario method, and vast discretion in the application of planning methods. This is the 
primary contribution of this article. 
The net result, which plagues the field, are the twin problems of “dismal” theory (Chermack 2002) 
amid “methodological chaos” (Martelli 2001). While the conspicuous repetitiveness of these formu-
laic messages is apparent to even casual observers of the literature, few scholars characterize the 
phenomenon. To say again that scenario planning lacks sufficient theory and suffers from methodo-
logical chaos has become something of a norm in the production of scientific accounts in the scenario 
planning literature, which, in mass repetition, appear to contribute to the widely-acknowledged unre-
solved character of this “open” controversy. The field has not and perhaps cannot sustain an appre-
ciable level of paradigmatic consistency that scholars such as Kuhn (1977) refer to as “normal sci-
ence.” In fact, it would not be an overstatement to suggest that one of the few points of scientific 
consensus in futures studies is that there is a lack of consensus with regard to theory and methodology 
in the scenario planning literature. This curiosity motivates both the review of the literature, which 
reveals it, and, in these concluding remarks, speculation with regard to the secondary or collateral 
function(s) that it serves in the field. 
In the end, it seems as though the same tautological problem that plagues scholars attempting to 
resolve methodological chaos also plague scholars attempting to resolve, apply, and/or specify foun-
dational theory to support the method. Thus, even efforts to resolve the lack of theory, by introducing 
theory, does not resolve the lack of theory and possibly fuels perceived chaos in the field. Thus, even 
efforts toward resolution, by contributing to the cacophony of voices, do not get scholars any closer 
to that resolution they claim they the field so desperately needs. If anything, such efforts may even 
begin to distance scholars from their goal (Spaniol & Rowland 2018). 
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Abstract  
A significant phenomenon of media and politics in Iran is the fact that it extremely reflects the state 
will. Top-Down governmental approach to control media objectives, whether to inform or amuse, has 
been applied either through press censorship in the rising era of making centric modern state in an 
early nineteenth century or through social media filtering in recent years. Although media technology 
is transformed or the characteristics of governmental policy are changed, the necessity to conduct 
people with media along with education remains fixed. Questioning what conditions are making pos-
sible the continuity of this powerful governmental intervention in media and politics as well as what 
myths & discourses are justified, is the main goal of this article. Causal Layered Analysis (CLA), as a 
critical futures studies method, is considered an appropriate method to deconstruct the present sta-
tus. In four different layers of analysis, first, we determine different aspects of Litany level, including 
the role of media in promoting enmity discourse concerning real and fictitious Iran’s enemies. In the 
second layer, we specify different social causes for the current situation of media and politics including 
new actors emerged in recent years. In the third level, which is about the deep discourses related to 
the issue under the study, we review the revolutionary discourse which mainly emphasizes on creating 
alternative responses to the controversy between tradition and modernity in the contemporary history 
of Iran. Regarding the fourth layer of CLA, which is entitled to the level of metaphor or myth, we dis-
cover the narrative of “Educating the Public” as the deepest myth behind media politics in Iran.  
Introduction and Background 
Media and politics are tightly interconnected with each other in Iran. In the relative lack of any sys-
tematic form of identifying the proper politics like party engagement, media platforms represent every 
political objective proposed by diverse power sects which depend on the state institutions in a broad 
sense. They also play a focal role in the political determination. Despite the fact that left-right political 
conflicts and negotiations provide a rich diverse political sphere in Iran’s contemporary era, the com-
mon trait here is the absence of ordinary people in political processes ended with a new decision for 
all. Instead of establishing an institutional condition for involvement, politicians on both sides fully 
expect media to inject political objectives into brains. Nevertheless, informal politics influence decision 
making behind the closed doors, particularly upon the advent of alternative media. The plural demands 
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have no other choice unless using the media stream out of different channels under the major limita-
tions which stand still. As a result, no top-down and bottom-up interconnectedness might be possible 
without mediated relationship through media interventions. 
To understand what causes create and facilitate the conditions of corrupted relationship between 
media and politics over the modern history of Iran, we have to go beyond the apparent level in which 
the mainstream media make an effort to inject political governmental objectives into the public, on 
one hand, and the alternative media resist top-down politics to pursue the growing demands of plural 
social strata in Iran on the other hand. Causal Layered Analysis (CLA) is one of the most credible 
frameworks to achieve this sight. In addition, we consider the plausibility of alternative critical futures 
which can be imagined to transform the situation from the status quo into the more desirable scenar-
ios. We investigate driving factors stimulating more media diversity as well as multi-trajectory politics 
after the deconstruction of present connections between media and politics. We argue that educating 
people, instead of informing them, is the most preventive myth on the deepest layer of the relationship 
between media and politics. 
Research Method: Causal layered analysis (CLA) 
Causal layered analysis (CLA) is known as a critical futures research method which deepens the un-
derstandings about the futures changes. It has been invented by Sohail Inayatullah in a 1998 article for 
Futures that would come to be widely cited. According to Inayatullah (2004), CLA is based on the 
assumption that the way in which a problem is framed will have an impact on how a change in the 
issue will be pursued. While the theoretical underpinning of CLA is based on post-structuralism, the 
approach is layered, that is, it is a method of analysis which is inclusive of accounting for various 
streams of causality operating in unison upon an issue (Ramos 2003). 
As he explains, causal layered analysis (CLA) consists of four dimensions. The litany or the day-to-
day layer, the commonly accepted headlines of the way things are or should be. Solutions to problems 
are at this level usually short term. The second dimension is deeper, focused on the social, economic, 
political causes of the issue. The third dimension is the culture or worldview. This is the big picture, 
the paradigm that informs what we think is real or not real, the cognitive lenses we use to understand 
and shape the world. The fourth dimension is the myth or the metaphor  this is the deep unconscious 
story behind the issue (Ibid). 
CLA seeks to integrate these four levels of understanding. Each level is true, and solutions need to 
be found at each level. Thus, policy solutions can be deeper. Litany interventions lead to short-term 
solutions, easy to grasp, packed with data. Systemic answers require interventions by efficiency ex-
perts. Governmental policies linked to a partnership with the private sector often results. Worldview 
change is much harder and longer term. It requires seeking solutions from outside the framework in 
which the solution has been defined. And myth solutions require deepest interventions, as this re-
quires telling a new story, rewiring the brain and building new memories and the personal and collec-
tive body (Inayatullah 2008, 421). 
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CLA has been vastly utilized in many different studies in the previous literature. Different studies 
have used CLA as the main research framework, or as a participatory environment for conducting 
workshops. It has been applied in various case studies as a stand-alone method, or in combination 
with other futures methods like scenarios, futures wheel and backcasting. Some of the most important 
practices of CLA are packed and presented in the book, “The Causal Layered Analysis (CLA) Reader”. 
According to Inayatullah (2004), Bangkok traffic futures (1993), the future of enrolments (1994), 
housing persons with disabilities (1995), and the future of United Nations (1996) are some of the initial 
practices of applying CLA in research frameworks and work-shops environment. In some recent stud-
ies, Lederwasch et.al (2001) apply CLA to create the future visions of mining and mineral industry in 
Australia, Lynda Shevellar (2011) reflects upon the usefulness of CLA as a means of responding to 
dilemmas within the current practice of community development, and Bishop and Dzidik (2014) utilize 
CLA as a qualitative methodology well suited for psychology and define a space for its adoption in the 
discipline. 
Litany layer: contemporary power of the state 
Regarding the relationship between media and politics in Iran, at the litany level, all the relevant news, 
documents and laws on the interconnections between politics and media sphere is of concern. In this 
sense, we scan many different documents, particularly all the relevant reinforced laws and legislations 
on media and media regulations in Iran. By scanning, collecting and conducting exploratory content 
analysis, we identify the crucial key elements with which the present relationship between media and 
politics in Iran is shaped and defined. 
Media ownership is the first key element of the relationship between media and politics in Iran. 
Dividing all media platforms into three categories including press media, broadcast media, and digital 
media, it can be said that the majority of the mainstream in all three categories are owned by the state 
regime in Iran. State owned media can be defined as media which are financially and editorially con-
trolled and administered by the states regimes and governments. Regarding this definition, radio and 
television broadcasting in Iran is completely owned and monopolized by the state regime, while digital 
media and press media are partly state owned, while some kinds of privately owned and alternative 
media are co-existing with the state owned ones as well. 
For instance, according to the regulations related to the internet infrastructure, the access service 
provider (A.S.P) for internet connections is monopolized and owned by the state regime. Every gov-
ernmental department or public sector which demands to provide its own ISP must request from the 
ministry of communication for a legal license and official permission (ASP Regulations 2008). Alt-
hough the internet in Iran is under the strict control of the state regime and the control is being rein-
forced through different surveillance and filtering policies (Aryan & Aryan & Halderman 2013), there 
is a counter flow of unofficial and alternative media platforms which many Iranian users have access 
to it with the help of VPNs and anti-filters. For example, there are many different blogs and web pages 
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that are filtered by the force of government, but they are still producing different kinds of digital con-
tents for their target audiences (e.g. private and personal blogs, podcasts, pages and groups on social 
media, etc.). State ownership is also found on other media forms: dozens of print and online press 
media fully supported by government budget are owned and administered by the state regime and 
Broadcasting is totally dominated by state according to Iran’s constitution (Iran’s Constitution 1979 
The Statute of Islamic Radio and Television Broadcasting 1983). 
Media control is the second element of the relationship between media and politics in Iran. Whether 
in the Islamic Republic of Iran state regime of in the previous imperial government in Pahlavi era, all 
different regimes and governments have always aimed to control and suppress media sphere in Iran 
by any means. Determining broadcasting media policies in a governmental supervision Council, press 
media license detention, visible and invisible ways of censorship, and filtering digital media contents 
on the internet are the general methods which Iran’s state regime employs to control and dominate 
the entire media sphere. According to Iran’s press law (1985), for instance, the publication of any pub-
lication, both in print or online news media, by actual and legal persons with Iranian capital requires 
obtaining a license from the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance. Therefore, every commercial 
and private press is in a way under the control of the state regime. Press supervisory board is estab-
lished to issue press license and investigate the required qualifications of the actual or legal person 
who has sought the license (article 11).  
The influence of the state regime on media content production is the third element of the relation-
ship between media and politics in Iran. Generally, the fundamental goal and mission of the state 
owned media platforms in Iran is to recreate and propagate the political and cultural discourses, which 
are desirable and advantageous for the state regime, particularly Islamic-based ones. Hence, it can be 
claimed that the state regime in Iran aims to use its own media and enforce private independent media 
platforms to promote and propagate the Islamic, traditional and ideological values and discourses. 
According to the article 9 of the radio and television broadcasting statute (1983), the main goal of 
radio and television broadcasting is to promote the Islamic culture. Preparing the social environment 
for public education and refinement, increasing people’s moral virtues and accelerating the evolution-
ary path of Islamic revolution worldwide are the other indicated aims of the IRIB. The article 11 of the 
mentioned statute emphasizes on the international function of broadcasting and explains that radio 
and television broadcasting has to develop international relations and communications in the light of 
Islam and Islamic standards.  
Thus, not only all different kinds of state owned media platforms are restricted by the state regime 
to produce media content inside the dominance Islamic discourse, but also private or citizen based 
ones are also limited to this constraints. The violation of these rules and norms is considered as the 
violation of the law and the violator media platform will be entitled to a vast spectrum of punishments 
and penalties. However, there has been always a counter media flow which attempts to appear as an 
alternative platform and bypass the state regime’s restrictions. Accordingly, alternative media plat-
form in Iran meaning those independent media that can bypass the control and censorship usually aim 
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to produce some alternative media contents. These alternative media try to provide their audiences 
with different modernist media content including secular, feminist, environmental, liberal, leftist, 
ethnic-based etc. They empower the audiences to choose their desired content among a colorful spec-
trum of contents. The layer of social causes unfolds this duality more.  
Systematic causes: the Advent of New Actors 
The state regime, as we mentioned before, has always been the key actor which determined the rela-
tionship between media and politics in Iran. After the Iranian revolution and from the first days of 
Islamic Republic of Iran establishment, the state regime attempted again to control and dominate the 
media sphere locally and globally. State ownership of the only broadcasting system in Iran, the publi-
cation of several state owned newspapers, press and online news media, and using different tools of 
suppression like censorship, filtering and license detention as well as pre-publication tools to ban like 
journalist deterrent are the manifestations of the state regime’s attempt to dominate all kinds of media 
platforms in Iran. The state regime’s dominance over the media sphere is also extended to the tele-
communication technologies and infrastructures. 
However, the state regime is not the only actor in the relationship between media and politics in 
Iran. In the different historical period, other actors have become influential and effective in determining 
this relationship by their roles and their original aims (Hajarian 1997). About ten years after the Islamic 
revolution in Iran, when the governmental economy and pro-socialist economic policies started to fail 
their promises and privatization of economy started to rise, the market became a crucial actor in media 
sphere in Iran. Commercial and private newspapers and publications started to emerge and they sup-
posed to convey a more counter flow of content production in the media sphere. 
In 1997, when the reformist political parties succeeded to win the presidential election, a powerful 
public demand emerged for a colorful media sphere. As many claims (Arjomand 2000 Khiabany & 
Serberny 2001) the reformist government aimed to relatively decrease the control and pressure on 
the civil society to allow the private press and media to be more independent and to discern more the 
freedom of speech. In this era, the civil society in Iran became an important actor in the relationship 
between media and politics. The civil society empowered to facilitate the publication of small and me-
dium size newspapers and different kinds of publications. At the same time, the reducing state control 
over the media sphere caused the emergence of more independent media platforms striving to convey 
a voice to the voiceless. Although many relatively independent newspapers emerged in this era, trying 
to stand in a critical position in contrast with state owned media, many of these publications encoun-
tered license detention and became suspended by the state regime’s judiciary which was generally in 
line with the supreme leader and previous president of Iran who generally have enough legal capability 
to dictate macro-policies of regime. 
Technology has been another key actor. From 2005 till the present, the growth of telecommunica-
tion technologies, the rise of the internet and satellite television channels, and finally the emergence 
of social media platforms have changed the relationship between media and politics and affected the 
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crucial role of the state regime in determining the rules and regulations of media sphere. The wide 
access to and the huge range of opposing media content and comprehensive information on the 
internet made the digital and online media relatively uncontrollable by the state regime. Although the 
state regime highly attempts to control the digital media by different means of filtering, the emergence 
of VPNs and other proxies empowered Iranian people to use the digital media in the way they want 
and access to almost anything they want on the internet. Similarly, when the television and radio sat-
ellite receivers became accessible and popular in Iran, many media users started to consume these 
media platform’s production instead of the state owned broadcasting programs Transmitted by IRIB 
or conventional state-owned press media. Despite the official legislations which ban the consumption 
of satellite channels in Iran, millions of Iranians watch foreign-based channels via illegal satellite dishes 
and receivers at their homes and regularly watch the satellite television channels (Barraclough 2001).  
These new are actors have a common characteristic: they are dissident due to the fact that they pro-
mote pro-western discourses as the official supported media content hyped up by the state is totally 
anti-western. The next layer is able to unfold this similarity among nonstate actors more. 
Discoursive Layer: Traditionalism vs Modernism 
The struggle between tradition and modernity was reached to its culmination when the Iranian revo-
lution was achieved to final victory in 19789. Under the umbrella of a charismatic clergy, Ayatollah 
Rouhollah Khomeini, the new political regime was established: the Islamic Republic of Iran. As this 
new title vividly indicates, the challenges between modernist and traditionalist discourses entered a 
new phase in which both have had some sort of political power in various governing bodies. It resulted 
in an ongoing gap between different administrative structures as well as political recruitments in re-
cent years (Bashiriyeh 2011, 106156). Those who were traditionalists before becoming radical mod-
ernists after.  The essential gap historically occurred at the beginning of the new regime when Mehdi 
Bazargan, one of the most prominent modernist figures, was forced to resign from the head of Iran’s 
interim government as the result of burdensome pressure from traditionalists who play a significant 
role in political decision makings, particularly after Khomeini supports US Embassy takeover by one of 
the most radical Islamist groups, Muslim Student Followers of the Imam’s Line.  
According to Soltani (2005), modernists and traditionalists who were two wing of the victory and 
the supporters of Khomeini’s leadership before the revolution were split into two different camps ad-
vocating different focal nodes: Islamic vs Republican. Islamists who gathered at Islamic Republican 
Party (IRP) on early years, utilized some discursive armament such as “clergy”, “supreme leadership” 
and “religious jurisprudence” on their controversies against modernists who tended to institutionalize 
some modern concepts such as “citizenry”, “legislation” and “freedom”. This discursive duality has 
been lasting for the whole history of Iran’s post-revolution era and crystallized on thereafter political 
controversies, particularly on presidential elections in which a pro-modernist candidate campaigned 
against a pro-traditionalist group of candidates (Tajik & Roozkhosh 2008 Jahangiri & Fattahi 2011 
Mirzaei & Rabani-Khorasgani 2016 Nariman & Azizi 2016).  
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Figure 1.Worldview: Traditionalism Vs Modernism 
Despite the fact that the traditionalist discourse is being hyped by the mainstream media as tradi-
tionalists have gained the upper hand on the political power, the alternative media have been strived 
highly to promote modernist discourses for a long time, declining the dominant traditionalist dis-
course. As the alternative press media have been conventionally played a vital role in the contempo-
rary history of Iran, their highest peak coincides with the evolutionary periods that the rise against 
traditionalism becomes one of the essential axioms of social struggles to establish a more democratic 
political system given to different kinds of modern discourses. Dissent journalists were at least the 
leading figures of constitutional movement from 1905 to 1911, nationalization of Iran’s oil industry 
movement in 1951, and the Iran’s Revolution of 197980. Regardless of some various aspects and ob-
jectives, they share a firm belief to demolish the despotism as the main symbol of traditionalism. This 
notion is crystallized by the concept of “rule of law” during the constitutional age, “nationalization” by 
Mohammad Mossadegh, as an opposing prime minister who fought against the monarchy power, and 
“Republicanism” by national-religious factions supporting the Ayatollah Khomeini at the advent of the 
revolution. Iranian reformists then employed the power of alternative newspapers to expand rapidly a 
new version of modernist discourse relied on the notation of citizenry as the focal node, articulating 
other signs like legislation, political development, civil society, freedom, and reforms. Although it was 
dominated party from 1997 to 2005, the widespread closure of alternative newspapers in 2000 (Samii 
2001) was just a link of the long chain of events indicated that Iran has a long run to be released from 
traditionalism. 
Given to the fact that the Internet enormously has been developed all around the world, publishing 
becomes easier, and broadcasting comes out of state’s monopoly, the alternative media also have 
been growing in the recent years. However, the pressure and constraint with which they are faced 
remain persistently as the discursive struggle which does not direct to a point of compromise or ulti-
mate dominance. The rapid expansion of new ICT technologies provides a great opportunity to prop-
agate the various modernist discourses by alternative media including feminist approaches, liberal 
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politics, environment advocacy perspectives, leftist criticism etc. In addition, it facilitates the media 
practice considering the substantial modality of digitality, virtuality, interactivity, hypersexuality, net-
working and simulating (Lister 2009) as well as the diversity of practitioners as different social strata 
which can participate actively in the Internet   to generate media content through citizen journalism, 
telegram channels, advocacy group websites, activist hidden forums etc. On the other hand, surveil-
lance technologies are developed simultaneously, hence, the traditional powerful institutions possess 
the more effective equipment to ban, block, filter or slow down different parts of the Internet. It also 
enhances the ability of security organizations dominated by traditionalists to track dissident activities, 
keep records of their deficiency, and to accuse them of what they believe or carry out in their ordinary 
life. Consequently, the new ICT technologies create a new open virtual space to listen to more various 
modernist voices by the alternative media, but also, they make it possible to suppress them by the 
apprehension of modern individuals with threatening to disclose their personal information or prose-
cution of modernist advocacy groups based on media evidence. 
The metaphor: “To Educate the Public”   
To unfold the deepest layer of causes, we have to go beyond the contemporary history of Iranian strug-
gle between tradition and modernity to find an ultimate metaphor or myths. As the history of media 
in the conventional sense goes back to the 19th century when the first periodicals aspiring to imitate 
western newspapers were published (Bashir 2000), we should seek to find another prevailing literary 
genre with which some similar properties could accomplish. In pre-modern Persian literature, a couple 
of prominent travelounge have been written for the illiterate populace to be informed, amused, and 
educated. In other words, they are some educational written forms with which the composer attempts 
to familiarize the readers with social and moral thoughts by the application of travel anecdotes in-
formative as well as storytelling tools attractive, though they are considered to be some pieces of 
prose literature nowadays. Thus, the travelogues combine the education of morality, social norms, 
wisdom etc. with lots of information derived from travel anecdotes that the composers observed or 
heard from somebody else.  
The notion of totalitarianism is also embedded broadly in the Iranian’s ancient literature as we can 
track it in written pieces of Saadi of Shiraz, one of the most prominent composers of Iran in the medi-
eval age. For instance, he tells many of his travel anecdotes in “Gulistan”, chapter 7, concerning the 
effects of education, but he quotes a viewpoint of the king that “he whose foundation is bad will not 
take instruction from the good; To educate unworthy persons is like throwing nuts on a cupola” 
(Gladwin & Ross 1865). The king actually rejects the possibility of pedagogy concurrent with the me-
dieval notation of education as the morality and the ordinary way of life which is an intrinsic quality, 
as his preference is “to extirpate the race and offspring of these people and to dig up their roots and 
foundations”. Consequently, the good (Saadi himself or generally “Dervishes”) has to centralize his 
endeavor to educate the king by aphorism as he named the first chapter of his book as “the manner of 
king”.   
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The combined thematic content of travelogues provides a foundational metaphor for media and 
politics contrary to the hypothetically so-called concept of “the 4th pillar of democracy” in the western 
history of media in the 19th century. At the advent of the modern era, Iranian intellectuals diverged the 
notion of education into pedagogy in order to engender a new modern manner in the populace. Now 
the wise king replaces with modernists who avow their commitments whether to educate all folks or 
to instruct the king how to establish a more modern society at the late of an early modern era in Qajar 
Dynasty (17891925). The first Iranian periodicals were published during this period of time when the 
most prominent chancellor of Iran, Mirza Taghi Khan Farahani known as Amir Kabir, founded the sec-
ond official newspaper, “Vaghaye Etefaghie” translated to “events”, with a key slogan: “the highly 
scramble of the majesty was busied with the education of peasants, merchants, tradespeople … as 
though he ordered the kingdom to publish that gazette...” (Vaghaye Etefaghie 1850). Simultaneously, 
he established the first  Iranian modern school -Dar al-Fanun translated to “graduate school”- to edu-
cate new sciences including physics, mathematics, etc. confronted with traditional ones (“Mak-
tabkhaneh” translated to “school”) educating conventional religious expertise and knowledge to make 
a couple of students the clergies.  
After the defeat of constitutionalism in progress, the authoritarian modernization (Atabaki & 
Zurcher 2004) under the personal conduct of new Shah of Iran since Reza Khan appointed as the legal 
monarch of Iran in 1925, transformed the romanticism considering to the substance of education re-
gardless of its exigency into the new project of coercively injecting modern values and arrangements 
into all of social strata. What remains still nowadays is the compulsory education of children in new 
modern schools as well as severe censorship of press media. Albeit some technical achievements, the 
next political evolutions were highly concentrated on the revision of modernity as the authoritarian 
regime of Pahlavi could not be concerned to tolerate any opposition against its politics. To reach the 
highest peak in Iranian Revolution of 19798, Ayatollah Khomeini told that “Cinema is one of the civi-
lization manifestation which has to serve to educate people” on his first public speech when he arrived 
in Iran after 14 years living in exile.  
After an early short period of media freedom provided with the new revolutionary atmosphere, the 
new regime has just changed some marginal components of the focal metaphor around the essential 
functions of the media as an educational apparatus, albeit more enormously limitations. Along with 
the domination of Islamist discourses on the next years, it legitimates the basic role of clergies or rep-
resentatives to educate all in different aspects of social life including the media practice, the 
pedagogical efforts in primary kindergartens, schools, universities or other forms of unofficial educa-
tion, artistic activities, religious ceremonies etc. Thus, the imaginary will to education remains still a 
fixed powerful myth. 
The alternative media are likewise organized to play the same role for education as the opponent 
modernist discourses take a subaltern position in civil sphere after the Iranian revolution. They attempt 
to fill the socio-political vacuum caused by the absence of any modernist response to any dilemma 
which comes from the incapacity of official governmental media to realize that a civil society moving 
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forward to the modern institutional orders could not be necessarily persuaded by media content de-
rived from traditional solutions. In this state of affairs, alternative media complies with an immense 
responsibility to diffuse the modern viewpoints in terms of what fallacies the public affirms as the 
result of mainstream media practices. this task is intrinsically perceived as an educational performance 
even though it would be a concert, a foreign soap opera, a social media channel about the women’s 
right to refute the compulsory vein, the sensational journalism, a TV series against the various minority 
stereotyping or any other media forms and contents not regularly admitted by the governmental me-
dia, totalitarian legislations, and traditional discourses. Thus, the contradictory dialectic between tra-
dition and modernity, at least in media sphere has been capable of maintaining for almost two century 
since they confess to a common metaphor to educate the public by the media instead of the pedagogy.  
Conclusions 
In this article, we attempt to investigate the multiple layers of causes that make the current relation-
ship between the media and politics in Iran. The particular interconnections of each layer have been 
established a long time ago and maintained rigorously. It is also worthwhile to identify which solutions 
might be highlighted for problems concerning each layer. However, any solution is not required to be 
simply practical given to the fact that different layers of analysis from apparent issues to the more 
deeply latent controversy or compromise take us into more abstract notions that we cannot translate 
into a specific policy or agenda. Despite the fact that offering a solution is highly problematic, we point 
out our rational resolution in table 1 as it also summarizes our findings in each layer of analysis.  
 
Table 1. Four Layer of Analysis and Its Solutions 
Layers Results 
Litany Mainstream media vs alternative media, solution in increasing “freedom of 
speech” 
Systematic 
causes 
Semi-totalitarian regime has to be repulsed by the civil society, completed by 
the market, and disarmed by ICT technology advancement 
Discourses/ 
worldview 
Traditionalism vs Modernism- the historical empowerment to a compromise 
Myth/ 
Metaphor 
The prophecy of education should be thwarted by a modernist responsibility to 
education vis-a-vis 
 
Despite the so-called colorful media sphere and diverse platforms and productions at the litany 
level, what is so fundamental here is the reality that the key actor which shapes the media sphere in 
Iran is still the state regime, though the influential role of new actors in the recent years is observable. 
Regarding the present conditions, the essential contradiction between traditionalism and modernism, 
discursively and objectively, will determine the short-term futures of the relationship between media 
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and politics in Iran. However, considering the long-term transformations, the myth of “education” re-
mains unchanged unless the scenario of “diverse media” in which we anticipate more democratic 
state, more competitive media market with multi stakeholders especially on infrastructures and more 
powerful civil society overcomes the other plausible alternatives. We conclude simply that it might be 
the predominance of modernist discourse by some revolutionary transformation, to some extent free 
of state control or surveillance, whereas the narrative of education by media practice.   
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Abstract 
Medical technology is one of the foundations health care systems in the world. Patient care technology 
has become increasingly complex and medical technology has improved health care efficiency, quality 
safety and cost. However, it is shown in patient care centers that current technology alone is not 
enough. Up to now several tools were originally created for morbid monitoring e.g. pain scale and 
bedsores protection to help patients communicate about their pain. However, in spite of the im-
portance and prevalence of pain, there are currently no clinically accepted tools to objectively monitor 
changes in pain level, requiring physicians to rely on patients’ subjective assessment, or to simply 
guess, when patients cannot describe their pain. [1] This article aimed to provide the theoretic frame-
work for improving patient safety system, and enhances the ability of health care professionals to co-
ordinate care by providing a patient’s health information. This framework is based on Morbid-Moni-
toring Systems include “Pain and Unconsciousness Scales-measurements” and “Thermal Wound In-
jury Prevention Sys-tem (TWIP)”. The multi-methods approaches to monitor these processes are 
Morbid Motion Monitoring, Facial expressions and effective Thermal Radiation. This article identifies 
these novel technologies that change the practice of nursing, and explores issues on how these novel 
technologies are driving change in the nursing environment. 
Keywords: Nursing informatics, Morbid monitoring, Pain scale, Bedsores, Thermal radiation. 
Introduction 
Computer technology gives us a tool which can be used to help us cope with the complexity and effi-
ciency which is of-ten required in many areas of work. [2] Since the earliest days of technology adop-
tion in health care, nursing informatics professionals have been at the forefront of leading change. 
Early pioneers included nurses who effectively combined the science of nursing with computer and 
information science to support the clinical workflow, adding value to the organization as they began 
their journey to join the digital revolution. [3] However, it has been difficult to find computer solutions 
that offer benefit to operational nurses, midwives and health visitors. Solutions are required that sup-
port patient-orientated developments in practice. [4] Therefore in the future, the nursing informatics 
systems committees must be able to sup-port quality morbid-monitoring. This document provides the 
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context for an examination of the issue of developing a nursing informatics strategy at the local level 
of patient care centers. 
Morbid‐Monitoring Systems 
Morbid monitoring can be defined as “repeated or continuous observations or measurements of the 
patient, his or her physiological function, and the function of life support equipment, for the purpose 
of guiding management decisions, including when to make therapeutic interventions, and assessment 
of those interventions” (Hudson, 1985, p. 630). Morbid monitoring system is classified by target pa-
rameter, e.g. monitoring treatment for chronic pain [5], painful monitoring, [6] pain-management 
medication monitoring, [7] neurological monitoring which generally refers to electroencephalography, 
intracranial pressure, anesthesia and pain monitoring, coma monitoring, monitoring of wound, etc. 
However, up to now the goal of monitoring has been to measure the degree of injury and to prevent 
further injury, rather than to measure, [8] “pain scales measurements”, “Unconsciousness scale meas-
urements” or “Injury Prevention”. Up to now several tools were originally created for patients such as 
the Brief Pain Inventory, PEG tool, Wong-Baker FACES Pain Rating Scale, 0–10 Numeric Pain Rating 
Scale, Pain Assessment in Advanced Dementia Scale (PAINAD) and etc. to help them communicate 
about their pain. However, in spite of the importance and prevalence of pain, there are currently no 
clinically accepted tools to objectively monitor changes in pain level, requiring physicians to rely on 
patients’ subjective assessment, or to simply guess, when patients cannot describe their pain. [9] 
The latest development in patient monitoring system can be used in Intensive Care Unit (ICU), Crit-
ical Care Unit (CCU), and Emergency Rooms of hospital. During treatment, the patient monitor is con-
tinuously monitoring the coma (a deep state of unconsciousness) patient to transmit the important 
information. [10] In 2011 Kansal and Dhillon have developed Advanced Coma Patient Monitoring Sys-
tem which is advanced product related to physical changes in body movement of the patient and gives 
Warning in form of alarm and display on the Liquid crystal display (LCD). It also passes a SMS to a 
person sitting at the distant place if there exists any movement in any body part of the patient. [11] In 
2013 Sneha Chowdary and et al proposed the Wearable Motion sensor system, which is used to mon-
itor the body movements such as eye blink movement and hand movement to detect the conscious 
state of an individual. This system will be helpful in assisting the doctor about the health condition of 
the unconscious patient and alerting the doctor whenever care is required. [12] 
However, these methods did not address the management of coma patients injured by penetrating 
objects such as thermal radiation, pressure ulcer and stab wounds. Pressure ulcers occur because of 
soft tissue distortion, and incidence rates are on the rise in the healthcare arena (James G. Spahn, 215). 
The pressure ulcer prevention protocol consisted of preventive interventions stratified on risk level, 
with implementation of support surfaces and turning/repositioning residents. [13] In 2013 Matthew 
and Pompeo have trialed new pressure map-ping technology for patients with pressure ulcers. The 
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system contains thousands of sensors, which sensors display specific areas of pressure, and it pro-
vides live feedback to clinicians as they reposition patients. [14] However, for implementation of the 
system, the nursing staff needs to understand its ability to record data. [15] To overcome these signif-
icant problems, we have designed and developed an Morbid-Monitoring System, with a novel tech-
nique to optimize the “pain and Unconsciousness scale measurements” and the prevention of “Ther-
mal Wound Injury” and “pressure ulcers”. The goal of this study is to develop Clinical Decision Support 
Systems for, “pain, unconsciousness and wound prevention managements that could be used by 
health care professionals throughout the world. 
Methods and Materials 
I) Pain and Unconsciousness Scale Measurements 
Two methods have described for the measurement of pain rate: Morbid mobility monitoring and Facial 
expressions and Micro expression. 
Morbid mobility monitoring 
Motion of morbid has been defined as the rate of pine and it is linked with various co-morbid condi-
tions. The data which is generated by the hospital on the basis of video data recorder is separated 
frame by frame. The next set of function is about the visual differences between various frames. A 
variety of techniques can be used as a basis for comparison between frames. One of these techniques 
is called Texture analysis based on DNA Modeling. The method is based on the linear mapping and 
the one-to-one correspondences between point features extracted from the frames and on calculating 
similarities in pixel values. This correspondence is determined by comparing two strings constructed 
from pixel values of the frames. The method uses a table called the Quarter Code table, which is the 
set of characters and numbers. In this table every number between 0 and 255 is translated into a 
unique string of four letter alphabet. Letters A, C, G, T are chosen, since they are the same as used in 
DNA sequences. In this way it possible to utilize tools originally programmed to DNA sequences anal-
ysis. When all pixel values of frames (images) are converted to virtual DNA sequences, one can show 
the differences between two virtual DNA sequences. The comparison between two virtual DNA se-
quences is done by Chi-squared test, DNA Sequence Alignment Algorithms (Needleman Wunsch and 
Smith Waterman), Markov Chain and glm plot. The rate of similarity between frames is plotted as a 
graph and it’s appearing in Monitor. The system is used to show and describe the displacement of the 
morbid on the bedside. The amount of ill transmitted to the morbid increase the motion ratio. In this 
manner Motion Ration is the ratio of the displacement of the morbid. 
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Facial expressions: interpretation of facial pain signals 
Neuropsychological and neuroimaging evidence suggests that the human brain contains facial expres-
sion recognition detectors specialized for specific discrete emotions. [16] Emotional facial expressions 
represent facial displays of emotions which determine different patterns of muscular correlates, cog-
nitive responses, and brain activation. [17] Behavioural/facial markers of pain refer to a variety of re-
sponses that typically accompany the experience of pain. They serve the purpose to communicate the 
inner state “pain” to others and thus play a crucial role in social interactions. [18] Methods designed 
to capture and measure this dynamic phenomenon have greatly improved our understanding of dis-
crete muscle action associated with the various facial displays. [19] In this study, a novel facial expres-
sion recognition method is proposed. The technique is based on DNA Modelling of digital images and 
their statistical analysis. This method is executed by Chi-Squared test. Chi-Squared test is a statistical 
test method commonly used to compare observed data with data we would expect. 
II) Prevention of Thermal Wound Injury and Pressure Ulcers 
A pressure ulcer is a localized injury to the skin or underlying tissue, usually over a bony prominence, 
as a result of unrelieved pressure. [20] Pressure ulcers are caused by unrelieved pressure, applied 
with great force over a short period (or with less force over a longer period), that disrupts blood supply 
to the capillary network, impeding blood flow and depriving tissues of oxygen and nutrients. This ex-
ternal pressure must be greater than arterial capillary pressure to lead to inflow impairment and re-
sultant local ischemia and tissue damage. [21] In 2015 Chaves and et al presented a study that sug-
gested a relationship between the temperature and area of pressure ulcers and proposed thermogra-
phy as an adjunctive method for the evaluation of healing processes. [22] In 2016 Bennett and col-
leagues began an examination of at-risk older adult patient data (pressure and thermal) to identify 
patterns that may related to pressure ulcer development. The results of this study suggested that a 
relationship may exist between the sleeping behavior of patient and the long term temperature distri-
bution of the feet. [23] However, before of these studies in 2013 Matthew Q. and Pompeo have trialed 
new pressure mapping technology for patients with pressure ulcers. In this technique, the device (The 
MAP System, Wellsense Inc, Nashville, TN) is a thin mat placed on a mattress that has a color monitor 
attached. The mat contains thousands of sensors, and is secured to the top of the mattress with straps. 
These sensors measure pressures through a sensing area measuring 1945 mm x 805 mm. The sensors 
display specific areas of pressure, and the system provides live feedback to clinicians as they reposi-
tion patients. The monitor acts as an educational tool for staff, patients, and family by indicating where 
the pressure points are located. It can also assist clinicians in optimal surface selection and detection 
of malfunctioning mattresses. Other features include a bed alarm that can be set to sound at the de-
sired interval to alert for turning. [24] 
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III) Hospital Application Integration 
Hospital Application Integration (HAI) is an integration framework composed of a collection of tech-
nologies and services to integrate a set of hospital computer applications. Hospital Computer Appli-
cations (HCA) is computer software used to integrate a set of hospital computer applications. 
 
 
Figure 1. Flowchart of the multimethod. 
Conclusion 
With the help of this system nurses can monitor the pain and unconsciousness scales with help of 
motion detection techniques and facial expressions. Nurses can also identify and prevent risk factors 
associated with hospital-acquired pre-existing pressure. Consequently, the system can enhance the 
ability of health care professionals to coordinate care by providing a patient’s health information. 
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Abstract 
Rising material consumption and associated greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) are becoming an en-
trenched stumbling block in the quest for low carbon transition worldwide. Consumption performs 
various functions in human wellbeing but the relationships are neither static nor inevitable and con-
sumption can be damaging. The ‘double dividend’ of enhanced wellbeing and reduced material con-
sumption and emissions has been identified as an approach to address this challenge. Rather than the 
global expansion of increasing consumption as the means of achieving wellbeing, this could be imple-
mented through enabling balanced multidimensional human wellbeing. Multiple independent lines of 
theory and evidence support a multidimensional concept of wellbeing, from the macro development 
perspective to the micro individual perspective. Changing the focus away from consumption could be 
facilitated by pursuing a more balanced ‘sustainable wellbeing’ that places a higher priority on other 
life domains. The advantage of such an approach is in the potential win-win of lowering the emissions 
trajectory while actually enhancing human wellbeing. Offering ‘the good life’ or indeed a more bal-
anced life, is a more enticing policy prospect than measures which give a perception of sacrifice or 
loss. 
Keywords: Climate change, consumption, low carbon transition, sustainable, multidimensional well-
being, wellbeing pathways. 
1. Introduction  
The Paris agreement of December 2015, under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC), set in train an international commitment for all nations to achieve significant 
global reductions in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions throughout the 21st century. Low carbon devel-
opment is now a global goal, with a necessity to continually re-invent and ramp up measures to reduce 
emissions as the cuts deepen. Against a backdrop of growing global population and affluence, the 
related trend of increasing material consumption and associated emissions is a continual drag on ef-
forts at mitigation and low carbon transition. While global resources continue to be increasingly ex-
ploited, and natural systems under intensifying pressure, meeting the requirements of global human 
wellbeing through material consumption will become ever more challenging. The flip-side is that there 
is a recognition that there is also a fundamental link between human development and sustainable 
development (O’Mahony and Dufour, 2015; Anand and Sen, 2000). Consequently, there is a potential 
opportunity to renew development efforts as described by Jackson and Marks (1999) that advance 
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both of these interdependent goals in tandem, a critical issue in low carbon transition (Victor et al., 
2014).  
The approaches in the field of sustainable consumption and production (SCP) have relied predom-
inantly on efficiency and consumer behaviour. While these are useful tools, they do not appear suffi-
cient to address the systemic challenges according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) fifth assessment report (Fleurbaey et al., 2014). In countries and contexts where ‘over-con-
sumption’ is problematic, shifting from a priority on consumption to a priority on multidimensional 
wellbeing could prove key to unlocking the double dividend.  Achieving wellbeing is predominantly a 
concern for more affluent populations where basic needs are already met and over-consumption con-
tinues. However, it also has relevance even for those in less affluent countries and those in poverty. 
The ability to be happy and contented with life is a central criterion of psychological adaptation and 
positive mental health (Lyubomirski et al., 2005). The middle classes and elites in developing coun-
tries are also in the process of developing high consumption lifestyles (Fleurbaey et al., 2014:308), 
and global inequality of consumption affects the ability of those in poverty to meet their basic human 
needs.  
Despite the growing problems of over-consumption and the related cultural phenomenon of ‘con-
sumerism,’ the potential significance of a multidimensional ‘sustainable wellbeing’ has yet to surface 
in thinking on the low carbon transition, or the related policy discussions, to any notable degree. Tran-
sition studies remain dominated by modelling derived scenario approaches, leading to a continued 
narrow policy focus on the three ‘T’s’; technology, tax and emissions trading (O’Mahony and Kirby, 
2018). However, in addition to the high-level discussion in the IPCC Assessment Report 5 (Fleurbaey 
et al., 2014), there are early signs of experimentation with elaborating the concept, the first shoots of 
a new research field. Helne and Hirvillami (2015) have begun sketching a multidimensional and rela-
tional sustainable wellbeing and Rogers et al. (2011) explored transitions to social sustainability. The 
New Zealand Department of Conservation moved from the ecologists position of looking at the supply 
of ecosystem services, and the economists at demand, to a social science perspective (Roberts et al., 
2015).  This embraced what is driving demand as seen through the lens of the rapidly expanding well-
being literature. Following this, Schleicher et al. (2017) placed the natural environment as a constituent 
of wellbeing, while Wingate et al. (2014) critiqued the ‘double dividend’ sociologically1. Kate Raworth’s 
doughnut economics (Raworth, 2017), probably the most high-profile in the public consciousness, 
gave framing to discussions of development within social and environmental boundaries. 
After the introduction in section 1.0 this paper is structured as follows; section 2.0 places consump-
tion in context in the climate change challenge, section 3.0 discusses the different functions of con-
sumption and section 4.0 reviews sustainable consumption and production. Section 5.0 discusses 
                                                            
 
1 Suggesting that the double dividend could be described as a ‘sales technique,’ as it reproduces the economic 
doctrine of the rational individual rather than challenging more fundamentally. 
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how the focus can be changed through three broadbrush approaches; shifting behaviour, shifting con-
sumption structure and shifting the priority on life domains towards balanced multidimensional well-
being pathways or ‘sustainable wellbeing’. Section 6.0 offers concluding remarks to synthesise the 
outcomes of the paper and its implications. 
2. The place of consumption in the climate problem 
It is recognised that the physical consumption of material resources and related GHG emissions show 
strong historical trends, driven primarily by economic development in industrialised and emerging 
countries (Fleurbaey et al., 2014). As resource use has grown more slowly than Gross Domestic Prod-
uct (GDP), some decoupling by ‘dematerialisation1’ has occurred, but this efficiency has been over-
whelmed by growth in demand, leading to an inexorable rise in material consumption and associated 
GHG emissions. Two of the defining issues of resource consumption; are global social inequality aris-
ing from income disparity and the purchasing patterns in affluent lifestyles, and secondly, that there 
are different levels of consumption for countries at similar levels of development and income. A defin-
ing condition of climate change mitigation is that it will be extremely difficult and expensive to suffi-
ciently reduce emissions through mitigation alone, without considering the underlying development 
path including consumption. An increasingly strong focus on consumption is now beginning to emerge 
globally. In IPCC Fifth Assessment Report, Fleurbaey et al. (2014: 290) highlight the centrality of these 
issues in mitigation by stating that; “…overcoming under-consumption and reversing over-consump-
tion, while maintaining and advancing human well-being, are fundamental dimensions of sustainable 
development, and are equally critical to resolving the climate problem.” The challenge of unsustainable 
consumption patterns place climate goals at risk. ‘Consumerism’ has been identified as a growing 
global cultural paradigm since the IPCC third assessment report (Toth et al., 2001). While the con-
sumption of those in poverty is driven mainly by meeting basic human needs, it is increasingly common 
across cultures that people seek meaning, contentment and acceptance in consumption. The spread 
of consumerism means that a large share of goods and services produced are ‘luxuries’ that only the 
wealthy can afford, while those in poverty are deprived of even basic goods and services (Khor, 
2011:23). While the relationship between income and wellbeing has been investigated for a number of 
decades, and a positive relationship is dubious beyond a certain point, the relationship of consumption 
to wellbeing has not been studied to any great degree. Recent efforst show that the impacts of con-
sumption on life satisfaction are diverse; across individuals, levels of development and types of con-
sumption, including negative impacts with some categories (Dumludag, D., 2015; Zhang, J. and Xiong, 
                                                            
 
1 Where the system becomes more efficient in generating GDP with less material resource inputs. 
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Y., 2015; Noll and Weick, 2015; Gokdemir, 2015). In societies that are more strongly tied to consum-
erism1 (Toth et al., 2001; Assadourian, 2010; Fleurbaey et al., 2014) other dimensions of wellbeing can 
be ignored or demoted to the detriment of overall individual wellbeing.   
3. The different functions of consumption  
The place of ‘needs’ in understanding consumption as a driver of climate change took prominence in 
the IPCC Special Report on Emission Scenarios (SRES) (Nakicenovic et al., 2000), using Maslow´s 
hierarchy of needs (Maslow, 1943) where choices are only possible once basic human needs have 
been met such as; food, shelter, health care, safety and education. The needs approach has proven 
controversial, but if we accept that consumption can indeed be problematic, or indeed that wellbeing 
is acknowledged as multidimensional (McGillivray, 2007; Stiglitz et al. 2009; Huppert, et al. 2005) 
then a critique of the place of consumption is patently necessary. In a large multi-country study in 
2011, Tay and Diener (2011) examined the association of needs fulfillment and subjective wellbeing 
(SWB), finding that needs are indeed universal, with life evaluation most associated with fulfilling basic 
needs, and positive feelings associated with social and respect needs. Once people’s basic needs are 
met, factors such as luxury consumption, status and comparisons are more significant in determining 
subjective well-being in countries with higher levels of development (Layard, 2005; Veenhoven, 
1998). However, Kasser (2002) also showed that materialism has a cost in terms of individual well-
being. As material commodities are poor satisfiers of social and psychological needs, materialism can 
directly hinder wellbeing. Just as GDP can hide many issues (O’Mahony et al., 2018), as can SWB and 
life satidsfaction. Within the complex systemic interactions that determine multidimensional human 
wellbeing, even fine data from happiness studies can obscure underlying phenomena that may have 
significant affects on how human wellbeing is evolving. 
Aside from meeting basic needs, it must be recognised that consumption can perform various func-
tions; assisting in the creation of meaning (McCracken, 1990) and social positioning in the long un-
derstood sociological phenomenon of conspicuous consumption (Veblen, 1899). Gronow and Warde 
(2001) point to factors in inconspicuous consumption of convenience, habit and responses to social 
norms and institutional contexts. In a seminal text, Jackson (2005a) has placed an important empha-
sis on sacred aspects of money, consumption and material goods as embodying meaning, cautioning 
simplistic assumptions about the contribution of material goods to our wellbeing. Conclusions from 
this strand of literature point to both push and pull factors, that both cause and restrict individual and 
collective human wellbeing at the same time. This points once more to complexity, which makes in-
terpretations more challenging. However, Gruber et al. (2011) provided an important contribution by 
clarifying that in the examples of both food and happiness, we can have too much, at the wrong time, 
                                                            
 
1 A cultural paradigm noted in wealthier countries that is spreading globally, where people seek meaning, con-
tentment and acceptance in consumption. 
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of the wrong type or pursue in the wrong way. The different functions of consumption and its implica-
tions have led to much research on steering consumption towards a more sustainable path.  
4. Sustainable Consumption and Production 
The transition towards sustainable development has often been described by two different types of 
decoupling; dematerialisation and immaterialisation. Dematerialisation involves the decoupling of ma-
terial resource consumption (including fossil fuels) and environmental impact (including climate 
change) from economic growth (Fleurbaey et al. 2014:304). Much of the focus occurs on the produc-
tion side through efficiency in production and ‘eco-efficiency’ to reduce the environmental impact of 
activities. Sustainable consumption and production (SCP) arrived on the international policy agenda 
through UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992, with the key aim on the 
consumption side to foster the diffusion of sustainable consumer behavior through raising awareness 
of the impacts of consumption choices. While efficiency on the production side has improved, it has 
been overwhelmed by absolute growth in consumption demand and emissions have continued to in-
crease. A new perspective on consumption patterns is therefore essential to enable sustainable de-
velopment according to Tukker et al. (2008). This moves attention more towards the second type of 
decoupling by immaterialisation, where human wellbeing is decoupled from economic growth or from 
material consumption. Moving towards immaterialisation recognises that consumption, or its proxy 
income, cannot be described as more than contributory dimensions of human wellbeing1. This is a 
position in-line with what is accepted in theory and evidence from multiple independent lines of en-
quiry, from the multidimensional concepts of wellbeing in development studies, economic perfor-
mance and social progress (McGillivray, 2007; Stiglitz et al. 2009, Sen, 1999; Nusbaum, 2005) to 
sustainable development (Halsnæs et al. 2014) and human health and psychology (Hupper et al. 
2005; Naci and Ionnadis, 2015; Keyes and Ryff 1999).  
5. Changing the focus 
Demand for consumer goods is not a simple consequence of income levels, populations at the same 
income levels consume different bundles of resources, emit widely varying amounts of greenhouse 
gases with varying levels of ‘wellbeing’. Production side changes can contribute but are insufficient to 
the challenge, and as stated by Tukker et al. (2008), the focus must now be directed towards the 
consumption or ‘demand side’. The question that arises then is how can demand for material con-
sumption be reduced, and how can this be achieved while human wellbeing is maintained or im-
proved? 
                                                            
 
1 The importance of income and consumption is indisputable, particularly for those in poverty and recognising 
problems with inequality, but they are neither the sole means nor the ends of human wellbeing as noted by Sen 
(1999). They are necessary but not sufficient for a sustainable wellbeing. 
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5.1 Shifting behaviour placed in context 
In seeking to understand the intractable elements of changing consumer behaviour, the IPCC fifth as-
sessment report offered systemic transdisciplinary conclusions (Fleurbaey et al., 2014). In contrast to 
rigid neoclassical assumptions on the rational choice of individuals, and utility maximisation measured 
in market prices and opportunity costs, this allows some of the sticking points to be more fully under-
stood. Research in psychology, sociology, and marketing science shows that consumer behavior is far 
more complicated than just a rational response to price signals (Mont and Plepys, 2005). Consump-
tion is influenced by a range of economic, informational, psychological, sociological, and cultural fac-
tors that operate at different levels or spheres in society  including the individual, the family, the 
locality, the market, and the work place (Thøgersen, 2010). There are structural issues beyond the 
individual, family or community, which lead to consumer lock-in to unsustainable patterns from prod-
uct availability and cultural norms and beliefs to working conditions that favour a ‘work-and-spend’ 
lifestyle (Sanne, 2002). The capacity of a ‘green consumer’ to enable sustainable consumption ap-
pears limited when recognising not only the structural factors, but the ‘value-action’ gap between 
‘green’ attitudes and consumption patterns and lifestyles (Barr, 2006; Young et al. 2010; De Barcellos 
et al., 2011) and the disabling influence of specific factors such as habit and cost (Young et al. 2010)1. 
The strength of the political economy factors and the inadequate attention to them by policy, is an 
important cause of the lack progress towards sustainable consumption patterns according to 
Fleurbaey et al. (2014: 308). 
5.2 Shifting consumption structure 
Pogutz and Micale (2011) suggest that demand can be shifted to lower impact consumption through 
environmentally friendly products and services and green shopping. There is an important distinction 
to be made here in that lowering material demand does not necessarily mean lowering expenditures, 
or indeed incomes, as highlighted by Pogutz and Micale. Consumption expenditures can theoretically 
be shifted towards consumption bundles that are inherently less emissions intensive, and from mate-
rial consumption to services and experiential goods. All three of the strands; lower emissions alterna-
tive goods, shifting the structure of consumption and seeking quality over quantity, could lead to lower 
emissions intensity of consumption in general as human wellbeing is dematerialised. By aligning con-
sumption expenditures with consumption bundles of lower emissions intensity, where they are asso-
ciated with higher wellbeing, a win-win approach of co-benefits and synergies can be pursued, as one 
of the gateways to the ‘double-dividend’. Value change in society is often described as a prerequisite 
towards higher concern for the environment and changes in lifestyle and behaviours (Gilg et al. 2005), 
                                                            
 
1 Young et al. (39) note factors including; habit, high transactions costs, availability, affordability, and non-
green criteria such as quality, size, brand, and discounts. 
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but there are also self-interest motivations for making such changes where they enhance individual 
wellbeing.  
5.3 Shifting the priority of life domains towards multidimensional ‘sustainable wellbeing’ 
An alternative approach to reducing the impacts of consumption is to seek an absolute reduction in 
material consumption levels on the demand side. It is frequently connected with lifestyle and behav-
iour change but has failed to gain much traction. In research on ‘low carbon transition and the good 
life’ that sought “to initiate a discussion surrounding the notion that reductions in greenhouse gas 
emissions always entail sacrifices” the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) became 
frontrunners in a field that is set to take on great importance as transition deepens globally, and con-
sumption moves to centre stage. They noted that a perception exists that moving to less materially 
intensive lifestyles is one of cost and loss and the sacrifice of quality of life (SEPA, 2012:71). However, 
this perception is peculiar when acknowledging the preceding evidence that not all types of consump-
tion are equal and some are damaging, to the individual, to society and to the environment. The per-
ception is common-place but evidently skewed, suggesting social and cultural lock-in is at play. It is 
likely linked to perceptions of ‘the good life’ as represented by pervasive consumer advertising 
(Fleurbaey et al. (2014: 308). Wellbeing is multidimensional and cannot be fully met through con-
sumption, which can actually compete with other life domains that are potentially more beneficial. 
Jackson (2005b) described the ´double dividend´ as an approach of reduced consumption and im-
proved wellbeing. This is described by SEPA (2012) as the ‘third way,’ focussing on human welfare and 
change that is beneficial to quality of life, while also reducing emissions at source. SEPA point out that 
“very little research has examined the actual relationship between reduced emissions and quality of 
life, and our review of the research that has been done does not point to any clear-cut link.” A growing 
if nascent literature has sought to explain and explore this concept as a promising double, triple or 
even quadruple dividend (Brown and Kasser, 2005; Gowdy 2005; Jackson 2005a, Princen, 2005: Do-
lan, et al. 2006; Marks, et al. 2006; Kasser, 2009; Welsch, 2009; Alexander, 2012), but there remain 
significant gaps in knowledge in how this is conceived and implemented as per SEPA (2012). The ap-
proach of alternative lifestyles have been enumerated as ‘sufficiency’1 (Muller, 2009), ‘voluntary sim-
plicity’ (Huneke, 2005) and ecologically concious or frugal lifestyles (Pepper et al., 2009). Such life-
styles are useful but may be limited in what they can achieve in the general population, at least in the 
short term without radical value change. Where they play into a perception of an austere narrative of 
reduction of ‘quality of life,’ they may not have a wide appeal, which would require long-term value 
change in society itself. It could therefore be argued that the key to achieving sustainable consumption 
patterns is not through addressing individual consumption behaviour, which is a viable supporting 
measure, but through beginning with a balance of overall human wellbeing. Rather than purusing 
                                                            
 
1 A ‘sufficient life’ is associated with moderation and prudence. 
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‘degrowth’ as a development paradigm this could bypass ‘reduce consumption’ for ‘increase wellbe-
ing,’ as part of a holistic approach to immaterialisation. 
A promising approach to improved human wellbeing that balances the different life domains is of-
fered by ‘wellbeing pathways’ of Henderson and Knight (2012) and Huta and Ryan (2010) and ‘full-
life’ or ‘integrated pathways’ of Waterman (1993) Seligman et al. (2004) Peterson et al., (2005) and 
Huppert and So (2009). Among the life domains, the social and relational feature prominently, with 
the key to wellbeing in achievement of balance and not necessarily ‘more’ as proposed by Delle Fave 
et al. (2011). While wellbeing needs to be defined individually and by different cultures1, to at least 
some degree, the eight dimensions of wellbeing in development of Stiglitz et al. (2009)2, the ten cen-
tral capabilities of Nussbaum (2005), and the six dimension model of psychological wellbeing of 
Keyes and Ryff (1999) show some overlap. In defining wellbeing pathways, the 2011 study of Delle 
Fave et al. (2011), of seven different countries3, outlined eleven different life domains from wellbeing 
research (i.e. Work, Family, Standard of Living, Interpersonal Relationships, Health, Personal Growth, 
Spirituality/Religion, Society issues, Community issues, Leisure, and Life in general). They found con-
cordance with what citizens referred to when they speak of wellbeing and happiness. Interestingly, 
balance, family, health and interpersonal relationships were once more ranked highest, and Henderson 
and Knight (2012) have recommended such a categorisation of life domains for future wellbeing re-
search. This literature could establish the seeds of sustainable wellbeing for immaterialisation that 
addresses over-consumption. In Fig. 1, the contrast of approaches to wellbeing that place a priority on 
consumption, verses balanced wellbeing pathways, are adapted from Delle Fave et al. (2011). They are 
illustrated with reference to a social and environmental sustainability threshold. For the purposes of 
illustration, the ‘standard of living’ domain of Delle Fave et al. (2011) is replaced with ‘consumption.’ 
While Stiglitz et al. (2009), Nussbaum (2005) and others (Kjell, 2011; Helne and Hirvilammi, 2015: 
Alexander, 2012) have noted the importance of the ‘environment,’ ‘nature’ and ‘other species,’ much 
of applied wellbeing research has tended not to include such categories. It would be useful to include 
a suitable category in the domains of Delle Fave et al. (2011) for alignment with development studies 
and sustainability literature as detailed in Fig. 1.  
 
 
 
                                                            
 
1 Recognising the importance of freedom and the cultural context as described in the capability approach of 
Amartya Sen (30). 
2 The eight dimensions of Stiglitz et al. (18) are listed as; i) Material living standards (income, consumption and 
wealth); ii) Health; iii) Education; iv) Personal activities including work; v) Political voice and governance; vi) 
Social connections and relationships; vii) Environment (present and future conditions); viii) Insecurity, of an 
economic as well as a physical nature. 
3 Australia, Croatia, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and South Africa. 
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Figure. 1 Contrasting approaches to wellbeing through a priority on consumption and balanced well-
being pathways adapted from Delle Fave et al. (63) 
Where the ‘sustainable wellbeing pathways’ approach (O’Mahony, 2016) becomes promising in 
transition, is when it is recognised that societies that are directed towards multidimensional wellbeing 
could causally be linked to lower material consumption and emissions. It is known that the life domains 
most beneficial for wellbeing are not income or consumption as previously discussed (Layard et al. 
2012; Delle Fave et al. 2011), but are domains such as the social and relational. With potential policy 
synergies and win-wins, the ‘double-dividend’ becomes a highly desirable pursuit in its function to 
reduce emissions. In line with a lower emissions development path, it can also be used to facilitate and 
empower citizens in all nations to pursue ‘the good life’. Ironically, it may also help spur the process of 
values change in society towards sustainability, the holy grail of SCP research, by re-establishing more 
direct links of human wellbeing to environmental wellbeing and the natural world. 
6. Conclusion 
The issue of material consumption patterns has been prominent since the debate on intergovernmen-
tal treaties on climate change accelerated in the 1990’s. Increasing material consumption levels have 
continued to drive GHG emissions, placing a significant barrier in the pathway of global low carbon 
transition, and achieving equality and sustainable development. While acknowledging the role of in-
come and consumption in reducing poverty, their role in delivering human wellbeing can be ques-
tioned. Income has been the usual proxy for consumption but the literature does not provide an en-
dorsement of its role as more than a contributor to wellbeing. Recent studies that seek to explore the 
relationship of consumption to wellbeing document a heterogeneous picture, where some consump-
tion bundles contribute more to wellbeing than others, and some categories can even be damaging 
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particularly in ‘over-consumption’. From development studies to health, and from psychology to well-
being science, a multidimensional model of wellbeing is now accepted, both by a long philosophical 
tradition and emerging empirical results. Development pathways that balance high levels of wellbeing 
and low emissions are a largely unexplored in modern history. Economic development and industrial-
isation have inherently involved higher consumption growth as the pathway to ‘the good life,’ status 
and national prestige. The field of sustainable consumption and production has sought to address this 
paradox, where the response that has emerged has centred on approaches such as production and 
eco-efficiency on the production side and the ‘green consumer’ and behaviour on the consumption 
side. While efficiency has improved, material consumption and emissions have continued to increase. 
A more fundamental focus looks at immaterialisation through decoupling income or consumption 
from human wellbeing. A focus on multidimensional wellbeing, with consumption as only one of the 
contributors to this, is supported by both theory and evidence. However, important conclusions by the 
Swedish Environmental Protection Agency (2012) have highlighted two defining characteristics. 
Firstly, little is known about the links between emissions and wellbeing, or the potential for the ‘double 
dividend,’ as there has been very little esearch. Secondly, the current approaches to transition are in-
sufficient, and the neglected issue of consumption can be neglected no more if there is to be a low 
carbon transition, a point echoed recently by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(Fleurbaey et al. 2014: 290). 
A more fundamental change involves a shift in the priority on life domains and a focus on balanced 
multidimensional wellbeing pathways or ‘sustainable wellbeing’ (O’Mahony, 2016). This could lead to 
higher levels of wellbeing while reducing emissions, the essence of Jackson’s ‘double dividend’ 
(2005b). Balanced wellbeing would address all of the dimensions of human wellbeing, rather than 
relying on income and material consumption as the route to living ‘the good life’. Recent research in 
wellbeing science and psychology has outlined ‘wellbeing pathways’ as a unifying conception that al-
lows a ‘full-life’ ‘flourishing’ concept to emerge in individuals and society. While debates on ‘degrowth’ 
have made important contributions on development within limits, for some the concept lacks intuitive 
appeal which could hamper its uptake. ‘Sustainable wellbeing’ could overcome such negative associ-
ations while also focussing clearly on outcomes and solutions, on win-win approaches within the en-
vironmental and social boundaries of development. This could facilitate the emergence of synergies 
and win-win outcomes, particularly the coincidence of an advancement of human wellbeing, in parallel 
to low carbon transition and environmental protection.  
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4.  RESILIENT FUTURES:  
FOOD AND WATER SAFETY 
The Cogitaire 5 Model: Thinking our way into the future  
Jude Walker 
FutureWorking, Australia 
Abstract 
Current research identifies the impact of new technologies on a range of global occupations and the 
changing nature of work itself, as many employers eliminate full-time jobs in favour of casual or con-
tract jobs in the gig economy. Unfortunately, the education/training system is not keeping pace with 
the changes occurring in the labour market. This paper puts forward the proposition that, rather than 
delivering vocationally specific courses, we should be assisting students, jobseekers and employees 
to develop cross-sector capabilities, and then offering them short, just-in-time vocational programs 
for the work they are about to undertake. The author has developed the Cogitaire 5 Model, which 
consists of five thinking capabilities which she believes will prepare people for the varied types of work 
and personal decisions which they need to make in the modern, chaotic world. These capabilities in-
clude Futures Thinking, Systems Thinking, Complexity Thinking, Entrepreneurial Thinking and Design 
Thinking.  This paper will discuss some of the tools and techniques which relate to each capability as 
well as the personal attributes which people can develop by learning these methods. 
Introduction and Background 
Global labour markets are undergoing change caused by the introduction of new technologies and 
changes to the structure of work involving a continuing decline in full-time jobs, and a rise in the gig 
economy.  This means that traditional vocationally specific courses are becoming less useful for those 
who find themselves having to make many personal and professional decisions in a constantly chang-
ing world. This paper examines factors impacting on the ability of the education/training sector to 
effectively meet the varied needs of these individuals.  This include discussion of the three Aristotelian 
categories of learning, the concept of neuroplasticity as it relates to learning, and the increasing irrel-
evance of mainstream factory models of education.  In their place, the author presents a different 
model of learning which assists individuals to develop a range of cross-sector capabilities designed to 
help them make more sophisticated, informed decisions about their future. This Cogitaire1 5 model 
                                                            
 
1 The word “Cogitaire” is the Latin word for “thinking” 
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consists of five thinking capabilities – Futures Thinking, Systems Thinking, Complexity Thinking, En-
trepreneurial Thinking and Design Thinking; and is designed to assist people to build their creative and 
critical thinking capacity. The paper will identify some of the tools and techniques which people can 
learn, and discuss the personal capabilities which can be developed through practice of these tech-
niques. 
New technologies 
Frey and Osborne (2013) examined occupational categories in the American labour market with the 
intent of estimating the statistical probability of each occupation being eliminated due to the introduc-
tion of new technologies.  Overall, they estimated that 47% of jobs in the U.S. were at high risk of 
disappearing over the next two decades (2013, 38).  That work has now been extrapolated into the 
European labour market (van Dijk & Edzes 2016) and the Australian labour market (Durrent-Whyte 
et al 2015).  The Australian research indicates that 40%, or five million, jobs are at high risk of being 
eliminated by 2030 (Durrent-Whyte et al 2015, 92). 
Whilst there is some debate as to the accuracy of the conclusions drawn by these studies (Ciriani 
& Perin 2015), it is certain that, even if specific jobs are not eliminated entirely, most jobs will be 
changed to a greater or lesser extent by the introduction of new technologies (Autor 2015, 9).   
The gig economy 
The gig economy is also known as the sharing, on-demand or portfolio economy.   
These terms indicate that these types of less traditional ways of working involve undertaking several 
jobs concurrently, sometimes in completely different occupations and even industry sectors. If indi-
viduals are to maximise their ability to take advantage of this type of work, then the education/training 
and employment sectors need to assist them to gain the capabilities necessary to navigate the more 
chaotic employment conditions they face. 
The rise in independent workers without the safety net of protection provided by Government reg-
ulation supported by an active labour movement is now putting that economic security at risk for many 
workers. Services such as Airbnb and Uber have been under the spotlight for some time (Rahman 
2016), and issues of labour underutilisation are now also becoming topics of research (Mayer 2014).  
Not only can this type of employment place workers into economic difficulties, it also poses a number 
of other risks for those in work or seeking work, as they grapple with changes in their own identity, 
purpose and meaning of life which, in the past, have often been associated with their occupations.  
This has left many people struggling with a range of life decisions, not just career ones.  Once again, 
the education/training system is ill equipped to effectively prepare students to make informed, so-
phisticated choices. 
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Material and Methods 
Whilst there are many pockets of innovation in education/training organisations, in the main the ed-
ucation sector still works on a traditional nineteenth century factory model (Gilham & Tomkins 2016), 
in which students proceed in lock-step fashion, with teachers using convergent methods of teaching 
which “usually corresponds to the default option in classrooms and is taught in interactions between 
teachers and students” (Bonnardel & Didier 2016, 86).  In using these convergent methods, teachers 
accustom students to seek the “one right answer”.  This method of teaching makes it difficult for stu-
dents to learn critical or creative thinking, but rather they accept that there is always a correct process 
to be followed to find that “one right answer”.  Bonnardel and Didier identify the difficulty in teaching 
creativity when convergent teaching practices are used. 
In many education/training organisations, a curriculum or competency driven approach also now 
appears to be more important than meeting the specific needs of learners.  It often appears as if the 
entire teaching process is subsumed into the need to develop timetables and to program the delivery 
of siloed subjects or competencies.  The problems in taking a curriculum driven approach have been 
the subject of research in a range of settings, including population health care training in which “such 
curriculum-driven structure may limit the development of problem representations that incorporate 
the necessary complexity and context to support adequate clinical solution development” (Merahn 
2015, 126). The difficulties in using a curriculum driven approach to problem-based learning is also 
examined in the context of medical training with the conclusion that a more integrated approach is 
needed for effective problem-based learning to occur (Amoako-Sakyi & Amonoo-Kuofi 2015).  Given 
the complexity of preparing people for the emerging labour market and the life decisions that this entails, 
this would seem to indicate that a different approach is needed by the education/training system. 
Aristotle’s three types of learning 
If we are to consider what different approaches may be useful in assisting people to gain the capabili-
ties that they are likely to need in the changing labour market, then an examination of Aristotle’s three 
types of learning may be useful. 
Aristotle (384-322BC) “allows for reconsidering and reintegrating ways of knowing: ‘traditional, 
practical, tacit, emotional, experiential, intuitive, etc., marginalised and considered insufficient by 
modernist [and postmodernist] thinking’” (Eikeland 2012, 20-21). 
The three famous virtues defined by Aristotle are: 
 episteme – scientific knowledge or theory, which is “universal, invariable, and context inde-
pendent” (Harper & Maher 2017, p. 3).  This is the type of knowledge which is highly valued 
and taught in both secondary levels of high school (that is, for students aged twelve to eight-
een) as well as in higher education institutions such as universities.   
 techne – “denotes production, namely art, workmanship, or skill (the ‘know how’). It describes 
the endeavor of using technical rationality to produce a certain outcome” (Ermenc, Vujisić & 
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Spasenović 2015, 3).  This is the type of knowledge which is taught in competency based Tech-
nical and Vocational Education & Training (TVET) institutions. 
 phronesis – “is most often translated as ‘practical wisdom’ or prudence, and denotes the ability 
or character trait of being able to use one’s collective knowledge in a different way, in order to 
produce the most optimal outcome of a specific situation.  A phronetic practitioner is able to 
draw on their knowledge, recognize what is needed in that situation, and deal with it effec-
tively. This ability requires a high level of perception and flexibility, in combination with an 
understanding of which epistemic and technical knowledge to apply for the best outcome” 
(2015, 3).   
 
It is this phronetic component which appears to be missing in the way people learn in our modern 
education and training institutions, as well as in modern workplaces.  Whilst students are well pre-
pared with theory and skill sets, they very often are not able to translate that learning effectively into 
their professional and private lives.  Nor are they able to develop an ethical framework by which to 
guide their lives (Chen 2015).  Without these capabilities, the author believes that we are losing our 
capacity for creative and critical thinking and ethical decision making.  This is demonstrated by the 
willingness of so many to blindly believe anything they see or read on social media.  Whilst this is 
indicative of all generations, it is a particular issue for the Generation Z group, born between 2005 and 
2014 (Rickes 2016, 25), whose upbringing has been described as “oversimple, overslowed [and] over-
protected” (Strauss & Howe 1997, 299). 
Neuroscience and neuroplasticity 
If we accept that existing mainstream education and training institutions are not adequately preparing 
students to deal with the complexities of the global labour market, then different forms of education 
need to be developed, and this means that different styles of teaching and learning may also be 
needed. Neuroscience shows that “[t]he brain is a network of neural networks. Hence, some form of 
network theory is required to explain how learning and memory work” (Tryon 2016, 277). One of the 
newer areas of research into teaching and learning is that of neuroplasticity, which is the study of how 
the brain forms new neural pathways, often after a traumatic event of some sort. For hundreds of 
years, scientists believed that humans brains were fully formed by adolescence and that no change 
was possible.   
We have known for a long time that “practice makes perfect”; that is, the more often we repeat 
what we have learnt, the more sub-conscious, and automatic, that learning becomes. In neuroplastic 
terms, we deepen those existing neural pathways which have been formed by the learning. In other 
words, “the more that you do something, the more it will ultimately form a more indelible relationship 
between neurons and neural networks” (Gustafson 2017, 22).  Whilst this has been seen as a positive 
aspect of learning, the other side of the neuroplastic coin is that, the deeper those neural pathways 
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become, the less likely we are to form new neural pathways by learning alternative ways of doing that 
thing we have learnt, or of doing a new thing instead. This can result in rigid thinking processes which 
have difficulty in accepting new information. This is known as cognitive dissonance, and the result is 
often the rejection of that new information. 
If we are to successfully prepare individuals to make informed, sophisticated decisions about their 
futures, then we need to stop relying simply on traditional ways of helping them to learn, and be willing 
to examine new learning structures. The rest of this paper will put forward one new model of assisting 
those learners to develop a range of cross-sector capabilities: the Cogitaire 5 model. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
The Cogitaire 5 model (see Figure 2 below) is built around five thinking capabilities which could be 
useful in preparing people for the varied types of work and personal decisions which they need to make 
in the modern, chaotic world of the gig economy, as well as in dealing with complex organisational 
issues. These include Futures Thinking, Systems Thinking, Complexity Thinking, Entrepreneurial 
Thinking and Design Thinking.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 - Cogitaire 5 model 
 
 
The thinking capabilities have been chosen in a particular order for reasons which will be defined as 
each capability is described.  The model is designed to assist people to develop their overarching abil-
ity to think creatively and critically; and includes a range of tools and techniques which relate to each 
capability.  The practice of these methods can also assist individuals to develop personal attributes 
which are vital if they are to be able to make informed, sophisticated decisions about their education 
and employment options, as well as the wide range of other important personal decisions which will 
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affect their futures. There are many tools and techniques which relate to each of these thinking capa-
bilities.  However, as there is insufficient room in this article to describe each of these, the focus will 
be on the ones the author considers most relevant in a range of conditions. The intent is that the se-
lection of tools and techniques being taught is based on the particular needs of the learner or group of 
learners. 
To test the efficacy of the model, the author consulted widely with employers, workers, educators, 
those seeking work, and the community agencies which work with all of these groups.  As well, a 
workshop was conducted with the Board and staff of a not-for-profit working to improve education 
and employment outcomes for regional residents.   
Futures thinking 
Lewis Carroll has been quoted as saying “If you don’t know where you’re going, any road will get you 
there” (Carroll n.d.). This is the reason that Futures Thinking is the first capability to be examined in 
the Cogitaire 5 model.  Without having thought deeply about where the future may take us if we make 
no changes, and what possibilities may be realised if we have a process to work towards them, then 
we might as well simply “float along” and see where the road takes us. Voros’ (2003) Futures Cone is 
a useful tool to explore probable, possible and preferred futures, from the pedestrian business-as-
usual scenario to the most outrageous “what if” possibilities. This exercise takes courage to really think 
about what could be; creativity, imagination and curiosity to develop a wide range of options; and 
vision to see the potential. 
Change is very difficult for most people (Kegan & Lahey 2009) and, unless there is a compelling rea-
son, it is often easier to maintain the status quo.  Inayatullah’s (2003) Futures Triangle and Causal 
Layered Analysis, along with Wilber’s (2001) Integral Theory are useful tools for individuals to reflect 
deeply, and critically, on their current and preferred future situations, and will often surface the key 
values which drive the person.     
Having undertaken the reflective work required to gain insights into what is holding us back and the 
imperatives to change, the individual can then use scenarios (Slaughter 1996b) to build narratives of 
what the future might hold. Scenarios require creative thinking and imagination to bring the stories to 
life, and are an excellent tool for testing our assumptions about the future. 
Having reflected deeply, examined why we need to change, and identified the probable, possible and 
preferred futures through the use of strategic foresight tools and techniques, we are then ready to 
move onto the next phase. 
Systems thinking 
Having examined a range of possible futures and selected the preferred future, it is then necessary to 
gain a deeper understanding of the system within which the individual is situated. The specific system 
will depend on the nature of the issue which has prompted the investigation in the first place. If the 
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desired future relates to an education/training/employment career based future, then the system will 
be the one in which those sectors, as well as the individual’s own networks, are nested. If the issue is 
an organisational problem or opportunity, then the system may include suppliers, customers, etc. If a 
life decision is being made, then friends, family, social contacts, club membership, personal view-
points, etc. will form the system.  Until the system itself is understood, then it is not possible to identify 
where the drivers and barriers for change are located. Meadows defines a system as: 
 
a set of things – people, cells, molecules, or whatever – interconnected in such a way 
that they produce their own pattern of behaviour over time.  The system may be buf-
feted, constricted, triggered, or driven by outside forces.  But the system’s response to 
these forces is characteristic of itself, and that response is seldom simple in the real 
world (2008, 2). 
 
In trying to understand the system relating to our current and preferred future, it is vital to under-
stand that that system is open to outside influence, and to gain insights into what those influences 
might be and whether they are benign or malignant. Often it is useful to visually map the system to 
identify how its parts are connected. This can be a very useful exercise as it assists the individual to 
develop their ability to think logically, conceptually and in a structured manner. 
Furthermore, we must understand the mental models through which we make sense of that system 
and the world in general. Are we leaders or followers? What does leadership and followership mean 
to us?  Have our experiences been positive or negative? Is the system cooperative or competitive and 
what does this mean for the interactions and communication between the parts of the system? What 
is the compelling vision for the future which will drive us towards change? What are the characteristics 
of the system which will facilitate that change, and which ones will be impediments? Until we under-
stand these things, we are unlikely to be successful in moving towards our preferred future. 
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Complexity thinking 
The problem with systems thinking is that, the minute we try to represent a system visually, we sim-
plify it out of reality.  Systems are highly complex things which ”for their inner dynamic and emergent 
nature … have to deal with emerging, unexpected and unknown possibilities of interactions that may 
lead to conditions of complexity” (Badinelli et al, 2012, 507). This is why, having examined systems 
thinking, we must then consider complexity thinking in the development of the Cogitaire 5 model. The 
process of doing this can help the individual to develop their personal capabilities in change tolerance, 
problem solving, decision making and critical thinking. 
Chaos and ambiguity seem to be more prevalent today than previously, with the world being de-
scribed as volatile, uncertain, complex and non-linear (Davis 2015, 2). In trying to understand the sys-
tem, we also need to consider the memes which drive it.  Waddock et al define memes as “cultural 
expressions that shape how things are perceived” (2015, 1004). The use of tools such as Spiral Dy-
namics© (Beck & Cowen 2014) can assist the individual to gain some insights into these areas, from 
both a group and personal perspective. 
Entrepreneurial thinking 
Amongst the many other quotes attributed to Albert Einstein, he has been reputed to have said “In-
sanity: doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results” (c. 1930) and “We 
can't solve problems by using the same kind of thinking we used when we created them” (n.d.). Once 
the preferred future has been identified and the system, in all its complexity is understood, then the 
individual is ready to make the changes necessary to achieve their goals. This cannot be done in the 
mindset which has been used in the past – an entrepreneurial mindset will be required if new oppor-
tunities are to be identified and realised.   
Paul and Seward examine six qualities which have been identified as forming entrepreneurial think-
ing, “questioning, improvising, being open to risk, being ready to fail, working collectively, and being 
self-driven. These are qualities of a mind-set that helps individuals be innovative, creative, and re-
sourceful in the way that they solve problems” (2016, 325). 
If the individual is to develop their personal capabilities for lateral thinking, risk tolerance, novel and 
adaptive thinking, as well as their curiosity, imagination and creative thinking capacity, then educa-
tors/trainers need to use exercises which will allow them to practice these skills. 
Design thinking 
The final component of the Cogitaire 5 model is Design Thinking.  Bringing an entrepreneurial mindset 
to the system in order to move towards the desired future, means that we have to try to redesign those 
parts of the system which are holding us back from making the necessary changes. Alternatively, if the 
system is completely dysfunctional, then we may need to attempt to design a completely new system 
which is supportive of the preferred future. 
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Design thinking can be very useful as it “can be applied very generally in numerous fields, serving 
as a tool that systematically prevents its applicants from using traditional means of problem solving” 
(Fischer 2015, 174). Vande Zande (2007) proposed that the use of design thinking can help individuals 
develop their critical thinking capabilities and it is these, along with creative thinking, which will be 
vital in achieving our desired future. 
Brown and Kuratko (2015) describe a process which can be applied to assist the individual to un-
derstand and redesign the issue or system in question. This includes problem definition, research, pro-
totyping, feedback, iterations, acquired knowledge, intuition and proof of concept. 
The use of this process, along with other Design Thinking tools and techniques such as empathy 
mapping or persona mapping (Piu 2011) can be useful when working with individuals who are seeking 
to make significant changes in their lives, whether this relates to their careers, their organisational 
futures or their personal lives. 
Conclusion 
The Cogitaire 5 model started out as the author’s response to the inability of the education/training 
system to keep pace with the technological and structural changes occurring in the global labour mar-
ket.  However, the research undertaken during the development of the model has shown that it has 
wider applicability. Like the Cogitaire 5 model, there are other learning models being promulgated as 
useful alternatives to the offerings of the mainstream education and training systems. The Cogitaire 5 
model is still in the early stages of development and needs further testing to establish its validity and 
reliability. The author is working with other reseachers who are developing alternative concepts to 
further develop the model’s usefulness for today’s complex world. 
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Particularities of the Future-Oriented Educational Practices in Different Re-
gions: Comparative Analysis Based on the Experience of Russia and Finland 
Tatiana Yakubovskaya 
National Research Tomsk State University, Head of Scientific-Educational Centre for  
Foresight-competence development, Russia 
Abstract 
The paper is focused on the methodological issues related to the particularities of the comparative 
analysis of the future-oriented educational practices in different regions. In the research, the concept 
of "educational foresight-event" (EFE) is developed as a comparative analysis model. The future-ori-
ented educational experience in Finland and Russia is considered on this basis.  
Introduction and Background 
Particularities of the generated educational models and methods, concepts and tools to develop fu-
tures/foresight thinking and futures/foresight literacy as a part of the modern worldview are consid-
ered by different educational and scientific groups in the world.  
The idea of this comparative research came from the analysis based on the experience of educa-
tional projects “Open Foresight-laboratory” in Russian regions. The educational technology “open 
foresight-laboratory” was developed by research and pedagogical teams in cooperation of Tomsk 
State University with high schools and colleges of West Siberia (Tomsk, 2012-2017) and Arctic area 
(Yamal, 2017). 
During the implementation of these programs for different regions, we formulated a hypothesis 
about the dependence of future-oriented educational programs on regional and territorial features. 
This hypothesis is focused on the key ussies: regional content of the future-oriented education and the 
circle of regional groups acting as participants of the future-oriented educational programs (stake-
holders who are interested in territory development): 
 Visioning (V): What kind of visions of the future are there on this territory? How do the visions 
of the future in the region influence future-oriented educational practices?  
 Communities (C): What kind of territory groups are there who are interested in future-ori-
ented educational practices? 
 Education (E): Who are agents and what kind of approaches, programs, projects for future- 
oriented educational practices do they need? 
The main purpose of this study is to perform a comparative analysis of the particularities of the 
future-oriented educational practices in different regions. Therefore, methodological issues and tools 
need to be discussed. Thus, we have two main research tasks: 1. to develop an analytical model for a 
comparative analysis of the future-oriented educational practices in different regions and 2. Based 
thereon to study particularities of the future-oriented educational practice in Russia and Finland.  
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Material and Methods 
Several types of research materials and methods from theoretical and practical educational and psy-
chological to philosophical and methodological researches were used for the comparative analysis of 
the future-oriented educational practices in different regions.  
One type of the research materials relates to the educational practices of the programs based on 
the new educational technology “Open Foresight-Laboratory for Students”. This educational project 
was developed by research and pedagogical teams in cooperation of Tomsk State University, region 
administrations, high schools and colleges. Different models of this educational technology were im-
plemented in West Siberia (Tomsk) and in the Arctic area (Yamal) within 2012-2017. 
The educational technology “open foresight-laboratory” is based on the Educational Foresight-
methodology and moves participants’ thinking from an uncertain vision of their futures to more posi-
tive and constructive versions, from a focus on new key technologies to the question about their ef-
fects and impacts on changes in economic, social-cultural, educational, professional levels of social 
life. In “open foresight-laboratory” programs students analyse how these changes influence the explo-
ration of worldviews and myths that underlie possible, probable and preferred future, rethinking ver-
sions about their educational and professional futures. Finally, they create new versions of their choice 
of educational scenarios as well as of the visions of the futures of the region. 
Model 1. Open foresight-laboratory of high school students “Key Technologies and Professions of 
the Future: Educational Foresight + 20” (2012–2017, Russia, Tomsk State University & high schools)  
 2012 (1): 5 experts, 70 high school students, 12 teachers from Seversk gymna-
sium/high school (Tomsk region) 
 2013 (1): 12 experts, 150 high school students, 34 teachers from 11 regions of Russia 
and Tomsk  
 2014 (2): 17 experts, 290 high school students, 41 teachers from Tomsk region and 10 
regions of Russia 
 2015 (2): 16 experts, 310 high school students, 46 teachers from Tomsk region and 13 
regions of Russia 
 2016 (2): 22 experts, 305 high school students, 46 teachers from Tomsk region and 
10 regions of Russia 
 2017 (2): 10 experts, 145 high school students, 21 teachers from Tomsk region and 13 
regions of Russia 
Model 2. Open foresight-laboratory for students for the regional development “Arctic Generations 
& Arctic Skills + 20” (2017, Russia, Tomsk State University & high schools’ and colleges’ of Yamal, 
Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous District, Arctic area)   
 March 2017: 18 experts, 60 high school and college students (10 groups), 20 teachers 
from 6 towns of Yamal 
 April 2017: 23 experts, 60 high school and college students (6 groups), 21 teachers 
from 5 towns of Yamal 
 November 2017: 12 experts, 60 students (6 groups) and 10 teachers from 5 medical 
college of Yamal  
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An example of future-oriented educational program: Model 2. Open foresight-laboratory for stu-
dents for the regional development “Arctic Generations & Arctic Skills + 20” (February-March 2017, 
Yamal, Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous District, for high schools & colleges, head of the program team – 
Tatiana Yakubovskaya)  
The program was held for 3 days (or 3 stages), and the prior preparation stage took 1 month. Par-
ticipants: 18 experts, 60 high school and college students, 20 teachers from 6 towns of Yamal.  
Structure of the educational program: 
1. Key Technologies for Arctic Lifestyle +20: Threats and Opportunities 
 Digitalization. IT 
 Robotics 
 New materials. 3- and 4-D printing 
 Power Engineering 
 Biotechnology 
2. Arctic Lifestyle & Arctic Generations +20 (versions) 
3. Arctic Skills + 20: Top ‐ 15 Professions for Arctic Generation and My Priorities for My Per‐
sonal Educational Programs (versions) 
The materials for analysis: 
 Programs (for different models) 
 Students’ Foresight-essays (from preparation/distance stage) 
 Presentations from the work teams of “Open Foresight-laboratory” (3-10 teams) 
 Questionnaires, interviews 
 Video materials, comics and others. 
The second type of research materials is based on the philosophical, psychological and methodo-
logical analysis of the future-oriented educational practices in the world. The development of the an-
alytical model for comparative analysis requires to consider why practical use of the concepts of the 
future in modern education generates a number of serious problems as well as new educational and 
pedagogical tasks. 
On the one hand, the accumulated global future-oriented education experience allows to hypothe-
size: what areas of educational activities meet conditions for understanding the concept of time in 
education and what opportunities to work with the future there are in the context of personalisation. 
Firstly, the concept of time is included into the idea of individualized education program (IEP) as the 
format of personalisation in education. 
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This means that different types of pedagogical activity are aimed at understanding personal re-
sources and constraints of a personal educational path with respect to various vectors of time "present 
- future - past". 
Secondly, the concept of time and the future corresponds to the organization of various educational 
co-creative events as the backbone units of teaching practice of personalisation. In the analysis of 
contemporary practices of personalisation attention is paid to the experience in developing special 
educational events to understand future trends. With the help of this type of educational events self-
determination and understanding of the development of specific educational route involving various 
resources to implement this educational program can be identified. 
Thirdly, to work with the concepts of time and future is fundamentally important in different peda-
gogical formats for project types of learning activities.  
But, on the other hand, analysis of the situation in modern education shows that the issue of the 
future is a major historical challenge for educational practice. The idea of education originally has a 
timeless character. And education as a social institute focused on broadcasting of "eternal values", 
cultural norms and activities without an idea of time. 
However, such global educational trends and practices of personalisation of education, project-
based approach, widespread foresight-literacy and future-thinking development pay attention to the 
concept of time in education and the issues how we can and must work with the concept of the future 
in education.  
 
Thesis 1. The future as a challenge for western education. When discussing future work in education 
practices, a fundamental revision of educational ideas is required. 
The idea of western education initially confronts the idea of time and is based on a fundamentally 
timeless nature of the goals of education. The history of the idea of education in western culture from 
antiquity to modern times is still related to the history of the social institute of education oriented to 
showing "eternal values", norms of culture and activities.  
In the pedagogical language, the term of “time” is used more as an empirical phenomenon, and not 
as a philosophical category: usually the “future” is considered as the term "tomorrow", in which the 
results of our "today" efforts are manifested for the development and preservation of the "past", in the 
forms of cultural norms and traditions. Accordingly, the term “future” in such pedagogical logic is a 
continuation of the “past” through its retention in the “present”. 
The forward-looking scenarios of the development in education which describe education of the 
future consider mainly new unique opportunities and implications for educational practices only in 
terms of technological innovations. However, the time perspective should be considered as the deep 
historical challenge for education, since the idea of time in education changes ontological foundations 
of the western paradigm of education. 
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In the context of time concept, questions about new approaches and opportunities to work with 
different vectors of time in educational practice including the future of the educational community as 
a whole open up new areas of research and development. 
 
Thesis 2. The trend of personalisation of education is commensurable with the question of the in-
troduction of the category of time into educational theory and practice. On this basis, a new paradigm 
of education can be created: today, the experience of future-oriented education is an interesting prom-
ising approach to this task.    
Introduction of the category of time in the concept of education requires rethinking of the underlying 
principles and the development of new conceptual solutions for the elaboration of the theory and prac-
tice of educational activities. 
The main hypothesis is that the practice of education personalisation commensurate with the cat-
egory of time and allows to work with the foresight-culture in the field of education. The idea of time 
enhances anthropological principles of education personalisation concept because the idea of human 
self-determination is related to the idea of time. The idea of time emphasizes the value of human per-
sonality through the projection of his subjectivity in different time dimensions and their co-scaling in 
the individual history of a person. 
 
Thesis 3. The cultural-historical theory (L. Vygotsky) creates a foundation for the introduction of 
the concept of time and the future into the pedagogical practices It also provides for the opportunities 
to reconsider the idea of education: the main ideas are the “zone of proximal development”, thinking 
and speaking as verbal tools to guide thinking and actions. Vygotsky's research in the field of psychol-
ogy of adolescence plays a special role in the organization of work with the concept of time and the 
future. Some of the most important research areas in the context of personalisation and future-ori-
ented education are as follows:  
1. In the context of cultural-historical theory the concepts of time and the future are considered to 
constitute the child's independence from the immediate situation at present, the possibility of 
free action by "the sketch of the future" [1]: mechanisms of the sign mediation, planning func-
tion of speech, symbolic operations, pilot actions, etc.  
2. The investigation of conditions for the formation of subjectivity. L.Vygotsky's positions about 
the social nature of the individual, the mastery of behaviour and projective action introduces the 
concept of time and the future in determining activity of human nature: “human element is not 
a given. It is revealed in "step" of the human formation - an effort to build actions and re-crea-
tion, re-creation of the act of acquisition of subjectivity” [3]. The psychology of adolescence 
with valuable modes of time and the concept of the future are strengthened by the fact that the 
teenager "comes to one of the most decisive moments of life - to the choice of vocation and 
profession" [2, 220].  
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3. The research of the conditions and processes of formation of conceptual thinking / theoretical 
thinking: "The language of thinking is the language of freedom"[2, 202]. The position of the 
intellectualization of mental functions (memory, volitional action, imagination, etc.) in the tran-
sitional age of teenagers and the formation of conceptual thinking allow us to consider the con-
nection of the concept of time and the future and the concept of freedom from ongoing activities 
and the work with intention. 
4. The research of the development of a new way of thinking which is "based mainly on speech or 
any other system of signs" [2, 221]. The future has a significant feature, it always stays in signs, 
knowledge of the future exists in different types of text format. In accordance with the basic 
ideas of the cultural-historical theory an important challenge for education and a specific ped-
agogical task is to work with texts and information about the future: search, analysis and eval-
uation, selection, creation. So, new opportunities for pedagogical actions with different texts 
about the future in the formats of educational foresight-events arise including: organization of 
team format evets, analysis of personal resources and development versions of the individual 
educational program, designing educational routes, etc. 
 
The third type of the research materials relates to the future studies and foresight researches and 
their use in the modern educational practice.  
The formation of a new educational content based on the analysis of contemporary culture 
knowledge about the future and foresight-culture is becoming the key challenge for educational prac-
tice. Today, the area of future studies is a special area of activity and culture that is beginning to have 
a noticeable impact on the modern education. This primarily occurs through the preparation of experts 
within university programs in the field of research methodology where Futures studies (and Foresight) 
take a special place. 
Compared to other approaches to the study of the s, the methodology of foresight is aimed at gain-
ing knowledge about the future as the basis for making strategic management decisions. The most 
important criterion for evaluating the foresight methodology is the quality and reliability of knowledge 
of the future for making decisions at different levels: national strategic program development, corpo-
rate strategy, education policy and others.  
On the one hand, in the modern western society foresight-knowledge has become a part of western 
culture and social institutions. On the other hand, the formation of a new educational content based 
on the modern foresight-culture requires radical re-thinking of the idea of education. Only within the 
framework of the introduction of time category into education we can talk about the development of 
future thinking and literacy in educational practices. The formation of modern culture of future-
knowledge and future thinking and the pedagogical working with a time perspective becomes very 
important in educational theory and practice.  
Thus, an analytical model for a comparative analysis of the future-oriented educational practice in 
Russia and Finland was developed on the basis of different types of research materials.  
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Results 
1. The concept and analytical model of “Educational Foresight-Event” (EFE, Figure 1 and 2) as an ana-
lytical model for the comparative analysis of the future-oriented educational practice in different re-
gions is based on the analyses of the regional content of economic, social-cultural, educational, pro-
fessional levels of social life and the regional groups or stakeholders who are interested in the devel-
opment of the territory: 
 Visioning (V): What kind of visions of the future are there on this territory? How do the visions 
of the future in the region influence future-oriented educational practices?  
 Communities (C): What kind of territorial groups are there who are interested in future-ori-
ented educational practices? 
 Education (E): Who are the agents and what kind of approaches, programs, projects for future-
oriented educational practices do they need? 
 
1.1. The concept of “Educational Foresight-Event” (EFE) includes three main types of regional fea-
tures as the dependence of future-oriented educational programs on territorial particularities:   
 Visioning (V): Rethinking of visions about the Future (versions about one’s own and regional 
futures): youth versions about their own future and future of the territory 
 Communities (C): Participation of the future-oriented communities in the EFE: groups inter-
ested in Future-oriented educational practices 
 Education (E): Educational formats EFE: agents, approaches, programs, projects for Future-
oriented educational practices 
 
1.2. The concept of “Educational Foresight-Event” (EFE) as a comparative analytical model of the 
future-oriented educational practice is the series of regular future-oriented educational events accord-
ing the educational technology “open foresight-laboratory”. It goes beyond “futures” as isolated les-
sons through the empirical, interpretive, critical, and action learning modes of futures studies. 
 The educational foresight-event (EFE) allows to: 
 establish links between the future, past and present,  
 teach skills for personal and social transformation, 
 lead to a meaningful change and development for individuals and groups within their learning 
environment in connection with the issues of future image formation, 
 move thinking from the focus on new technologies to the question of effects and impacts on 
economic, social-cultural, educational, professional changes,  
 explore the worldviews and myths that underlie possible, probable and preferred futures  
 achieve versions of one’s own choice of educational scenarios and profession in line with the 
possibilities of desired presents and futures, 
 rethink versions about one’s own futures (educational, professional) and futures of the terri-
tory: from uncertain visions about one’s own futures to more positive and constructive ver-
sions. 
 
1.3. The concept of “Educational Foresight-Event” (EFE) develops significant focus within the future-
oriented education by examination and adopting of the following ideas: 
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 Ideas from Psychology: fundamental models from Vygotsky's Cultural-historical / Sociocul-
tural Theory 
 Ideas from Futures studies: methods of educational foresight and narrative foresight (S.Ina-
yatullah) approaches,  
 Ideas from Philosophy: theory of extreme events and problems with probability, randomness 
(concept of Black Swan, N. Taleb),  
 Ideas from training technologies for social innovation: “transformative action” model (Trans-
formative Action Institute, TAI) 
 
The concept of Education Foresight-Event (EFE) as a comparative analytical model  
of the future-oriented educational practice is based on the following ideas: 
Ideas from Philosophy: Theory of extreme 
events (concept of Black Swan) (N. Taleb) 
Issues: extreme event, problems with 
probability, randomness, human error, the 
philosophy of knowledge and so on. 
Ideas from Psychology: Vygotsky's Cul-
tural-historical Theory: “zone of proximal 
development”, thinking and speaking as 
verbal tools to guide thinking and actions, 
and other ideas.  
Ideas from Futures studies: Educational 
foresight and Narrative foresight peda-
gogy (CLA) (S. Inayatullah):  
Analysis: new technologies; impacts on 
economic, social-cultural, educational, 
changes of competencies and professions; 
possible, probable and preferred futures; 
versions of one’s own choice of educa-
tional scenarios and professions, possibil-
ities of desired presents and futures. 
Ideas from training technologies for social 
innovation: 
Transformative Action Institute (TAI): 
transforming action as a model for per-
sonal and social change 
Education (E): Educational formats EFE 
Educational Foresight-Events (EFE) as a series of regu-
lar future-oriented educational event according to the 
educational technology “open foresight-laboratory”  
EFE goes beyond “futures” as isolated lessons through 
the empirical, interpretive, critical, and action learning 
modes of futures studies.  
Communities (C): Participation of Future-oriented 
communities in the EFE 
Students’ and future-oriented communities’ participa-
tion in transformining action through education fore-
sight and narrative foresight:  
 analysis of the issues from a focus on new 
technologies to the question of effects and im-
pacts on economic, social-cultural, educa-
tional, changes of competencies and profes-
sions, 
 to an exploration of the worldviews and myths 
that underlie possible, probable and preferred 
futures  
 and, finally, towards versions of their own 
choice of educational scenarios and profes-
sions in line with the possibilities of desired 
presents and futures 
Visioning (V): Rethinking visions about Future 
Rethinking versions about one’s own futures (educa-
tional, professional) and futures of the territory: from 
uncertain visions about one’s own futures to more pos-
itive and constructive versions.  
 
Figure 1.The concept of “Educational Foresight-Event” (EFE) as a comparative analytical model of the 
future-oriented educational practice 
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Figure 2.The concept of “Educational Foresight-Event”(EFE) for the comparative analysis of the fu-
ture-oriented educational practice in different regions. 
 
2. Based on the analytical model “Educational Foresight-Event” (EFE) the particularities of the future-
oriented educational practice in Russia and Finland have been studied.  
 
2.1. Particularities of the future-oriented educational practice in different types of regions: West Si-
beria – Arctic area was studied based on the developed analytical model Educational Foresight-Event 
(EFE). 
 
Case 1. Tomsk, West Siberia – Scientific-education centre and Siberian Technological-Innovation re-
gion of West Siberia (600 000 peoples, 294,6 km2, 6 universities) 
Model 1. Open foresight-laboratory of high school students (2012–2017, Russia, Tomsk State 
University & high schools)  
 
Case 2. Yamal, Arctic area, Yamalo-Nenets Autonomus District – Russia's strategic oil and gas region 
(600 000 peoples, 769 250,0 km2, region without universities) 
Model 2. Open foresight-laboratory for students for regional development (2017, Russia, 
Tomsk State University & high schools and colleges of Yamal, Yamalo-Nenets Autonomus 
District, Arctic area)   
 
Educational foresight‐events (EFE) as 
series of regular future‐oriented 
educational events in regions
Visioning: Rethinking visions about 
Future (versions about own and region 
futures)
Communities: Future‐oriented 
communities’ participation into EFE
Education: Educational formats EFE 
Consept of 
Education foresight‐event is 
based on ideas:  
Extreme Events (N.Taleb), 
transformative actions (TAI), 
Educational foresight and 
Narrative foresight pedagogy 
(CLA),  Vygotsky's Cultural‐
historical  Theory
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Case 1. Tomsk, West Siberia 
(600 000 peoples, 294,6 km2, 6 universities) 
Scientific-education centre 
Siberian Technological-Innovation region 
 
Case 2. Yamal, Arctic area 
(600 000 peoples, 769 250,0 km2, region 
without universities) 
Yamalo-Nenets Autonomus District 
Russia's strategic oil and gas region 
E: Educational Policy: 
agents, approaches, programs, projects for Future-oriented educational practices 
University groups: educational projects for the 
schools oriented at high-technological profes-
sions and competencies  
Industrial groups: profession-oriented edu-
cational projects for the needs of industrial, 
HR-programs 
C: Future-oriented communities: 
groups interested in Future-oriented educational practices 
High-technological scientific and entrepreneurial 
communities 
University communities 
Regional and city administration for innovation 
and economic development 
Parents groups  
Technological groups of oil and gas industry 
Town communities 
Parents groups  
V: Visions about Future: 
Youth versions about their own futures and futures of the territory 
“Futures through education” in Tomsk or Russian 
and international universities  
Visions about one’s own futures are positive and 
constructive  
 
“Futures through migration” from the terri-
tory for living and studying at other regions 
of Russia  
Visions about one’s own futures is uncertain  
 
 
Figure 3.Some results of the comparative analysis of the future-oriented educational practice in dif-
ferent regions of Russia based on the concept of “Educational Foresight-Event” (EFE) 
 
2.2. Particularities of the future-oriented educational practice in different countries: Finland and Russia  
In the Finnish education policy and educational practice, the use of futures studies and foresight is 
considered as an important task since 2000. In modern Russia, we can talk about the education policy 
in the area of “futures/foresight literacy” only after 2010. 
At the same time, in Finland and Russia there are educational practices where educational models 
and methods, concepts and tools for the development of futures/foresight thinking as a part of a 
worldview are generated. The issue of “futures in education” is one of the insufficiently studied and 
difficult to approach issues: what problems and opportunities of using the concepts of time and the 
future in the formation of the “futures/foresight literacy” concepts and the futures thinking develop-
ment there are for the modern theory and practice of education in Finland and Russia.  
A special place in this issue is devoted to the analysis of education modernization in Finland in 2015-
2016. Thematic area L7: Participation, influence and building a sustainable future was introduced into 
the new Finland state educational program for secondary and high school. The main content of the 
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thematic areas is the following: "During basic training, students reflect / think through the relationship 
between past, present and future, as well as various options for the future”.  
Russian examples of the experience in the use of the foresight-culture in educational practice are 
presented by both high school level and university education as well as by training programs for school 
teachers and university professors.  
The analysis of pedagogical experience of Russia and Finland in the development of future-thinking, 
especially in the development of individual educational programs and the organization of educational 
and professional orientation for high school students. 
 
FINLAND RUSSIA 
E: Educational Policy: 
agents, approaches, programs, projects for Future-oriented educational practices 
Finnish National Agency for Education 
since 2003  
- Educational foresight http://www.am-
mattinetti.fi/artikkelit/detail/25_artik-
keli;?link=true    
- Curriculum reform (since 2014-2016) 
http://www.oph.fi/down-
load/158389_general_as-
pects_of_basic_education_curriculum_re-
form.pdf  
Future-oriented curriculum process and 
competence (L7): Participation and influ-
ence, building the sustainable future.  
Agency for Strategic Initiatives (the autonomous 
non-profit organization established by the Govern-
ment of Russia) since 2013 
Some new educational projects:   
- Atlas of emerging jobs http://atlas100.ru/en/fu-
ture/  
- Global Education Foresight 
https://asi.ru/eng/staffing/globaleduintegration/  
- New model of the system of additional  
education of children https://asi.ru/eng/so-
cial/education/ , e.g. Youth and Education indus-
trial camp “School Technopark”, Network of inter-
active scientific and entertainment centers of chil-
dren and youth “Innopark” and so on.  
C: Future-oriented communities: 
groups interested in Future-oriented educational practices 
- Finland Futures Research Centre, Finland 
Futures Academy, the Finland National 
Foresight Network  
- High – technological scientific and entre-
preneurial communities 
- University communities 
- Regional authorities or innovation and 
economic development 
- Parents groups  
- Foresight Groups (Skolkovo) 
- High – technological scientific and entrepreneur-
ial communities 
- Universities communities 
- Regional administrations for innovation and eco-
nomic development 
- Parents groups  
V: Visions about Future: 
youth versions about their own futures and the futures of the territory 
The development of future-thinking, especially in the development of individual educational pro-
grams and the organization of educational and professional orientation for high school students 
 
Figure 4.Some results of the comparative analysis of the future-oriented educational practices in dif-
ferent regions: Russia and Finland (based on the concept of “Educational Foresight-Event”, EFE) 
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Discussion and Conclusions 
The concept and analytical model of "educational foresight-event" (EFE) is a methodological tool 
which allows to analyse the hypothesis that “future-oriented educational practice depends on partic-
ularities of the region”. It also helps to consider the cases related to the particularities of the future-
oriented educational practice in different regions. This model integrates, on the one hand, regional key 
aspects of different types of regions and, on the other hand, feathers of the future-oriented educational 
theoretical and practical views.  
In this connection, the main conclusion is that the process of developing and forming future-ori-
ented educational programs includes a comparative regional analysis as a specific character of the 
future-oriented education. 
This comparative analytical model needs further development and discussions. Additionally, we 
plan to continue the research of the comparative analysis of the future-oriented educational experi-
ence in Finland and Russia and to consider the particularities of the generated educational models and 
methods, concepts and tools to develop futures/foresight thinking and futures/foresight literacy. 
Thus, in the future research related to the hypothesis that “future-oriented educational practice de-
pends on particularities of the region” we plan to study different types of regions in Finland and Russia 
to elaborate versions of the comparative analysis of the future-oriented educational practice as follows: 
 
Case 1. Finland: Innovative region VS Arctic Innovative regions.  
Case 2. Russia: Tomsk, Innovative region, Siberia VS Yamal, Arctic Innovative region.  
Case 3. Finland (Innovative region) VS Russia (Tomsk, Innovative region, Siberia). 
Case 4. Finland (Arctic Innovative regions) VS Russia (Yamal, Arctic Innovative region). 
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5. RESILIENT FUTURES:  
FOOD AND WATER SAFETY 
Institutional Interventions for preparing the Indian farmer to face  
an uncertain future 
Methil V. Ashok  
Chief General Manager, National Bank for Agriculture & Rural Development, Mumbai, India  
Abstract 
India, with a population of 1.31 billion, has about 50% dependent on the agriculture sector and more 
than 85% of farmers are small holder farmers. Agriculture is largely rain fed in India and faces a com-
plex uncertain future due to climate change which is manifested in terms of erratic monsoon, freak 
weather conditions like frost, hail storm and catastrophes like floods and droughts. Small holder farm-
ers are disproportionately affected due to their low financial and adaptive capacity. 
However, Government of India has accorded top priority for addressing climate change and has 
formulated the National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC) in 2008 that established 8 National 
Missions. NAPCC is further scaled down through State/Provincial Action Plans on Climate Change 
(SAPCC) for each of the 29 States and 7 Union Territories. The Government has established the Na-
tional Adaptation Fund for Climate Change (NAFCC) which is a pioneering step to address climate 
change adaptation needs of the farmers. India’s only Development Financial Institution for agriculture, 
the National Bank for Agriculture & Rural Development (NABARD) is the only National Implementing 
Entity for implanting projects funds under the Adaptation Fund as well as the Green Climate Fund. NAB-
ARD is taking up projects and programmes aimed at building climate resilient agriculture and supporting 
adaptation & mitigation projects related to plantation, horticulture, forestry, land development, water-
shed development, micro irrigation, solar power, hydel power, etc. that help the small and marginal farm-
ers. The good practices are being mainstreamed for sustainable development in the region.   
Introduction & Background 
Agriculture in India 
1.0 India is a very large country, covering about 2.4 per cent of the world’s land surface area with the 
second largest population in the world, being home to approximately 1.31 billion people in 2010, or 15 
per cent of the world’s population.  India’s agriculture has always been dependent on monsoons. Nev-
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ertheless, today India ranks second worldwide in farm output. Agriculture and allied sectors like for-
estry and fisheries accounted for 13.7% of the GDP   (gross domestic product) in 2013, about 50% of 
the workforce.  Agriculture is demographically the broadest economic sector and plays a significant 
role in the overall socio-economic fabric of India.  
1.1 India is the world's largest producer of many fresh fruits and vegetables, milk, major spices, se-
lect fibrous crops such as jute, staples such as millets and castor oil seed. India is the second largest 
producer of wheat and rice, the world's major food crop.  India has been maintaining its position as the 
world’s second or third largest producer of several dry fruits, agriculture-based textile raw materials, 
roots and tuber crops, pulses, farmed fish, eggs, coconut, sugarcane and numerous vegetables. India 
ranked in the world's five largest producers of over 80% of agricultural produce items, including 
many cash crops such as coffee and cotton, in 2010.[ India is one of the world's five largest producers 
of livestock and poultry meat, with one of the fastest growth rates, as of 2011.  
1.2 India exported $39 billion worth of agricultural products in 2013, making it the seventh largest 
agricultural exporter worldwide and the sixth largest net exporter. Most of its agriculture exports serve 
developing and least developed nations. Indian agricultural/horticultural and processed foods are ex-
ported to more than 100 countries, primarily in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, SAARC countries, the 
EU and the United States.  Any change in monsoon trends drastically affects agriculture. Any increase 
in temperature affect Indian agriculture. India exported $39 billion worth of agricultural products in 
2013, making it the seventh largest agricultural exporter worldwide, and the sixth largest net exporter. 
This represents explosive growth, as in 2003 net export were about $5 billion. India is the fastest 
growing exporter of agricultural products over a 10-year period, its $39 billion of net exports is more 
than double the combined exports of the European Union (EU-28). It has become one of the world's 
largest supplier of rice, cotton, sugar and wheat. India exported around 2 million metric tonnes of 
wheat and 2.1 million metric tonnes of rice in 2011 to Africa, Nepal, Bangladesh and other regions 
around the world.   
Changing scenario in Indian agriculture 
2.0 Recent studies done at the Indian Agricultural Research Institute indicate the possibility of a loss 
of between 4 and 5 million tons in wheat production in the future with every rise of 1 degree Celsius 
temperature throughout the growing period. Rice production is slated to decrease by almost a 
tonne/hectare if the temperature rises by 2 degree celsius. In Rajasthan, a 2 degree rise in temperature 
was estimated to reduce production of pearl millet by 10 to 15 percent. If maximum and minimum 
temperatures rise by 3 and 3.5 degrees respectively, then soya bean yields in M.P will decline by 5 
percent compared to 1998. Agriculture will be affected in the coastal regions of Gujarat and Maha-
rashtra, as fertile areas are vulnerable to inundation and salinization. 
2.1 The major impacts of climate change will be on rain fed or un-irrigated crops, which are culti-
vated on nearly 60 percent of cropland. A temperature rise by 0.5oC in winter temperature is pro-
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jected to reduce rain fed wheat yield by 0.45 tonnes per hectare. Possibly there might be some im-
provement in yields of chickpeas, winter maize, sorghum and millets and coconut on the west coast 
and less loss in potatoes, mustard and vegetables in north-western India due to reduced frost damage. 
Increased droughts and floods are likely to increase production variability. 
Climate change and Indian agriculture 
3.0 Climate change is one of the most critical global challenges of our times. Recent events have em-
phatically demonstrated our growing vulnerability to climate change. Climate change impacts will 
range from affecting agriculture – further endangering food security – to sea-level rise and the accel-
erated erosion of coastal zones, increasing intensity of natural disasters, species extinction, and the 
spread of vector-borne diseases.  Climate change has become real and tangible, affecting people’s 
lives worldwide. It is a major challenge for agriculture, food security and rural livelihoods. As indicated 
in Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in its Fifth Assessment Report released in 
March 2014, poor, marginalized, and rural communities are likely to be hit hardest by climate change 
impacts. For these vulnerable groups, climate change acts as a “risk multiplier” worsening existing 
social, economic, political, and environmental stresses. 
3.1 The impacts of climate change are global, but countries like India are more vulnerable in view of 
the high population depending on agriculture, which in turn is dependent on the seasonal monsoons. 
India is confronted with the challenge of sustaining rapid economic growth amidst the increasing 
global threat of climate change. India has already shown its commitment to help address the global 
climate challenge and Government of India accorded top priority for addressing climate change related 
concerns.  India is highly vulnerable to various natural hazards such as droughts, floods, heat waves 
and cyclones.  Climate change is altering the environment affecting agriculture, water availability, and 
sea-levels. It is increasing the intensity of natural disasters, the rate of species extinction and the 
spread of vector-borne diseases. Those most vulnerable to climate change are the world's poor as they 
are often directly reliant on natural resources to meet their basic needs. They also have the fewest 
resources to cope with climate-related shocks. 
3.2 This paper tries to examine how the Indian farmers is being supported by Institutions in India to 
prepare themselves for an uncertain future, the dangers of climate change.   
Materials and Methods 
4.0 The author makes a review of the existing institutions both from the Governments side as well as 
the Non-Governmental side to understand the measures taken by them to achieve the objective. The 
paper is based mostly on secondary information and information obtained through personal interviews 
with a few officials of Institutions like Government of India, Indian Council of Agricultural Research, 
National Bank for Agriculture & Rural Development (NABARD) and a few other Non-Governmental 
Organisations. 
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The Results 
5.0 The review reveals that the Governments of India as well as the Research Institutions under the  
Indian Council of Agricultural Research  are fully geared up to tackle the situation and has taken several 
measures to help the farmers in India to prepare himself to face the problems of climate change. The 
measures taken by institutions like National Bank for Agriculture & Rural Development and various 
Non- Governmental Organisations across the country have also been studied and presented here. 
 Adaptation by Indian farmers to climate change 
5.1 In view of drastic environmental changes taking place it is necessary for farmers to adapt to chang-
ing situation as soon as possible. Fortunately India was an early adopter of the climate change adap-
tation strategies. As more than 85 % of the farmers in India are small farmers with 5 ac or less of land 
and lack resources of various kinds, they need to be supported to face the vagaries of the climatic 
changes that are taking place.  Indian farmers are made ready to cope with the current climatic risks 
by providing value-added weather services to farmers so that the farmers can adapt to climate 
changes to some degree by shifting planting dates, choosing varieties with different growth duration, 
or changing crop rotations. An early warning system helps to monitor changes in pest and disease 
outbreaks. The overall pest control strategy should be based on integrated pest management because 
it takes care of multiple pests in a given climatic scenario. Developing short-duration crop varieties 
that can mature before the peak heat phase set in. Farmers are educated to select genotype in crops 
that have a higher per day yield potential to counter yield loss from heat-induced reduction in growing 
periods.  
Interventions by Government of India  
5.2 Government of India has already shown its commitment to help address the global climate chal-
lenge and Government of India accorded top priority for addressing climate change related concerns. 
India has signed the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and has 
acceded to the Kyoto Protocol in 2002.  The Government formulated the National Action Plan on 
Climate Change (NAPCC) on June, 2008 that established 8 National Missions to reduce the vulnera-
bility to the impacts of climate change through adaptation and mitigation measures. 
India's National Action Plan on Climate Change 
5.3 The action plan designed by the Government of India outlines a number of steps to simultaneously 
advance India's development and climate change-related objectives. The National Action Plan on Cli-
mate Change (NAPCC) encompasses a range of measures. It focuses on eight missions, which are as 
follows: 
 National Solar Mission  
 National Mission for Enhanced Energy Efficiency  
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 National Mission on Sustainable Habitat  
 National Water Mission  
 National Mission for Sustaining the Himalayan Ecosystem  
 Green India Mission  
 National Mission for Sustainable Agriculture  
 National Mission on Strategic Knowledge for Climate Change 
 
5.4 The NAPCC is further scaled down through State / Provincial Action Plan on Climate Change 
(SAPCC) for each of the 29 States and 7 Union Territories. The National Adaptation Fund on Climate 
Change (NAFCC) has been established by the Government of India. In addition to the above, the Govt. 
of India has also set up in August 2015 the National Adaptation Fund on Climate Change (NAFCC) to 
meet the cost of adaptation to climate change for the State and Union Territories of India that are 
particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change for which the National Bank for Agri-
culture & Rural Development (NABARD) in India, the Development Financial Institution for Agricul-
ture, which has been accredited globally as a National Implementing Entity (NIE) in July 2012 and is 
the only NIE for India for implanting projects funder under the Adaptation Fund.  In 2011, efforts con-
tinued to take the discourse and planning on climate change to the state level. Ten states prepared 
draft action plans for climate change which are currently under review. The Plans address a range of 
concerns including, assessing community vulnerabilities, mapping climate change affects across 
states, understanding the impact of economic activities on the environment, and proposing strategies 
to respond to climate change.  
Indian Council of Agricultural Research 
5.5 The Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR) is an autonomous organisation under the De-
partment of Agricultural Research and Education (DARE), Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers Wel-
fare, Government of India. It was established in 1929 as a registered society in pursuance of the report 
of the Royal Commission on Agriculture. The Council is the apex body for co-ordinating, guiding and 
managing research and education in agriculture including horticulture, fisheries and animal sciences 
in the entire country. With 101 Research Institutes and 71 agricultural universities spread across the 
country this is one of the largest national agricultural systems in the world. The ICAR has played a 
pioneering role in ushering Green Revolution during the 1960s and subsequent developments in agri-
culture in India through its research and technology development that has enabled the country to in-
crease the production of food grains by 5 times, horticultural crops by 9.5 times, fish by 12.5 
times, milk 7.8 times and eggs 39 times since 1951 to 2014, thus making a visible impact on the na-
tional food and nutritional security.  
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Strategic Research 
5.6 Adaptation to climate variability and climate change requires long term strategic research in the 
area of Natural Resource Management, Crops, Pests and disease dynamics, Livestock, Fisheries & En-
ergy Efficiency. Focused programmes are taken up on different commodities on adaptation and miti-
gation. The strategic research is being carried out involving 21 Research Institutes of the Indian Council 
of Agricultural Research (ICAR) out of which seven are core institutes where state of the art research 
infrastructure and equipments are installed for climate change research on irrigated crops, rainfed 
crops, horticulture, livestock, fisheries and energy efficiency. The following Institutes have been iden-
tified for thematic research across crops and agro-climatic zones are: 
1. Indian Veterinary Research Institute (IVRI), Izatnagar 
2. Central Inland Fisheries Research Institute (CIFRI), Barrackpore 
3. Central Institute for Brackish Water Aquaculture (CIBA), Chennai 
4. National Institute for Abiotic Stress Management (NIASM), Baramati, Pune 
5. Central Rice Research Institute (CRRI), Cuttack 
6. Directorate of Rice Research (DRR), Hyderabad 
7. Indian Institute of Pulses Research (IIPR), Kanpur 
8. Indian Institute of Vegetable Research (IIVR), Varanasi 
9. ICAR Research Complex for Eastern Region, Ranchi 
10. NRC on Plant Biotechnology, New Delhi 
11. National Centre for Integrated Pest Management (NCIPM), New Delhi 
12. National Research Centre for Agro Forestry (NRCAF), Jhansi 
13. Directorate of Water Management, Bhubhaneshwar 
14. Project Directorate for Farming System Research (PDFSR), Modipuram 
Technology Demonstration 
5.7 An integrated package of proven technologies are demonstrated in one village in each district by 
Krishi Vigyan Kendra (Agriculture Knowledge Centres) or other Research Centres for adaptation and 
mitigation of the crop and livestock production systems to climate variability based on the available 
technologies. Agricultural Science Centres known as Krishi Vigyan Kendras are innovative institutions 
for taking technology from the laboratory to the field and imparting vocational training to the practic-
ing farmers, and field level extension functionaries at the field level. The KVKs have been established 
under the aiegies of the Indian Council of Agricultural Research by various sponsors. At present there 
are 660 KVKs in India,  largely promoted by the State Agricultural Universities (SAU) and Central 
Agricultural University (CAU), some of them directly  under the ICAR, a few of them by NGOs, and 
some of them by the  State Governments, and very few number by  other educational institutions.  On-
farm testing to assess the location specificity of agricultural technologies under various farming sys-
tems. 
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 Frontline demonstrations to establish production potential of technologies on the farmers’ 
fields 
 Capacity development of farmers and extension personnel to update their knowledge and 
skills on modern agricultural technologies 
 To work as Knowledge and Resource Centre of agricultural technologies for supporting initia-
tives of public, private and voluntary sectors in improving the agricultural economy of the dis-
trict. 
 Provide farm advisories using ICT and other media means on varied subjects of interest to 
farmers. 
 
(ii) The All India Coordinated Research Project (AICRP) for Dryland Agriculture  was  launched in 
India in  1970 with the assistance of Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and has now 
a network of 25 centres spread across arid, semi-arid, sub-humid and per-humid rainfed agro ecolo-
gies and works with the following mandate : 
 Optimize the use of natural resources, i.e., rainfall, land and water, and minimize soil and water 
loss and degradation of environment  
 Evolve simple technologies to substantially increase crop productivity and profitability  
 Increase stability of crop production over years by providing improvements in natural re-
sources management, crop management systems and alternate crop production technologies 
matching weather aberrations  
 Develop alternate and sustainable land use systems  
 Evaluate and study transferability of improved dryland technologies to farmers’ fields  
 (iii) Besides the 100 KVKs and 25 centres of the AICRP the following Core Institutes under the 
ICAR have been identified for Technology Transfer as indicated below: 
1. Central Research Institute for Dryland Agriculture (CRIDA), Hyderabad 
2. Indian Agricultural Research Institute (IARI), New Delhi 
3. Indian Institute of Horticultural Research (IIHR), Bangalore 
4. National Dairy Research Institute (NDRI), Karnal 
5. Central Marine Fisheries Research Institute (CMFRI), Cochin 
6. Central Institute of Agricultural Engineering (CIAE), Bhopal 
7. ICAR-Research Complex for NEH Region, Barapani, Shillong 
National Initiative on Climate Resilient Agriculture 
5.8 The Ministry of Agriculture Government of India, through the Indian Council of Agricultural Re-
search (ICAR), launched the National Initiative on Climate Resilient Agriculture (NICRA) in 2011 with 
funding from Government of India with the following objectives: 
 To enhance the resilience of Indian agriculture covering crops, livestock and fisheries to cli-
matic variability and climate change through development and application of improved pro-
duction and risk management technologies. 
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 To demonstrate site specific technology packages on farmers' fields for adapting to current 
climate risks. 
 To enhance the capacity of scientists and other stakeholders in climate resilient agricultural 
research and its application. 
 The mega project of NICRA has three major objectives of strategic research, technology 
demonstrations and capacity building. The interventions under NICRA consist of four modules 
– natural resource management, improving soil health, crop production and livestock and is 
aimed making the farmers self-reliant. 
Key Features of NICRA 
 Critical assessment of different crops/zones in the country for vulnerability to climatic 
stresses and extreme events, in particular, intra seasonal variability of rainfall 
 Installation of the state-of-the-art equipment like flux towers for measurement of greenhouse 
gases in large field areas to understand the impact of management practices and contribute 
data on emissions as national responsibility. 
 Rapid and large scale screening of crop germplasm including wild relatives for drought and 
heat tolerance through phenomics platforms for quick identification of promising lines and 
early development and release of heat/drought tolerant varieties. 
 Comprehensive field evaluation of new and emerging approaches of paddy cultivation like aer-
obic rice and SRI for their contribution to reduce the GHG emissions and water saving. 
 Special attention to livestock and fishery sectors including aquaculture which have not re-
ceived enough attention in climate change research in the past. In particular, the documenta-
tion of adaptive traits in indigenous breeds is the most useful step. 
 Thorough understanding of crop-pest/pathogen relationship and emergence of new biotypes 
due to climate change. 
 Simultaneous up-scaling of the outputs both through KVKs and the National Mission on Sus-
tainable Agriculture for wider adoption by the farmers 
 Integrated simulation modeling for research,  development and policy support 
India Meteorological Department  
5.9 The India Meteorological Department (IMD), also referred to as the Met Department, is an agency 
of the Ministry of Earth Sciences of the Government of India. It is the principal agency responsible 
for meteorological observations, weather forecasting and seismology. IMD is headquartered in New 
Delhi and has 127 district agromet units to collect weather data on a real time basis and provide it to 
the IMD regional stations and operates hundreds of observation stations across India and Antarctica. 
IMD is also one of the six Regional Specialized Meteorological Centres of the World Meteorological 
Organization. It has the responsibility for forecasting, naming and distribution of warnings for tropical 
cyclones in the Northern Indian Ocean region, including the Malacca Straits, the Bay of Bengal, 
the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf.  The agro-meteorology advisory service (AMAS) is an old pro-
gram, in practice by the Indian Meteorological Department (IMD), since 1945. Initially, AMAS was 
provided at the national level only and was extended to the states in 1976. The IMD started organizing 
one-day farmer awareness program in different agro-climates zones of the country to educate farmers 
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on weather and climate information and their role in farm management. The Met department is work-
ing with all states on how weather-sensitive information can be sent to farmers. The IMD already 
generates forecasts, which are sent to these units, which have agro-meteorologists and experts to 
gauge the effect of impending weather phenomenon on crops and agricultural activities. Advisories 
are then prepared and issued.  
The “Science Express” by the Ministry of Railways 
5.10 The Ministry of Railways of Government of India has flagged off a “Science Express” that will 
spend seven months traveling across the country and raising awareness among the public who largely 
are farmers. A collaborative effort by the Ministries of Railways, Environment and Science and Tech-
nology, the Science Express Climate Action Special has already begun its journey of 19,000 km cov-
ering 68 stations across 20 states across India with 16 coaches and will end it on September 8, 2017. 
The Government of India felt with every passing year it has become increasingly clear that there is an 
urgent need to address the challenges posed by climate change in the world and one of the main ways 
to do so is by educating the public which comprise the farmers in all the rural areas, of its implications 
and urging them to make better choices for themselves and the planet.  
NABARD’s interventions towards Adaptation to Climate Change  
6.0 National Bank for Agriculture & Rural Development (NABARD) is set up as an apex Development 
Financial Institution (DFI) in India established on 12 July 1982 by an Act of the Parliament with a man-
date for facilitating credit flow for promotion and development of agriculture, small-scale industries, 
cottage and village industries, handicrafts and other rural crafts. It also has the mandate to support all 
other allied economic activities in rural areas, promote integrated and sustainable rural development 
and secure prosperity of rural areas. In discharging its role as a facilitator for rural prosperity in India,  
the activities of NABARD can be broadly grouped into three broad categories: 
1. Credit related 
2. Developmental   
3. Supervisory 
 
6.1 NABARD has already taken various initiatives in addressing the challenges posed by Climate 
Change particularly in the areas of agriculture and rural livelihood sectors. In this direction NABARD 
aims to channelize national, international and private finances for adaptation and mitigation activities 
in India.  
NABARD and Adaptation Fund of UNFCC 
6.2 The Ministry of Environment, Forest & Climate Change, Govt. of India is the National Designated 
Authority (NDA) for proposals under the Adaptation Fund set up under the Kyoto Protocol of the 
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United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) established in 2001 and offi-
cially launched in 2007 at CoP 7 in Marrakesh, Morocco which aims to finance concrete projects and 
programmes that help vulnerable communities in developing countries that are Parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol to adapt to climate change. NABARD in the capacity of NIE can access Adaptation Fund from 
AFB for implementation of feasible climate adaptation projects posed by eligible Executive Entities 
such as NGOs, Central/State Government Departments, Research Institutions, and Technical Institu-
tions etc. So far 6 projects have been sanctioned under Adaptation Fund Board.  In this direction, NAB-
ARD aims to channelize national, international and private finances for adaptation and mitigation ac-
tivities in India. 
NABARD accredited as National Implementing Entity by UNFCC  
6.3 The National Bank for Agriculture & Rural Development (NABARD) in India has been accredited 
globally as a National Implementing Entity (NIE) in July 2012 and is the only NIE for India for implanting 
projects funder under the Adaptation Fund set up under the Kyoto Protocol of the UNFCCC. The NIE 
bears full responsibility for the overall management of the projects and programmes financed by the 
Adaptation Fund and have all financial, monitoring, and reporting responsibilities NABARD has also 
been accredited as NIE for implementation of projects under the Green Climate Fund as an imple-
menting entity for undertaking climate change related projects in India. 
NABARD and Green Climate Fund 
6.4 NABARD as the accredited agency is the National Implementing Entity for projects under the 
Green Climate Fund and is eligible to submit large size projects having outlay of more than USD 250 
million. The Green Climate Fund, head quartered in Songdo, Incheon City, Republic of Korea, has been 
designated as an operating entity of the financial mechanism of the UNFCCC. The decision to set up 
the Green Climate fund (GCF) was taken at COP 16 in Cancun on December 2010 and the GCF was 
operationalized in COP 17 in Durban in 2011. The Fund aims to promote a paradigm shift towards low 
emission and climate-resilient development pathways by providing support to developing countries 
to limit or reduce their greenhouse gas emissions and to adapt to the impacts of climate change, taking 
into account the needs of those developing countries particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of 
climate change. 
 
NABARD and National Adaptation Fund  
6.5 The National Adaptation Fund for Climate Change (NAFCC) was established in August, 2015 by 
the Government of India with a budget provision of Rs.350 crores for the year 2015-16 and 2016-17, 
with an estimated requirement of Rs. 181.5 crores for financial year 2017-18 for NAFCC. The projects 
under NAFCC prioritizes the needs that builds climate resilience in the areas identified under the 
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SAPCC (State Action Plan on Climate Change) and the relevant Missions under NAPCC (National 
Action Plan on Climate Change). Considering the existing arrangement with NABARD as National Im-
plementing Entity (NIE) for Adaptation Fund (AF) under Kyoto Protocol and its presence across the 
country, NABARD has been designated as National Implementing Entity (NIE) for implementation of 
adaptation projects under NAFCC by Govt. of India. Under this arrangement, NABARD would perform 
roles in facilitating identification of project ideas/concepts from State Action Plan for Climate Change 
(SAPCC), project formulation, appraisal, sanction, disbursement of fund, monitoring & evaluation and 
capacity building of stakeholders including State Governments.  
Pilot Projects of NABARD on Climate Change 
Climate Change Adaptation (CCA) project  
6.6 NABARD had implemented a Climate Change Adaptation (CCA) project with a fund support of 
US$ 3.5 million in 72 villages in the 3 states of Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh 
covering an area of 44,772 ha with the objective to improve the adaptive capacities of rural commu-
nities to respond to the effects of emerging climate changes by regenerating the eco-systems they live 
in, diversifying livelihood sources in order to reduce risks, and adopting new agricultural and renewable 
energy technologies. The project is directly benefitting 71,541 people. Besides watershed develop-
ment, WOTR is introducing new elements such as agro-meteorology for tracking weather patterns at 
the village level leading to generation of advisories to farmers on what steps to take in emergency 
conditions. This is also linked to water budgeting, crop planning, adaptive and sustainable agronomic 
practices and irrigation management. Added to this, WOTR integrates biodiversity concerns in all its 
activities and encourages alternate energy to meet some of rural energy requirements.  
Role of Non‐Governmental Organisations 
7.0 Adaptation plans are largely state driven and top-down in approach, while climate change is locally 
experienced and can only be effectively addressed by engaging local groups and institutions. All ad-
aptation is local, and that local agencies, especially Non-Governmental organisations (NGOs) serving 
the rural communities, being closest to the problem, are best suited to creating adaptive capacities 
within communities. There are different areas in which NGOs can help communities adapt to climate 
change.  Technology, investments, policy and regulations alone will not be able to provide the solution. 
A multi-stakeholder engagement of all concerned parties, on a sustained basis, starting at the com-
munity, regional and national levels, is required. Enlisting the active cooperation of local groups, com-
munities, local institutions and stakeholders, building up their capacities and empowering them as 
active participants in decision making processes are a foundational pre-condition for efficient and ef-
fective adaptation measures. This is because the effects of climate change are experienced locally by 
communities, local institutions and stakeholders and they are best suited to addressing them.  India 
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has about 500 NGOs across India which are implementing watershed projects and Tribal Develop-
ment projects funded by NABARD leading to effective adaptation by the local farmers against climate 
change effects. To give a flavor of these NGOs, salient features of a few major NGOs operating across 
the country are indicated below. 
The Tata Trusts 
7.1 The Tata trusts are the unsung heroes of an extraordinary saga of philanthropy that has enriched 
India and its citizens in myriad ways. It was formed by merging two principal Trusts operating under 
Tata Trusts' umbrella,  the Sir Dorabji Tata Trust and Allied Trusts (SDTT) & the Sir Ratan Tata Trust 
and Allied Trusts (SRTT) which was set up in 1919 which was established with a corpus of Rs. 8 million, 
to further Sir Ratan Tata's vision of building a self-sufficient nation.  The Tata Trusts are common for 
all the Tata group companies. All developmental activities by the Group companies are carried out 
through the Tata Trusts. As such all group companies pool their CSR funds into the Tata Trust for 
implementing any developmental activity.  The Tata Trust operations broadly cover areas of natural 
resource management and rural livelihoods; urban poverty and livelihoods; education; health; civil so-
ciety, governance and human rights; and media, art, and culture.  
M. S. Swaminathan Research Foundation (MSSRF)  
7.2 The M. S. Swaminathan Research Foundation (MSSRF) was established in 1988 as a not-for-profit 
trust, envisioned and founded by Professor M. S. Swaminathan the doyen of ‘Green Revolution’ of India 
with proceeds from the First World Food Prize that he received in 1987. The Foundation aims to ac-
celerate use of modern science for agricultural and rural development for development and dissemi-
nation of technology to improve lives and livelihoods of tribal and rural communities. These efforts 
have been undertaken in a participatory manner and in partnership with other knowledge-based insti-
tutions, public and private sector organisations and local communities. From a small beginning, across 
the years, the Foundation has made its impact felt in various dimensions making a difference to the 
lives of over 600,000 individuals, impacting livelihood of 100,000 farmers and fisherfolk every day 
with influence that spreads across 18 countries. MSSRF is carrying out research and development fo-
cusing on major thematic areas. MSSRF has been associated with the following project in India which 
in connection with climate change adaptation. 
1. International Training Programme on Plant Genetic Resources  
2. Rice – Saviour of Food Security in an era of Climate Change: Prof M S Swaminathan  
3. Contextualizing Climate Change discussions to Tamil Nadu  State 
4. Community afforestation efforts in Odisha  
5. Training for Scientists on Agrobiodiversity Conservation and Climate Change Adaptation 
6. Seasonal Climate Information for Ensuring Agricultural Sustainability and Food Security of Small 
Holder Rainfed Farmers 
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Watershed Organsiation Trust (WOTR) 
7.3. Watershed Organsiation Trust (WOTR) is a not-for-profit NGO founded in 1993 and launched in 
Maharashtra, India by Fr. Hermann Bacher, founder and its Chairman of WOTR. It is currently operat-
ing in 7 Indian states of Maharashtra, Telangana, Seemaandhra, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Jhar-
khand and Odisha.  WOTR is recognised widely as a premier institution in the field of and Climate 
Change Adaptation through its unique participatory Watershed Development process. Its unique 
strength lies in its on-field experience and in a systemic, participatory approach. WOTR’s mandate is 
address climate change adversites and reduce poverty through mobilising the self-help capacities of 
individuals and communities to regenerate the eco-spaces or watersheds they live in, harvest rain wa-
ter wherever it falls, use it productively, undertake sustainable livelihoods and do whatever else it takes 
to get them out of poverty. Since its inception in 1993 WOTR has been in the forefront of mobilizing 
vulnerable communities in semi-arid and resource fragile regions to help themselves out of poverty by 
harvesting rainwater wherever it falls and regenerating the ecosystems they live in. WOTR believes 
that the well-being and economic sufficiency of agrarian communities, is directly related to the 
productivity, quality, quantity and range of services that the Ecosystems they live in can provide. 
WOTR’s concept of Watershed and Ecosystems Management in the context of Climate Change builds 
upon its extensive work and expertise in Watershed Development in organising communities to sus-
tainably manage the ecosystems they live in, and bringing about an optimal equilibrium in the eco-
space between natural resources, man and animals. WOTR roots itself in Ecosystems Management 
as a means to reduce risks, mitigate the impact of extreme meteorological events, increase productiv-
ity, conserve biodiversity, improve the quality of life and stabilise and enhance nature based liveli-
hoods.  
Climate Change Adaptation (CCA) Project by WOTR 
7.3.2. WOTR is implementing a Climate Change Adaptation project in 72 villages in the 3 states of 
Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh covering an area of 44,772 ha and directly bene-
fitting 71,541 people with the objective to improve the adaptive capacities of rural communities to 
respond to the effects of emerging climate changes by regenerating the eco-systems they live in, di-
versifying livelihood sources in order to reduce risks, and adopting new agricultural and renewable 
energy technologies. Besides watershed development, WOTR is has introduced new elements in the 
project  such as agro-metereology for tracking weather patterns at the village level leading to genera-
tion of advisories to farmers on what steps to take in emergency conditions. This is also linked to water 
budgeting, crop planning, adaptive and sustainable agronomic practices and irrigation management. 
Added to this, WOTR integrates biodiversity concerns in all its activities and encourages alternate 
energy to meet some of rural energy requirements. Advanced project management and GIS-based 
systems are also being deployed so as to track progress, capture results and identify impacts. 
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WOTR Centre for Resilience Studies (W‐CReS) 
7.3.3 Realising that there is an urgent need for developing and implementing a science-and-evidence 
based risk mitigation and adaptation strategy and that there exists considerable knowledge gaps in 
understanding vulnerability especially that resulting from climate change, socio-economic impacts 
and identifying suitable pathways to build resilience WOTR felt the need for imparting education, rais-
ing awareness, training and capacity building for effective implementation of resilience enhancing in-
terventions and therefore established WOTR Centre for Resilience Studies (W-CReS).  W-CReS pro-
poses to bridge some of the gaps between science, policy and practice and promote multi-stake-
holder collaborative networks at all levels.  
BAIF Development Research Foundation  
7.4 BAIF Development Research Foundation (formerly registered as the Bharatiya Agro Industries 
Foundation (BAIF), is a reputed voluntary organisation based in Maharshtra state, established in 1967 
by Dr. Manibhai Desai, a disciple of Mahatma Gandhi considered as the Father of the nation, at 
Urulikanchan, near Pune to promote sustainable livelihood in Rural India. BAIF is committed to provide 
sustainable livelihood to the rural poor through climate-resilient agriculture, management of natural 
resources, livestock development, watershed development and agri-horti-forestry as major income 
generation activities. BAIF has evolved innovative models of micro-enterprises to ensure inclusive de-
velopment through dairy husbandry, goat production, agri-horti-forestry and sustainable agricultural 
production for food security and poverty alleviation. Formation of Producers' Groups, Empowerment 
of women and environmental sustainability cut across all these programmes. With a flexible and in-
novative approach to address individual needs of families, BAIF is now able to provide services to over 
5 million small and marginal landless families spread over one lakh villages in backward regions of 16 
states in the country. Apart from 4500 staff engaged by BAIF, there are thousands of field volunteers 
and para-veterinarians who are engaged in mentoring the needy beneficiaries at the grassroot level. 
Over the last few decades BAIF has been working on various approaches and programmes that have 
shown encouraging potential in countering agrarian distress. These holistic approaches encompass 
three key thrust areas:  
1. sustainable management of natural resources;  
2. diversifying farming systems; and  
3. building social capital and cohesion.  
Professional Assistance for Development Action (PRADAN) 
7.5 PRADAN is a voluntary organisation registered under the Societies Registration Act of India. Es-
tablished in Delhi in 1983, PRADAN was pioneered by a group of young professionals, all of whom 
were inspired by the conviction that individuals with knowledge resources and empathy for the mar-
ginalised must work with communities at the grassroots in order to help them overcome poverty.  
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PRADAN has over 350 highly Motivated and skilled Professionals who are working in the remote vil-
lages of India, immersing themselves directly with target communities.  And work with over 374,008 
families in 5,766 villages across 7 of the poorest states in the country. A majority of the families that 
PRADAN works with belong to the Schedule Tribes and Schedule Castes. Pradan intervention focus 
on the following broad areas of livelihood viz., Forest based Livelihood, Natural Resource Management 
based Livelihood Development, Livestock based Livelihood Development. 
PRADAN follows a four-pronged approach to achieve its goals: 
 Promoting and nurturing Self-Help Groups (SHGs) of poor women and strengthening them as 
organisations to leverage institutional finances for members’ livelihoods.   
 Developing and introducing locally suitable economic activities to increase productivity and 
incomes among SHG members; building synergic collaboration with a wide variety of stake-
holders. 
 Mobilising finances for livelihood assets and infrastructure from government bodies, donors, 
banks, and other financial institutions. 
 Setting up mechanisms to sustain the livelihood gains made by the poor communities. 
Self‐Reliant Initiatives through Joint ActioN (SRIJAN)  
7.6 Self-Reliant Initiatives through Joint Action (SRIJAN) is a multi-state NGO established in 1979 and 
working in 5 states of India. It is a grassroot implementation and support agency committed to pro-
mote sustainable and self-reliant models of rural development through interventions in: 
 Agriculture & Horticulture 
 Natural Resource Management 
 Dairy & Livestock 
 
SRIJAN works in close to 750 villages, with over 2000 SHGs and almost 40,000 families and have 
deliberately chosen to work with the socio-economically disadvantaged, particularly women, sociall 
and tribal people, as they need empowerment the most. SRIJAN is engaged in the following broad 
themes: Community Institution Building, Agriculture, Horticulture, Livestock and Natural Resource 
Management. They primarily work with women and provide livelihood support through the concept of 
Self Help Groups, constituting of and managed by women. SRIJAN works with the SHG members, 
motivating them, educating them about the latest techniques and best practices; assisting them with 
procurement of inputs, production cycle and finding the best price for their produce. They also help 
them get access to finance through bank linkages. Once SHGs are deemed satisfactory, they are clus-
tered into village level bodies and after an incubation period, further coalesced into federations. Once 
federations are self-sustaining, SRIJAN plans a retreat from daily management but continues to pro-
vide support and consultation.  
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Gesellschaft fur Internationale Zusammernabeit (GiZ) 
7.7 The Gesellschaft fur Internationale Zusammernabeit (GiZ), a German Government Technical ser-
vice agency is supporting NABARD for the Climate Proofing component, to assess their Indo-German 
Watershed Development Programme (IGWDP) in regards to observed and projected climatic 
changes. The Indo-German development project of Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF) and 
Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Internationale Zusammernabeit (GiZ) "Adaptation to Climate Change in 
Rural Areas of India" aims to contribute to improving the livelihoods and adaptive capacities of vul-
nerable rural communities in India. It also aims to develop concrete pilot experiences on adaptation 
measures together with the Indian state development programmes and supports the up-scaling of 
successful technical and financial adaptation approaches. For the Climate Proofing component, GiZ is 
supporting NABARD to assess their Indo-German Watershed Development Programme (IGWDP) in 
regards to observed and projected climatic changes.  
Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) 
7.8 The Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) is a corporation under the Government of Germany 
and functions are those of a promotional bank for the domestic economy and a development bank for 
the developing countries. The National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD), KfW 
development bank and GiZ are collectively implementing the Umbrella Programme for Natural Re-
source Management (UPNRM), the aim of which is to promote environmentally sustainable growth 
by encouraging private investments that are pro-poor. The UPNRM Project helps  for Climate Proofing 
with Key Features like Sustainable Natural Resources conservation and resource based livelihood plan-
ning Community involvement in planning, implementation, resources management and monitoring, 
environment sustainability. 
United Nations Development Programme and intervention for Climate Change 
7.9 UNDP's climate change work falls into four main areas: 
 Helping people to adapt make poor people less vulnerable on all fronts. This includes striving 
to ensure they have access to basic energy services 
 Assisting developing countries to have the knowledge and skills they need 
 Help to make carbon finance work for the poor 
 Energizing and climate-proofing the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
 
The UNDP Climate Change Adaptation programme is addressing a crucial dimension of these vul-
nerabilities by supporting specific activities to enhance climate change induced risk management ca-
pacities (adaptation, disaster mitigation and risk reduction) in districts across flood-prone areas of 
Odisha and drought-prone areas of Madhya Pradesh. The project, in partnership with the Australian 
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Agency for International Development, aims to address a crucial dimension of vulnerabilities by sup-
porting specific activities to enhance climate change induced risk management capacities (adaptation, 
disaster mitigation and risk reduction) in districts flood-prone areas of Odisha and drought-prone ar-
eas of Madhya Pradesh. The project aims to build the resilience of poor women and men to climate 
change and enhance disaster risk capabilities in West Nimar district (Madhya Pradesh) and Puri dis-
trict (Odisha) through integrated water management and incorporation of climate change adaptation 
in the state Disaster Management Plan to be achieved through:  
 Developing models of community-based management of water resources. This will involve par-
ticipatory vulnerability assessment and strengthening of communities  
 Integrating water management and climate change risk concerns into disaster management 
planning at district and gram panchayat levels  
 Informing state-level policy and planning process on climate change and disaster risk manage-
ment on adaptive water management practices like rain water harvesting, sustainable drainage 
system, plantations, etc.  
World Bank interventions for climate change adaptation 
7.10 The World Bank has signed a series of agreements with India to boost climate change mitigation 
projects with a focus on dealing with cyclone disasters. The bank approved US$104 million in credit 
for the first phase of the National Cyclone Risk Mitigation (NCRMP) programme, which started in 
2010, to help the states of Odisha and Andhra Pradesh respond to cyclones more effectively. The 
scheme has helped Odisha and Andhra Pradesh construct a combined 128 shelters, 550-km of evac-
uation roads and 11 bridges, benefitting an estimated 400,000 people. The bank also signed deals with 
Goa, Gujarat, Karnataka, Kerala, Maharashtra, and West Bengal governments to start the second 
phase of the NCRMP scheme. The new deals will see the World Bank channel US $308 million in credit 
to help the six states develop early warning dissemination systems, build cyclone risk mitigation infra-
structure and provide technical assistance for multi-hazard risk management.  
7.10.1 Another World Bank project focusses on climate resilient farming project that the Maharash-
tra state government is taking up in over 5,000 villages in drought-affected areas within Vidarbha and 
Marathwada regions of the State which have been affected by consistent drought years for last three 
years.  Under this project, water conservation and changes in agriculture patterns to boost productivity 
and to make these villages more resilient towards changes in climate will be introduced.    
7.10.2  A Grant Agreement for World Bank assistance of US$ 8 million for Sustainable Livelihoods 
and Adaptation to Climate Change (SLACC) Project has been signed between the Government of In-
dia and the World Bank. The grant project is funded through the Special Climate Change Fund of US$ 
8 million. The SLACC project will help community institutions of the rural poor, particularly women 
farmers, to foster improved resilience in the production system in collaboration with government. Cli-
matic hazards that affect the availability of natural resources, adversely affect the livelihoods of the 
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poor by impacting production, affecting incomes and preventing building up of assets. The project 
aims to improve adaptive capacity of the rural poor engaged in farm-based livelihoods to cope with 
climate variability and change in Bihar and Madhya Pradesh and scale up the demonstrated best prac-
tices and lessons into the Government of India’s National Rural Livelihoods Mission. National Rural 
Livelihoods Mission is the implementing agency.  
Discussion and conclusion 
8.0 India has reasons to be concerned about the impacts of climate change. Its large population de-
pends on climate-sensitive sectors like agriculture and forestry for livelihoods. Any adverse impact on 
water availability due to recession of glaciers, decrease in rainfall and increased flooding in certain 
pockets would threaten food security, cause die back of natural ecosystems including species that 
sustain the livelihoods of rural households, and adversely impact the coastal system due to sea level 
rise and increased frequency of extreme events. In addition to these impacts, achievement of vital 
national development goals related to other systems such as habitats, health, energy demand, and 
infrastructure investments would be adversely affected. 
8.1 The integrated approach that India follows to combat climate change offers opportunities for 
India to meet its INDC and sustainable development goal targets using best practices in the local con-
text and to scale impact. The major environmental challenge India faces-the nexus of natural resource 
and environmental degradation with poverty.  Adaptation to climate change in India requires inte-
grated solutions that simultaneously address livelihood improvements, environmental sustainability, 
as well as growth issues. Proactive measures for adaptation to climate variability and change can sub-
stantially reduce many of the adverse impacts, and thus contribute to livelihood security of the vulner-
able rural population. While climate change will affect the nation’s economy as a whole, its impact will 
be more severely felt by the poor who also have the least adaptive capacity. 
8.2 All these are results of conscious steps taken by various institutions in India like the Government 
of India, the State Governments, the Research Institutions like the Indian Council of Agricultural Re-
search and its constituent Research centers, State Agricultural Universities, the district level Krishi 
Vigyan Kendras (Agricultural Knowledge Centers) established by the State Agricultural Universities 
or Non-Governmental Organizations of repute who have the capability in terms of land, technical and 
professional manpower, Development Financial Institutions like National Bank for Agriculture & Rural 
Development (NABARD), International organizations of German origin  like the GiZ, KfW, etc., and 
other international organisaions like the  World Bank,,United Naions Development Fund (UNDP), 
Non-Governmental Organizations, etc. This paper attempts to present the efforts taken by many of 
these institutions which are helping the farmers in India face the brunt of the climate changes and 
increase the efficiency of the adaptive capabilities. 
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Global Water Ecosystem – Past, Present, Future? 
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Abstract 
Water resources at the globe are among the critical elements of life conditions not only for biological 
processes but for industry as well. It is not only the water consumption for different kind of purposes 
but also the destroying of water reserves by many ways. This paper is based on the research project 
Circle, financed by European Regional Development Fund. The project will focus on opportunities for 
energy recycling, nutrients re-use, water reserves recycling and reducing of water use as well as op-
portunities for technology development. The geographical focus is on the global issues although the 
web survey results are based on the Finnish perspectives.  In this paper we will present trends affecting 
the future of water service business in the long run, actors forming the water ecosystem as well as 
preliminary scenarios and visionary concepts concerning the future in water business. The data for 
this paper has been collected by a web-survey sent to actors in water ecosystem, but also from student 
work in Laurea UAS in spring 2017. Circle is an ongoing project until end November 2018. 
Introduction and Background 
Water resources at the globe are among the critical elements of life conditions for all biological pro-
cesses. Three tensions will impact on the global future: East –west –tension has its background in the 
times of the cold war, when the weapon competition between US and former Soviet Union created the 
roots for the continuous economic growth. Today, this tension is a bit weak and the world is still look-
ing for the new poles strong enough to generate growth again. During the last decades e.g. USA and 
China have been in the so called non-military war from the first position as an economic leader in the 
world or today perhaps USA and North Korea are even more in a traditional debate concerning war 
and nuclear weapons, too. North-south –tension has been defined as a polarization between rich and 
pure parts of the world. In the history, the rich north has used (and is still using) the resources of the 
poor south, e.g. in the form of cheap labor but also by exploiting the natural resources under the market 
prices. Also, during last two three years the increasing volume of immigrated people from south to 
north Europe is a sign of this tension. Human –nature –tension means the relationship of human beings 
and the globe as an ecosystem. Human beings have been used natural resources on the planet Tellus 
more than the nature can renew them. If all people in the world would live like north-Americans, we 
would need five globes. Even if people would live like we Finns, we would need four globes (Meristö 
2013). 
Water reserves on the globe are limited. It is not only the water consumption for different kind of 
purposes but also the destroying of water reserves by many even illegal ways is essential for the future 
development of whole mankind and the globe as a whole. Water reserves on the globe are 90% in the 
188 
seas, but also other reserves like polar ice, ground water or water in the air. Water reserves are dis-
tributed unequally between the countries in the world. North part of the globe has the best reserves. 
Still, water is needed everywhere and almost for every action both in natural and in manmade work. 
Quality requirements for drinking water are very high in order to avoid health problems and diseases. 
Ten percent (10%) from the world population is without safety water, and 30 % without basic sanita-
tion. Waste water in the global context will be purified only in 20% of the cases, and 80% remain as 
it is (Katko 2017). Water services are a big business. Investment needs in the global context in 2017 
are all together 150 billion dollars, but in the reality investments will reach only 45 billion dollars. Be-
cause of the poor infrastructure 30% of drinking water will be lost before reaching a consumer, in 
developing countries the share is even bigger, approximately 40-50% (Hukka 2017).  
Water is the new oil! This is a sentence the futurists have repeated during the last decades since 
1980´s. This means that the war of the clean water is as possible as the wars and conflicts because of 
oil have been since the first oil crisis in 1973. On energy side the renewables are coming, i.e. windmills, 
bioenergy from waste or solar energy. On water side, the recycling is still in the very beginning. In 
Singapore they do have the concept of new water, based on recycling through the process not only for 
other purposes but also for drinking water, which is unusual in the case of recycling water. In industry 
side recycling of all materials and alternative stuff is more familiar, even water recycling e.g. in the 
form of closed circulation in pulp and paper industry, the concept developed decades ago in Finland. 
Material and Methods 
In this paper we will focus on global water ecosystem, especially on how to exploit the nutrients and 
energy from the water on agricultural side, how to avoid pollution to the water in all sectors in the 
future and how to decrease the water consumption not only at institutional level including business, 
government and other institutes but also at consumer or citizen level especially concerning the every-
day living in different type of residential areas. This paper is based on our ongoing research project 
CIRCLE, financed by ERDF, i.e. European Regional Development Fund. Häme University of Applied Sci-
ences acts as a coordinator and the other partners are Laurea University of Applied Sciences (UAS) 
with its FuturesLab CoFi, the Association for Water and Environment of Western Uusimaa (LUVY), 
Aalto University and Sykli Environmental School of Finland. The web survey results consist of the Finn-
ish perspectives but they are relevant also in the global context. 
The Circle project focuses on opportunities for energy recycling, nutrients re-use, water reserves 
recycling and reducing of water use as well as opportunities for technology development. In this con-
text also financial mechanisms, legislation, educational needs and ecosystem actors with the best 
practices will be analyzed. Laurea’s research group has got support and contribution in data collection 
and analysis from two student groups from Laurea UAS, namely business students from Hyvinkää 
campus and MBA students in futures research field from Tikkurila campus, both in spring 2017.  
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Data collection for the study includes futures workshops with ecosystem actors to produce vision-
ary knowledge, web-surveys to actors and experts to collect trends and impacts on this field and com-
plementary interviews among key actors from water business and from water research side. The web-
survey sent in winter/spring 2017 to the actors of the water ecosystem will form the main data for this 
paper. Also, alternative scenarios for the water related businesses were created in spring 2017 by six 
groups of students in Laurea MBA program (Student reports 2017). Examples of these students´ work 
will be presented at the end of this paper in the conclusion part.  
This Circle project started in September 2016 and it will continue until August 2018. Theoretical 
background lies on one hand on the futures research paradigm and its methodology, including mega-
trends, PESTE analysis, scenario approach as well as visionary concept design. Visionary concept de-
sign (Kokkonen et al. 2005) is a methodology developed by FuturesLab CoFi in co-operation with the 
former University of Arts and the former University of Technology, both today better known as a part 
of Aalto University in Finland. Visionary concept design starts from the future and its alternative de-
velopment paths and focuses on needs and opportunities risen from alternative scenarios. Scenarios 
will serve as wind tunnels to test ideas and concepts, but also as and ideation source to design vision-
ary concepts, i.e. future-oriented concepts that are based on the future needs identified in different 
scenarios (Leppimäki et al. 2008; Laitinen & Meristö 2016). 
On the other hand, cluster analysis and ecosystem theory are a part of the methodological concept 
in which actors and factors will be combined and described into a systemic view to the water ecosys-
tem and its sustainable future alternatives. (Meristö & Laitinen 2017). Analysis and synthesis of the 
knowledge collected and created will be processed with the help of scenario methodology tool kit. 
Web Survey Results: Actors and Factors Shaping the Future in Water Business 
The main aim of our web-survey was to identify actors and factors influencing on the future of the 
water service business sector in the long run. Also, the estimates for the state of the art were asked, 
too. The surveys consisted of six parts including (1) background information of the recipient, (2) esti-
mating the change factors affecting to the future, (3) estimating the key actors in the field, (4) key 
indicators to follow, (5) vision for the water sector and (6) opportunity for the open feedback. The 
survey was sent to the different actors in the water business and related actors from public and private 
sectors as well as from NGOs. The survey was open from March 8th to the end of April 2017. All to-
gether 54 replies were got broadly from various categories in business, government, education, and 
so on. According to the web-survey results, the recipients considered the future with the time frame 
variating from the less than one year up to 20 years. The most common horizon among the recipients 
was 20 years to the future, which is very easy to understand in the field of water service business with 
heavy investments to the infrastructure. 
The change factors to the future were estimated by scale almost/fully agreed or disagreed with the 
statements presented in the survey (Figure 1). Altogether 15 statements from different perspectives 
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were presented: three of them were political by nature, three economic, three social, three technolog-
ical and three ecological according to PESTE analysis (Meristö 1983). Time frame to the future reached 
the next 20 years, i.e. one generation ahead until 2037.  
The most disagreed statements were number 2 and 8, which were not believed among the replies: 
- (2) Reform of the Regional Administration in Finland will break the monopoly of municipalities. 
- (8) Water Crisis will cause a collapse in trust index of citizens concerning municipalities´ Water 
Services. 
The most agreed trends on the other hand were statements number 4, 5, 6, 11, 12 ja 14: 
- (4) Weak economic situation in municipalities will bring totally new fees and taxes on the water 
services (e.g. rainwater fee) 
- (5) Citizens´ willingness to pay extra for clean water with good quality. 
- (6) Public-Private Partnership models will provide new business opportunities for agile actors. 
- (11) Digital follow up services and products will enable real-time pricing of water (analogy from en-
ergy sector, stock exchange electricity) 
- (12) Technologies enabling Recycling of energy and nutrients will come to water service branch 
slowly. 
- (14) Extreme weather phenomena will make more difficult the control of floodwater significantly in 
Finland, too. 
The actors answering the survey would be surprised, if the reform of regional administration would 
break the monopoly of municipalities, and also the trust of consumers to the water services will be 
strong in the future, too. Changes were expected to the action models in the field and also to the pricing 
policy. Consumers will be willing to pay for the high-quality water, but also the municipalities will 
probably need to develop new type of fees for their services to fulfill the financial gap in their economy. 
Climate change will cause extreme weather phenomena more often, which will complicate the control 
of floodwater in Finland, too. The water service sector is conservative. This means, that the new tech-
nologies will be slowly adopted in this field. Digital advices and services will become more general 
among consumers, and this will enable e.g. real-time pricing even in the near future.  
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Totally  
agree 
(value: 4) 
Agree  
(value: 3) 
Disagree 
(value: 2) 
Totally dis-
agree 
(value: 1) 
1. Difference of the legislation in foreign countries will form 
limitations for the Finnish companies and their business op-
portunities (avg: 2,32) 
        
 
2. Reform of the Regional Administration in Finland will break 
the monopoly of municipalities (avg: 2,09) 
        
 
3. EU directives and harmonization will obstruct regional de-
velopment. (avg: 2,25) 
        
 
4. Weak economic situation in municipalities will bring totally 
new fees and taxes on the water services (e.g. rainwater fee) 
(avg: 3,02) 
        
 
5. Citizens´ willingness to pay extra for clean water with good 
quality (avg: 2,89) 
        
 
6. Public-Private Partnership models will provide new business 
opportunities for agile actors. (avg: 3,15) 
        
 
7. The loading of Water Services in Rural residential areas will 
significantly decrease because of the Urbanization develop-
ment (avg: 2,45) 
        
 
8. Water Crisis will cause a collapse in trust index of citizens 
concerning municipalities´ Water Services. (avg: 2,07) 
        
 
9. Urbanization will put speed to the automatization of agri-
culture and its water services (avg: 2,40) 
        
 
10. Growing demand for energy-efficiency will move water 
services towards local solutions (e.g. logistics) (avg: 2,53) 
        
 
11. Digital follow up services and products will enable real-
time pricing of water (avg: 2,96) 
      
 
12. Technologies enabling Recycling of energy and nutrients 
will come to water service branch slowly (avg: 2,96) 
        
 
13 Lack of (clean) water is a fact in international context and 
that will rise the water prices (avg: 2,89) 
        
 
14. Extreme weather phenomena will make more difficult the 
control of floodwater significantly in Finland, too (avg: 2,96) 
        
 
15. The growing awareness of people can be recognized in 
everyday life concerning water consumption. (avg: 2,76) 
        
 
 
Figure 1.Estimations (N=54) concerning the future statements in the water business service sector. 
According to the web-survey the key actors in the water service field come from water treatment 
plants, but also from the group of decision-makers at national level (Figure 2). Private companies as 
well as by authorities controlling and regulating the sector have an important role in the field, too. The 
lowest position of the actors was given to the residential associations, agricultural actors as well as 
active citizens. Nor did education or lobbying organizations play any important role in this field.  
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Importance of different actor groups 
Big 
(Arvo: 4) 
Quite big 
(Arvo: 3) 
Small 
(Arvo: 2) 
Very small 
(Arvo: 1) 
1. Companies (avg: 3,13)       
 
2. Water treatment plants (avg: 3,59)       
 
3. Authorities (avg: 3,11)       
 
4. Water cooperatives (avg: 2,35)         
 
5. Agricultural actors (avg: 2,00)         
 
6. Decision makers (municipal) (avg: 2,85)         
 
7. Decision makers (national) (avg: 3,28)       
 
8. Decision makers (EU) (avg: 2,94)         
 
9. Education (avg: 2,20)         
 
10. Research (avg: 2,54)         
 
11. Environmental organisations (avg: 2,37)         
 
12. Residents’ associations (avg: 1,96)        
 
13. Lobbying organisations (avg: 2,33)        
 
14. Experts (avg: 2,87)       
 
15. Active citizens (avg: 2,15)         
 
 
Figure 2.Estimations (N=54) concerning the role of different actors in the water ecosystem field. 
 
The actors in the water ecosystem face critical phenomena and factors in the future, as our survey 
results show. The water ecosystem consists of many different actors with different roles. Theoreti-
cally, in the ecosystem there are first the actors in the middle, playing the main role in the field and 
then there are related and supporting actors, forming the multidisciplinary service and industry net-
work around the key actors. Furthermore, the main actors in the water ecosystem context need also 
so called enablers, which usually are actors from public sector, but also from the third sector like dif-
ferent associations and other NGOs as well as from the financing sector. Each actor has its specific 
role in the ecosystem dynamics and their significance can vary from time to time in the “save the 
water” project, depending on the conditions in the real world.  
In our web-survey, we also asked what kind of innovation water business cluster would need in the 
future. Most of the respondents saw that the technological innovations are the most needed ones. 
More specifically, technological innovations could be related e.g. to IoT-based solutions, real-time 
monitoring systems and automation. However, quite many of the respondents saw that also business 
and social innovations are needed. Business innovations could relate e.g. to financing models, co-op-
eration models and procurement processes whereas social innovations could relate to financial solu-
tions on poor countries. 
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Results: New Service and Product Concepts for Water Sector Companies 
As an example scenarios and visionary concepts in each scenario will be presented for an illustrative 
state owned airline company diversifying its business to the water business sector (Student report 
Anttila et al 2017). First, PESTE factors were identified and their significance was estimated. The most 
significant factors are as follows:  
- (P) Rainwater belongs to the state, End of state owned companies 
- (E) For mid-class consumers air ticket prices too high, Increasing costs of air plane vehicles  
- (S) Clean water a priviledge only for a few people, Tourism – an unethical activity  
- (T) Copying water for household use a new opportunity, Water zipping possible  
- (E) Clean water the most valuable asset for marketing in tourism, unexpected natural phenomena 
more common in future.  
Copying water is a revolutionary concept, where copying is analogically compared to copying data 
files, i.e. from water it can be produced more water without more resources. Water zipping is also a 
radical concept, which comes from file zipping meaning that the requirements for the space are less 
than in normal case.  
Second, four alternative scenarios were built from different assumptions, where scenario axes con-
sist of two dimensions, i.e. drivers for the future, which are Water technology (innovations in this field 
or not) and Water reserves (lack or enough). In scenario alternatives there is on one hand enough 
water or not and on the other hand technology is advanced or not. Based on these assumptions sce-
nario alternatives are the next four: 
Scenario 1. ZIP-water and a flying water bottle. This scenario assumes that the technology develops 
so radically that the packing and copying of water is possible. As a consequence, transporting water 
by airplanes is efficient and the global water resources will be distributed more evenly. 
Scenario 2. Water mine. In this scenario there is serious lack of pure water because of contamina-
tion. Technological development enables airplanes to collect water from the clouds and the airline 
companies become remarkable players in water business. 
Scenario 3. Water war. This scenario assumes that remarkable share of water resources are con-
taminated and there is not much technological development in water supply field. The ownership of 
the water resources is fragmented which weakens global water supply. The scarce water resources 
lead water wars and water becomes a luxury product with a high price. 
Scenario 4. Social water –common good with water. In this scenario it is assumed that there are 
very dry areas in the globe and the technology has not managed to solve the problem. The difficult 
situation in the dry area in leads to the increased amount of refuses. Also, social corporate responsi-
bility and end social entrepreneurship becomes more general.  
Each of these scenarios will include a wide range of opportunities for new products and services as 
well as for new business models. Scenario 1 will rise up innovations for water transportation with re-
movable zip-water and water-express opportunities. Scenario 2 includes the revolutionary concept for 
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the future with a flying water mine in the sky. Scenario 3 will focus on army flights and red-cross hos-
pital flights but also on water business as usual, if possible in uncertain environment. Scenario 4 will 
grow with network-based business model and with a daughter company as a social entrepreneurial 
firm.  
As a conclusion we will present a summary of the work prepared by all our student groups in spring 
2017, focusing on different themes concerning global water reserves (Table 1). 
 
Table 1.Visionary concepts and innovations (based on Student reports 2017). 
Theme Visionary concepts (examples) 
Local water from 
business perspective 
Business unit for humanitarian aid 
Cleaning pill 
Utilizing water received from snow 
Filtered water for new markets 
Water business in airline 
company 
Zip water 
Cloud catcher / Water hoover 
Speculative trading with water resources 
Cooperation with charities 
Rain management Weather manipulation 
Cooperation with insurance companies 
Transferring rains 
Brand: “More sun” 
Recreational use of water Water park at home 
Spiritual water retreats 
Natural water parks 
Branded organic water 
Water purification in  
traveling 
Utilizing nanotechnology in packaging 
Possibility to manipulate the taste of water 
Purifying packages 
Ecological tourism Virtual lake tourism 
Importing water from space 
Green card lotteries to Finland to find pure water experiences 
 
The themes of student groups and the visionary concepts developed were related to the opportuni-
ties concerning local water, water business in airline company, rain management, recreational use of 
water, water purification in traveling and ecological tourism. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
Ecosystem, including all the actors from core actors to enablers is similar in other countries, although 
our survey results consider only Finnish actors. Especially research community co-operation in Circle 
project shows that Finnish practices are appreciated e.g. in Brazil and Kenya. Changing factors are 
partly country related (e.g. issues concerning legislation, administration and regional development) 
but many of them are universal like the growing awareness of people concerning water consumption. 
Scenarios developed for an illustrative airline company can be generalized almost everywhere. Mar-
ket in this case is global, covering especially the areas with scarce water resources. Visionary concepts 
195 
themselves are “useful” in every company working in this field, regardless of the home country. Some 
of the visionary concepts mentioned in this paper are quite radical ones. According to Rush & Marshall 
(2015), in the water related businesses there is a tendency for the system to encourage incremental 
rather than more radical innovations. However, the future-orientation and the long timeframe explains 
the radical features of some concepts introduced in this paper. 
In theory, this paper relies on the methods proved in practice, and the results and their significance 
are fruitful mostly for practioners or practice-oriented researchers. The Circle project is an ongoing 
project. These results are preliminary ones. The research work will continue together with the whole 
project team in order to clarify and complete the ecosystem with real water business actors with their 
roles and positions in it, but also to co-create generic scenarios for the water business sector in coop-
eration with the real actors in joint futures workshop facilitated by the futures researchers of our team. 
Water business sector is a challenging field, where the traditional attitudes will meet the future chal-
lenges. The changes in the mindset are necessary at all levels in the ecosystem. We wish our joint 
effort in the Circle project will bring the actors more close to the shared vision of the desirable future.  
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Abstract 
This research paper presents the first outcomes of Academy funded project Smart Energy Transition, 
which studies how and in what ways Finland could benefit from the disruption occurring in the energy 
sector. To get a comprehensive set of expert opinions and alternative views on the occurring transition 
in the Finnish energy sector, a two-round Delphi survey with concluding workshop has been organized 
in spring 2016, resulting in this paper as one of the summarizing outcomes. 
Introduction and Background 
International consensus on the climate change prevention and general acknowledgment of the need 
for future energy solutions has challenged the traditional energy system for instance through the up-
take of wind power systems in Sweden and Denmark. As Finland is also facing this energy system 
disruption, the Academy of Finland funded project Smart Energy Transition (SET) is studying how and 
in what ways Finland could benefit from this disruption, or alternatively from this expected transition 
in the energy sector.  
To get expert opinions and alternative views on the future energy system and on the role of different 
technologies in it, a two-round Delphi survey with concluding workshop was organized in spring 2016. 
Energy technologies were selected from both nationally promising ones (such as demand response) 
and currently marginal ones (such as solar photovoltaics), and were further developed into seven tech-
nology themes that were considered in the second round of the survey and in the workshop. 
This paper introduces how survey respondents see the role and significance of the selected tech-
nology themes in Finland, and how different energy technologies are seen to be linked to each other. 
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Development of Delphi Study for Smart Energy Transition Project 
‘Smart energy transition – realizing its potential for sustainable growth for Finland’s second century’1 
(SET) is a project funded by Strategic Research Council (SRC) for the years 2015-2020. Main research 
objective of this research project is to tackle the ongoing global disruption of energy markets by cre-
ating pathways for Finland to profit from this disruption. As generally required in SRC-funded projects, 
SET comprises a cross-disciplinary research consortium with academic partners from 
 a management studies department at a business school; 
 a political science unit; 
 a design department; 
 an engineering department working particularly with solar and wind power production  
technology; 
 a building technology research unit; 
 an institution for economic research; 
 an environmental policy research unit, which has allowed conducting of research with  
technology, business, learning and policy point of views. 
 
One key ingredient of the technology-related SET research is a two-round Delphi survey, conducted 
in spring 2016 with a concluding workshop, to generate exploratory future scenarios about disruptive 
changes in the Finnish energy system. While the main responsibility of the Delphi survey was with the 
authors of this paper from engineering and design departments, also all other academic partners and 
multiple non-academic partners contributed to the formulation of the survey.  
Planning of the Delphi study started already when drafting the project application. Key technologies, 
such as new forms of intermittent power production by solar and wind, were mentioned in the appli-
cation. However, much of the content of the survey remained open at the time of submitting the ap-
plication. After positive funding decision in autumn 2015, the partners thus needed to re-assemble 
visions of smart energy and relevant research foci. After establishing first ideas of the content, the 
planning of the Delphi survey followed guidelines given in previous research (e.g. Gordon 2000; Riiko-
nen & Tapio 2009). Accordingly, a few knowledgeable and willing respondents were selected to help 
in creating background understanding of the issue through interviews. It was thus the SET-project 
partners and the few interviewed external actors who had the opportunity to draw in technologies, 
trends, observations and emerging knowledge pools to the energy vision created for the Delphi study. 
Fig. 1 lists key steps in developing a Delphi study in the SET project and introduces documentation that 
has been formed during the development of Delphi study process. 
  
                                                            
 
1 www.smartenergytransition.fi   
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Figure 1.Key steps and related documentation produced during the preparation of Delphi survey 
(available in www.smartenergytransition.fi). 
 
Based on the results to more general questions in the first round of Delphi survey, the second round 
was focused to the selected key technologies being possibly part of the disruption in the energy sector: 
 solar photovoltaics (PV); 
 solar heat, heat pumps and storages; 
 wind power; 
 biomass-based energy system; 
 energy efficiency in buildings; 
 production of peak and reserve power; 
 digitalization and automating of demand response (DR). 
 
This division was also applied in the concluding workshop, where views were gathered for each tech-
nology with separately prepared work process (Marttila et al. 2017). 
Main Results of Delphi Survey 
The Delphi survey comprises both numerical data obtained with two-round questionnaire and key in-
sights from workshop discussions by 40 experts. That data is used as comparative source of infor-
mation in the study of alternative solutions for the Finnish energy sector actors. The first main results 
of the Delphi survey are described in this section. 
One of the main influencing factors to the obtained results is the background of survey respondents. 
As Fig. 2 illustrates, knowledge of respondents was strongly focused to solar PV systems and least to 
the energy efficiency of buildings. Distribution of respondents’ main area of activity was more even 
across the academia, industry and public sector (including non-governmental organizations). 
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Figure 2.Background of Delphi survey respondents. 
 
The second round of Delphi survey provided overall views on the significance and export potential 
of different energy technologies for Finland in year 2030. Compared to today’s situation, heat pump, 
wind power and automated demand response systems are expected to be a more significant part of 
Finnish energy system in 2030. When these qualitative results are compared with the estimated val-
ues (or significance) given in the Finnish Energy and Climate Strategy for year 2030, especially the 
role of wind energy systems seems more prominent by respondents than by policy-related scenario 
(TEM 2017). Otherwise, expected upcoming of automated demand response and use of heat pumps 
as a part of district heating systems are in line with results illustrated in Fig. 3.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.Expected importance of different energy technologies in Finland in 2030. 
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Survey results for the expected export potential of different technologies is illustrated in Fig. 4. It 
clearly illustrates how automated DR systems and new applications of forest biomass (such as mate-
rials and fuels) are seen to provide openings for new export activities, which are also expected in the 
Finnish Energy and Climate Strategy. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.Expected export potential of different energy technologies in Finland in 2030. 
 
Technology-specific Findings Obtained with Survey and Workshop 
The summarizing workshop was organised right after the second round of Delphi survey in spring 
2016. It followed the above presented listing of technologies, which can be thematically summarized 
under four topics titled as 
 Disruptive electricity production methods: wind and solar PV; 
 Balancing of demand and production: management of peak power demand, automated DR; 
 New usage possibilities of renewable resources: biomass-based energy system; 
 Changes in the energy consumption: energy efficiency in buildings, decentralized heating  
solutions. 
 
This section summarizes technology-specific findings obtained from the survey and workshop data 
for wind power, solar photovoltaics, biomass-based energy system and automated demand response, 
which relate to the production and demand of electricity in Finland in 2030. 
 
  
202 
Wind Power 
Wind power can be considered the main disruptive source in Nordic countries, since building of wind 
energy capacity especially to Sweden and Denmark has led to the decrease of electricity prices in 
Nordic market region below 40 €/MWh (ET 2017)1. As a comparison, published values of levelized 
cost of electricity (LCOE) in the latest Nordic projects have been around 45 €/MWh (Norwea 2016), 
demonstrating the effect of subsidy schemes (such as electricity certificates, investment grants and 
feed-in tariffs) on having the present capacity in Nordic countries. At the end of 2016, installed wind 
power capacity in Finland was around 1500 MW with annual production of 3 TWh, which was 3.6 % 
of annual electricity of 85 TWh in 2016 (ET 2017). According to (TEM 2017), Finnish government 
objective is to have 8 TWh of annual production capacity in 2030 that is below 10 % of expected 
electricity consumption at that time (i.e., 93 TWh for year 2030 “with additional measures” scenario). 
As Fig. 5 illustrates, Delphi respondents expert over 10 % share for wind power in Finland with a 
notable share of offshore farms. This is one of the very interesting outcomes, as the present number 
of offshore windfarms in Finland very limited, and their LCOE tends to be higher than for onshore 
farms. On other other hand, the most expected share of 10-20 % is in line with the research findings 
of (Zakeri et al. 2015), where the maximum level of economically viable wind integration is 18.7 %. 
Acceptance of wind power is also expected to increase, which is also needed for seeing further in-
crease in the onshore wind power capacity. 
 
    
 
Figure 5.Delphi results concerning wind power systems. 
 
Solar Photovoltaic Systems 
Capacity of grid-connected solar PV systems has strongly increased in Finland during the last three 
years, as the installed capacity was 8 MWp at the end of 2015, and it has tripled being 27 MWp at the 
end of 2016 (Energiauutiset 2017). This increase has mainly happened without specific subsidy 
schemes, as solar PV systems do not receive feed-in tariffs in Finland, and even the investment-grant 
                                                            
 
1 Please note that this average price does not represent as such the hourly fluctuation of electricity prices in the 
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supported payback time of a solar PV system is still close to ten years in Finland. If the annual produc-
tion of grid-connected solar PV systems in Finland is estimated with the ratio of 800 kWh/kWp, the 
present annual production is around 0.02 TWh. Compared to this, solar PV systems are projected to 
produce 0.2 TWh/a already in 2020 and 0.7 TWh in 2030 (TEM 2017), corresponding capacities of 
250 and 875 MWp, respectively.  
 
 
Figure 6.Strong increase in the Finnish solar PV capacity is mainly contributed by residential and util-
ity-scale plants built for the compensation of own electricity consumption (YLE 2016). 
 
According to the Delphi study data, materialization of solar PV system is expected to happen espe-
cially in buildings that is logical continuation to their present installation for the compensation of own 
electricity consumption. This trend is closely related to the possible uptake of battery energy storages 
and electric vehicles that can work as direct storage for surplus electricity production. Share of the 
solar PV in electricity production is expected to be quite significant compared with values projected in 
the Finnish Energy and Climate Scenario, being in the range of several percentage units and hence in 
the range of several terawatt hours already in 2030. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.Delphi results concerning solar photovoltaic systems. 
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Biomass-based Energy System 
Biomass originating from forests, waste and process side streams can be considered as the “corner-
stone” of Finnish energy system through their use in combined heat and power (CHP) plants and as 
an ingredient for bio-based fuels. Principal examples of biomass-based energy system in Finland are 
the new Äänekoski bioproduct mill and widening use of biofuels in traffic sector to reach the 39 % 
emission decrease target set for sectors outside the emission trading system: as Fig. 8 illustrates, this 
target seems unreachable with existing policy measures for traffic sector. 
 
 
Figure 8.Target level set by European Union for the reduction of greenhouse gases outside the emis-
sion trading system against the trendline based on existing policy measures (Kuuva 2016). 
 
Delphi respondents have mixed views on the role of biomass in Finnish energy system: they recog-
nize its significance as a renewable energy source, but they would like to see more added value in them 
with ensured carbon neutrality. This question arises especially with possibly upcoming Kaidi biorefin-
ery in Kemi that will produce biofuel with wood-based biomass, such as energy wood, harvesting re-
mains and leftover bark from the forest industry (Kaidi 2017). 
 
 
 
Figure 9.Delphi results concerning biomass-based energy system. 
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Automated Demand Response Systems 
Traditionally the balance between supply and demand in the energy system is achieved by regulating 
the output power of generators. However, in the future, growing share of the electricity production will 
be based on intermittent generation (i.e. wind and solar), of which power output is variable and regu-
lating possibilities are limited. Hence, there is an increasing need for novel solutions for regulating the 
system energy demand. In Finland, automated DR is closely related to the use of automated meter 
reading for electricity consumption and digital services for showing the customer’s electricity con-
sumption even in the real time. 
As already noted in Fig. 4, automated DR systems are expected to have notable export potential in 
the near future and also significance in the Finnish energy system. To give more detailed view on the 
development needs of DR systems, Fig. 10 illustrates the significance of different factors in automated 
DR: open data access with communication between systems and real-time interaction with customers 
were considered most important in the answers to this question. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.Delphi results concerning automated DR systems. 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
Conducted Delphi study has provided views and opinions on the future development of Finnish energy 
system. Especially the role of digital services and renewable energy sources are expected to increase 
by Delphi respondents. Based on the obtained data, electricity markets can be seen to develop as a 
market place for demand availability with higher price volatility between different hours. One of the 
interesting comparison between themes is whether digitalization and related services or wood in dif-
ferent forms will work as key exportable in year 2030? Hopefully both, as all solutions are needed in 
limiting the amount of greenhouse gases.  
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Another interesting question relates to the uptake of storage solutions: as there will be more wind 
power and solar PV systems, will there also be significantly more battery energy storage systems (like 
Tesla Powerwall 2) in Finland or will electric vehicles become useable also as grid-connected energy 
storages? As Smart Energy Transition project is forecasted to continue up to year 2021, these ques-
tions will be reviewed in another Delphi study by authors. 
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Energy security analysis and future recommendations  Four categories: R&D 
expenditure, education expenditure, rule of law and democracy  
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Abstract 
This paper sheds the light on an important aspect of the energy system: Energy Security. Energy secu-
rity is a global issue that directs policy makers to vote decisions in. The promise for a more secure 
energy system is meant to provide societies with a better life. As energy security is a multidimensional 
concept, this paper investigates the relationship between four different parameters with energy secu-
rity in a global holistic view. All countries with reliable data are compared in regards to their energy 
security based on these four parameters (R&D, education, rule of law and democracy). The results 
show clearly that there is a substantial difference between countries in their energy security level. It 
also, provides conclusions to policy makers of how energy security can be enhanced.  
Introduction and Background 
Energy security is a global concern (Ang et al. 2015) for different fields of science, national energy 
policies (Franki and Višković 2015) and politics, international relations (Kirchner and Berk 2010), pol-
icymakers (Turton and Barreto 2006; Winzer 2012), and as a national security issue (Dyer and Trom-
betta 2013).  
There are many reasons for this interest: increased energy prices (Vivoda 2010), the global energy 
supply crisis, climate change, growing dependence of industrialised economies on energy as an engine 
for economic growth, major disruptions in oil markets related to military upheavals, political conflicts, 
social development (Augutis et al. 2011), complex global markets and the threats to the energy sys-
tem. Although the energy security concept is an important concept, countries differ in their level of 
energy security. The reason is the different aspects and standpoints of energy security (Narula and 
Reddy 2015). 
Being able to study and analyse the energy security level of countries is a strong tool that allows 
making proper recommendations for decision makers (Turton and Barreto 2006; Winzer 2012). Once 
decisions consider the energy security of the country, they are closer to be more sustainable decisions 
(Andrews and Shabani 2014). When sustainable decisions are taken for a country, the promise of 
development and prosperity can be achieved (Maslow 1943). 
As the concept of energy security has many dimensions to be addressed (Yergin 2006), in this 
research, energy security is analysed based on four parameters, of which two are related to the Liter-
acy dimension and the other two to the Policy dimension.  
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The four parameters to be addressed are:  
1. Research and Development (R&D) expenditures 
2. Education expenditures 
3. Democracy index 
4. Rule of law.  
 
As found in previous research (Azzuni and Breyer 2017), these parameters have a strong relation 
to energy security. R&D expenditures affect energy security; R&D expenditures on renewable energy 
technologies enhance energy security (Lovins 1979; Franki and Višković 2015; Schellnhuber et al. 
2016), by providing environmental friendly options. Furthermore, R&D expenditures allows for better 
understanding of the energy systems and thus gives an opportunity for efficiency gain and therefore 
achieving energy security (WEC 2015). Increasing efficiency makes the energy system more secure 
(Lovins 1976; IEA 2007; Brown et al. 2014; Augutis et al. 2015) and provides a double-win for the 
climate traits (Refaat 2009). Also, in the area of societal behavior, R&D expenditures highlights the 
possibilities for energy conservation and energy demand reduction (Hughes 2009) by users giving 
away some of the services that are derived from their energy use (Rutherford et al. 2007). This energy 
conservation has a substantial impact on energy security in which it allows for better use of the re-
sources.  
When it comes to education expenditures, education is important to spread awareness about en-
ergy security. Awareness and education result in informed members in the society which means to 
use and run the energy system securely (Balmer 2015). In addition, expenditures on education helps 
individuals to attain certain attitudes when using the energy system. In general terms, individuals with 
higher levels of education are more likely to have responsible attitudes in regards to energy security 
(Knox-Hayes et al. 2013). Also, energy literacy gives homeowners more control over their own energy 
security (Hossain et al. 2016), e.g. rooftop PV systems. 
Further, as democracy is enhanced, so is energy security. Once citizens have their demands 
achieved, their needs covered and their will listened to, the energy system is considered more secure. 
More informed societies can shape their energy system by making a societal pressure on their gov-
ernments to act based on the citizens’ will. In such situations, energy security is clearly seen as the 
responsibility of the state (Barrett et al. 2010) that represents individuals whose will is supported by 
the right information. The stronger a democratic system, decisions are made with more coherence 
with citizens' daily needs (Johnson and Boersma 2015). 
For the last parameter, the rule of law is important to ensure energy security. The more corruption 
in the system, the less secure it becomes. For example, Nicholas Stern clearly pointed out that “The 
existence of climate change is the largest and widest ranging market failure ever seen.” (Stern et al. 
2006). Further, when the rule of law is applied selectively by responsible personals to attain their own 
benefits (Bruusgaard 2006), the energy security is deteriorated. An example of such a corruption that 
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deteriorates energy security is the nuclear waste buried in some African countries. Regulations pre-
vent nuclear waste to be buried in the country but because of the corruption, some people in high 
positions manipulated the regulations for a huge payment to allow this waste. For this, the better the 
rule of law the better for the energy security, whereas the more corrupt the system is the more dete-
rioration of energy security can be observed (Onamics 2005).  
Material and Methods 
Each of the parameters is plotted and compared to GDP PPP for each country. Then countries around 
the world are divided into four groups. Countries with high GDP PPP and score high at the same time 
in a certain parameter are considered to have achieved energy security. Vice versa, countries with low 
GDP PPP and having low achievement in a parameter are considered to lack energy security. Countries 
in between the two ends are considered to be in a transition mode. The division into four categories is 
based on a 50% split. 50% of the GDP PPP makes the vertical dividing line and 50% of the maximum 
value of each indicator makes the horizontal dividing line.    
GDP PPP of Singapore was taken to be 100% and all countries are shown as a percentage of Singa-
pore GDP PPP. The energy security parameters are all in a percentage form. Internet endings are used 
in circles to represent each country. Countries with no data for any of the parameter were excluded 
from being represented. 
Results 
The data for R&D expenditures in each country was obtained from the World Bank database (WB 
2014). The result of plotting each countries’ R&D expenditures (vertical access) against the GDP PPP 
(horizontal axis) in each country resulted in Figure 1. 
The data for education expenditures in each country was obtained from the World Bank database 
(WB 2015a). The result of plotting each countries education expenditure (vertical axis) against the 
GDP PPP (horizontal axis) in each country resulted in Figure 2. 
The data for the democracy index in each country was obtained from The Economist Intelligence 
Unit (EIU 2016). The result of plotting each countries democracy index (vertical axis) against the GDP 
PPP (horizontal axis) in each country resulted in Figure 3. 
The data for the Rule of law in each country was obtained from World Bank worldwide governance 
indicators (WB 2015b). The result of plotting each countries rule of law indicator (vertical axis) against 
the GDP PPP (horizontal axis) in each country resulted in Figure 4. 
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Fig. 1: Research and development expenditures as a percentage of GDP, 2014 or latest, versus GDP 
PPP normalized to Singapore GDP PPP. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2: Education expenditures as a percentage of total government expenditure, 2014 or latest, ver-
sus GDP PPP normalized to Singapore GDP PPP. 
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Fig. 3: Democracy index (percentage), versus GDP PPP normalized to Singapore GDP PPP. 
 
Fig. 4: Rule of law (percentile ranking) versus GDP PPP normalized to Singapore GDP PPP. 
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Discussion and Conclusions 
The results in the previous section showed clearly how countries performed in regards to energy se-
curity. Many countries fell in the insecure area and many in the transition area. The discussion for each 
of the parameters and the countries performance is presented in this section.  
1. It is noticed from Figure 1 that countries need to spend more on R&D. Most of the countries in 
the world do not spend enough on R&D to reach the transition area. Most of the countries lay 
in the insecure area. The reason for this categorization is the combined fact of low R&D ex-
penditures and low GDP PPP levels in these countries. Examples of countries are France and 
Kyrgyzstan. These countries in this area need to improve their situation by one of two ways, 
either by increasing the R&D expenditure and thus move to the upper left side. Then the more 
R&D expenditures should be directed to invest in economic production that increase the GDP 
PPP. In this way the country can reach the secure zone. The second path is to increase the 
GDP PPP by other means e.g. natural resources export. Then, the public and private sector  
start allocating more money to R&D activities. On the other notice, many countries are already 
on the transition side with a high enough GDP PPP. They need to spend more on R&D that they 
can achieve a higher level of energy security. Examples for countries that should spend more 
on R&D are Qatar and Luxemburg.  
2. When it comes to expenditures on education, it is noticed that many countries are already in 
the transition quarters, where they spend enough on education. However, it seems that ex-
penditures on education in their cases need longer time to drive economic growth. There can 
be many reasons for this observation; first, the countries face corruption and thus the money 
spent on education does not reach its final destination. Second, the expenditures on education 
are tunnelled to non-productive activities. Third, the education system needs more infrastruc-
ture to become a reliable education system, in this case, even the expenditures on education 
are high in comparison to other countries in the world as a percentage of GDP PPP, there is 
still need for more investment on education in absolute values. On the other side of the tran-
sition zone, many countries need to start spending more on education immediately, in order 
to reach the secure area, e.g. United Arab Emirates. 
3. The noticeable result from the democracy index is that, if the GDP PPP is high, it is not a guar-
antee for a high democracy level. For example, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have high GDP PPP but 
their democracy index is not high. This result shows the failure of countries in this zone to 
utilize their high GDP to root the democracy practice. On the other side, countries on the upper 
transition area have achieved high a democracy index but still they need to implement that 
democratic practice to achieve higher GDP PPP. This can be applied by for example allowing 
citizens to choose governmental projects in a more direct way. The last category are the coun-
tries in the insecure zone. These countries suffer from poverty and low democracy. This mix-
ture makes it a real challenge. Although increasing the wealth of the society without democ-
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racy is possible sometimes, the challenge comes after that to shift the regime into a demo-
cratic one. The easier path is to establish a full democratic approach in the country that allows 
for better representation of citizens’ will. As the collective intelligence leads for creative solu-
tions, a higher democracy level can drive the economic growth.  
4. What was seen in the democracy index can be seen in the rule of law with one difference. 
There is no country in the world for which the GDP PPP is high and having low levels of rule of 
law. Law in these countries is applied more than countries with less GDP PPP. It can be con-
cluded that high GDP PPP is a guarantee for rule of law, because any country with such big 
wealth will do its best to keep that level, thus the law is applied. For the countries in the tran-
sition upper left zone, there is a sub-relation between GDP PPP and rule of law. It seems that 
the rule of law is increased, if GDP PPP increases and vice versa. This brings us back to the 
previous conclusion; increasing GDP PPP drives for more ruling of law, most likely in that way 
that ruling of law is a precondition for a continuous GDP PPP growth. The last area in the rule 
of law paradigm is the insecure zone. For these countries in the insecure zone, the path out to 
security is first by achieving a higher rule of law to reach the transition area. Then the rational 
relationship will take place to drive these countries to the secure zone.     
 
The conclusion of this research emphasizes the need of many countries to invest more in their ed-
ucation system and spend more on research and development in order to achieve higher levels of 
energy security. More democratic rule with higher rule of law enhance energy security. The recom-
mendations for countries in the insecure zone are to apply changes on their respective systems in 
order to reach the secure zone. This can be done by increasing the GDP that will result in enhancing 
energy security parameters. Alternatively, to enhance the parameters in which on its turn will increase 
the GDP. The second option is longer and not guaranteed because many countries can get stuck in the 
transition zone for longer period.   
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Abstract 
This paper includes synergy and trade-off analyses of key energy consumption variables and key driv-
ers of energy consumption in the EU-28 countries. Key driver variables are in the trade-off and synergy 
analyses: population, value added and urban population. Energy consumption variables are energy in-
tensity and final electricity consumption per capita. Synergy and trade-off analyses cover the years 
1995-2014. These analyses reveal many interesting aspects of energy efficiency improvements in the 
European Union. 
Introduction and Background 
The energy intensity of industry in developed countries has steadily declined in most countries in the 
world since the oil price shocks of the 1970s. The production of energy-intensive industrial commod-
ities has grown dramatically and is expected to continue growing as population and per capita income 
increase – especially in the developing countries. Energy use represents the largest source of GHG 
emissions in industries. Energy efficiency improvements are linked to global climate change politics. 
Historically, industrial energy-efficiency improvement rates have typically been around 1%/year.  
Also in service sector, energy-efficiency has improved during last decades. Still, there exists large 
potentials to further reduce energy use and GHG emissions in most sectors and economies. Chal-
lenges to improve energy efficiency and save energy are still big and remarkable. There is strong needs 
to monitor progress in energy savings and energy efficiency.  
Energy efficiency can be studied at different levels and in different spatial, temporal and functional 
scales. In this paper our focus is national country-level scale. Efficient energy use means that we typi-
cally aim to minimizing the amount of energy used for a given, constant energy service. In this article 
we present some energy efficiency analyses using trade-off analyses (see, e.g. Kaivo-oja et al. 2014) 
and synergy analyses (see, e.g. Luukkanen et al. 2012).  
In this paper the concepts of trade-off and synergy are important. As we know, the concept of syn-
ergy refers to a nonlinear relationship between two or more elements/variables whereby they gener-
ate a combined outcome that is more or less than the sum of their parts taken separately. This happens 
due to their capacity to work together (positive synergy) or against each other (negative synergy). 
The idea of a synergy is one of the core concepts within systems theory in that it forms the foundation 
to the idea of emergence and the concept of a system as being more than the sum of its parts. For 
complexity theory, measurements of synergy are one critical foundation of theoretical and empirical 
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development. Trade-off relationship refers to mote linear relationship between elements and varia-
bles. (see e.g. Johnson 2007, Hausmann et al. 2014) 
Material and Methods 
This section describes the data sources and methods of study. In Table 1 data sources of the study are 
reported.  
 
Table 1. Data sources of the study. 
Data Sources 
Population (number, 
first of January) 
Word Bank Database 2016, Web: http://databank.worldbank.org/data/re-
ports.aspx?source=2&series=SP.URB.TOTL&country=  
Value added (Value 
added, gross, in cur-
rent prices, million 
euros) 
Eurostat Database 2016, Web: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-ex-
plained/index.php/National_accounts_and_GDP  
Urban population 
(number) 
Word Bank Database 2016, Web: http://databank.worldbank.org/data/re-
ports.aspx?source=2&series=SP.URB.TOTL&country=  
Energy intensity, 
(toe/MEuro) 
Eurostat, DG Economic and Financial Affrairs, May 2015, Web: 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/Pocket-
Book_ENERGY_2015%20PDF%20final.pdf  
Energy consumption 
per capita, 
(kgoe/cap) 
Eurostat, DG Economic and Financial Affrairs, May 2015, Web: 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/Pocket-
Book_ENERGY_2015%20PDF%20final.pdf  
Final electricity con-
sumption per capita, 
(kWh/cap) 
Eurostat, DG Economic and Financial Affrairs, May 2015, Web: 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/Pocket-
Book_ENERGY_2015%20PDF%20final.pdf  
Primary energy in-
tensity, (toe/MEuro, 
2010) 
Eurostat, DG Economic and Financial Affrairs, May 2015, Web: 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/Pocket-
Book_ENERGY_2015%20PDF%20final.pdf  
 
The methodology of this study is based on synergy analysis and trade-off analyses of data. Meth-
odologically, the analysis is based on a new assessment tool developed for the analysis of synergies 
and trade-offs between selected development trends. Understanding trade-offs and synergies is 
needed in smart management and decision-making (see .e.g. Luukkanen et al. 2012; Kaivo-oja et al. 
2014). The synergy tool is developed to analyze the synergy between two different trends, but it can 
be used to analyze simultaneously the synergy between many variables (see Mainali, Luukkanen, Sil-
veira & Kaivo-oja 2016, Luukkanen et al. 2012; see also Rothman 1976).  
In Figure 1 we have presented 3 basic forms of synergy between two variables.  
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Figure 1. Alternatives of synergy level between two variables, x and y.  
 
Maximum synergy can be obtained when relative changes x and y are equal. In case the change 
in y i.e. y is larger than changes in x i.e. x, the quotient must be inverted to estimate potential syn-
ergy ratio. Therefore, potential synergy/trade-off between two variables can be measured between -
1 to +1. Negative sign indicates trade-off between two variables. In this study we calculate conventional 
index number of synergy and average long-run synergy index (Luukkanen et al. 2012).  
Synergy method allows us to present explorative analysis of the relationships between key variables 
(in this case drivers of energy consumption and two energy consumption variables). It allow also crit-
ical analysis on long-run dynamics of economies (Ahern 2011, Cortina-Borja et al. 2009, de Roo 2012). 
There is always possibilities to create win-win policies from trade-offs. Empirical verification of trade-
offs is, of course, important also for sustainability analyses and sustainability politics (see Rothman 
1976, Southwood 1978, Wunder 2001, Mirc 2012, Howe et al. 2014, Jia 2014, Kaivo-oja et al. 2014, 
Mainali et al. 2016). For example, smart adaption to on-going economic growth and urban population 
trends may be impossible without detailed trade-off analyses (Kaivo-oja et al. 2014, Puuhacai & 
Zuidema 2017).  
The synergy methodology provides essential information for future-oriented policy-planners and 
decision-makers. Synergy method is a new powerful tool for sustainability analyses. We remind us 
readers that the evaluation of synergy/trade-off proposed on this paper indicates only possible (po-
tential) causality but, does not infer a causal relationship between the variables. In this article we apply 
stablised synergy analysis, which means that we calculated smoothed trends of synergies. This calcu-
lation methodology filters out strong cycles of synergy. 
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Results 
Synergy analyses and trade‐off analyses between key drivers and energy intensity 
First, we present synergy analyses and trade-off analyses between energy intensity and key drivers, 
population, value added and urban population.  First synergy analysis is presented in Fig. 2. The results 
are quite clear, because there is negative synergy between energy intensity and value added almost in 
all EU-28 countries. There are only two exceptions, Luxembourg and Austria. This result indicates that 
energy intensity has mostly negative synergy with value added. This result is reasonable. Biggest neg-
ative synergy levels (over -0,50) are observed in Sweden and United Kingdom.  
 
 
Figure 2. Average stabilised synergy level analysis in 1985-2014: Synergy analysis between energy 
intensity and value added in the EU-28 countries. 
 
In Fig. 3 trade-off curve between energy intensity and value added in the EU-28 countries is outlined. 
We can observe negative trade-off curve. This result is consistent with the synergy analysis presented 
above. In general, the higher is value-added, the lower is energy intensity.  
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Figure 3. Trade-off analysis between energy intensity and value added in the EU-28 countries. Aver-
age stabilised synergy level analysis in 1985-2014.  
 
Second synergy analysis is presented in Fig. 4. The results are not quite clear, because there is both 
negative and positive synergies between energy intensity and population in EU-28 countries. Negative 
synergies were identified in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, 
Cyprus, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Slovenia, Finland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
Positive synergies were identified in Bulgaria, Germany, Estonia, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, 
Poland, Romania and Slovakia. If we think normatively, we would like to see negative synergy between 
population and energy intensity, but this is not the case in the EU-28. There are still quite many coun-
tries, which have positive synergy between population and energy intensity. This is an important ob-
servation for policy-makers. 
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Figure 4. Average stabilised synergy level analysis in 1985-2014: Synergy analysis between energy 
intensity and population in the EU-28 countries. 
 
In Fig. 5 trade-off curve between energy intensity and population in the EU-28 countries is outlined. 
We can observe negative trade-off curve. This result is consistent with the synergy analysis presented 
above. In general, the lower is population, the higher is energy intensity.  
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Figure 5. Trade-off analysis between energy intensity and population in the EU-28 countries. Aver-
age stabilised synergy level analysis in 1985-2014.  
 
Third synergy analysis is presented in Fig. 6. The results are not quite clear, because there is both 
negative and negative synergies between energy intensity and urban population in EU-28 countries. 
Positive synergies were identified in Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia. 
In other EU-28 countries synergy between energy intensity and urban population was negative. If we 
think normatively, we would like to see negative synergy between urban population and energy inten-
sity, but this is not the case in the EU-28. There are still some countries (7 EU-member countries) 
which have positive synergy between urban population and energy intensity.  
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Figure 6. Average stabilised synergy level analysis in 1985-2014: Synergy analysis between energy 
intensity and urban population in the EU-28 countries. 
 
In Fig. 7 trade-off curve between energy intensity and urban population in the EU-28 countries is 
outlined. We can observe negative trade-off curve. This result is consistent with the synergy analysis 
presented above. In general, the lower is urban population, the higher is energy intensity.  
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Figure 7. Trade-off analysis between energy intensity and urban population in the EU-28 countries. 
Average stabilised synergy level analysis in 1985-2014.  
 
Synergy analyses and trade‐off analyses between key drivers and energy consumption per 
capita 
Secondly, we present synergy analyses and trade-off analyses between energy consumption per cap-
ita and key drivers: population, value added and urban population. Fourth synergy analysis is presented 
in Fig. 8. The results are quite clear, because there is negative synergy between energy consumption 
per capita and value added almost in all EU-28 countries. There are only two exceptions, Luxembourg 
and Austria. This result indicates that energy consumption per capita has mostly negative synergy 
with value added. This result is reasonable. Biggest negative synergy levels (over -0,50) are observed 
in Sweden and United Kingdom.  
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Figure 8. Average stabilised synergy level analysis in 1985-2014: Synergy analysis between average 
energy consumption per capita and average value added in the EU-28 countries. 
 
In Fig. 9 trade-off curve between energy consumption per capita and value added in the EU-28 
countries is outlined. We can observe negative trade-off curve. This result is consistent with the syn-
ergy analysis presented above. In general, the higher is value-added, the lower is energy consumption 
per capita.  
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Figure 9. Trade-off analysis between energy consumption per capita and value added in the EU-28 
countries. Average stabilised synergy level analysis in 1985-2014.  
 
Fifth synergy analysis is presented in Fig. 10. The results are not quite clear, because there is both 
negative and negative synergies between energy consumption per capita and population in EU-28 
countries. Positive synergies between energy consumption per capita and population were identified 
in Bulgaria, Germany, Estonia, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland and Romania. In other EU-
28 countries synergy between energy consumption per capita and population was negative. If we think 
normatively, we would like to see negative synergy between energy consumption per capita and pop-
ulation, but this is not the case in the EU-28. There are still some countries which have positive synergy 
between energy consumption per capita and population.  
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Figure 10. Average stabilised synergy level analysis in 1985-2014: Synergy analysis between average 
energy consumption per capita and average population in the EU-28 countries. 
 
In Fig. 11 trade-off curve between energy consumption per capita and population in the EU-28 coun-
tries is outlined. We can observe negative trade-off curve. This result is consistent with the synergy 
analysis presented above. In general, the higher is population, the lower is energy consumption per 
capita.  
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Figure 11. Trade-off analysis between energy consumption per capita and population in the EU-28 
countries. Average stabilised synergy level analysis in 1985-2014.  
 
Sixth synergy analysis is presented in Fig. 12. The results are not quite clear, because there is both 
negative and negative synergies between energy consumption per capita and urban population in EU-
28 countries. Positive synergies between energy consumption per capita and urban population were 
identified in Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania and Slovakia (7 EU-member 
countries). In other EU-28 countries (21 EU-member countries) synergy between energy consumption 
per capita and urban population was negative. In Czech Republic synergy was close to zero level. If we 
think normatively, we would like to see negative synergy between energy consumption per capita and 
urban population, but this is not the case in the EU-28. There are still some countries which have pos-
itive synergy between energy consumption per capita and population. Baltic countries, Bulgaria, Po-
land and Romania are having positive synergy between energy consumption per capita and urban pop-
ulation. 
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Figure 12. Average stabilised synergy level analysis in 1985-2014: Synergy analysis between average 
energy consumption per capita and average urban population in the EU-28 countries. 
 
In Fig. 13 trade-off curve between energy consumption per capita and urban population in the EU-
28 countries is outlined. We can observe negative trade-off curve. This result is consistent with the 
synergy analysis presented above. In general, the higher is urban population, the lower is energy con-
sumption per capita.  
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Figure 13. Trade-off analysis between energy consumption per capita and urban population in the 
EU-28 countries. Average stabilised synergy level analysis in 1995-2014.  
 
Synergy analyses and trade‐off analyses between key drivers and final electricity consump‐
tion per capita 
Thirdly, we present synergy analyses and trade-off analyses between final electricity consumption per 
capita and key drivers: population, value added and urban population. Seventh synergy analysis is pre-
sented in Fig. 14. The results are quite clear, because there are mostly negative synergies between final 
electricity consumption per capita and value added in EU-28 countries. Positive synergies between 
final electricity consumption per capita and value added were identified in Luxembourg and Austria. 
In other EU-28 countries synergy between final electricity consumption per capita and value added 
was negative. If we think normatively, we would like to see negative synergy between final electricity 
consumption per capita and value added. There are still two countries (Luxembourg and Austria), 
which have positive synergy between final electricity consumption per capita and value added, but 
majority of EU-28 countries have negative synergy between final electricity consumption per capita 
and value added.  
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Figure 14. Average stabilised synergy level analysis in 1985-2014: Synergy analysis between final 
electricity consumption per capita and average value added in the EU-28 countries. 
 
In Fig. 15 trade-off curve between final electricity consumption per capita and average value added 
in the EU-28 countries is outlined. We can observe negative trade-off curve. This result is consistent 
with the synergy analysis presented above. In general, the higher is value added, the lower is final 
electricity consumption per capita in the EU-28 region.  
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Figure 15. Trade-off analysis between final electricity consumption per capita and value added in the 
EU-28 countries. Average stabilised synergy level analysis in 1985-2014.  
 
Eighth synergy analysis is presented in Fig. 16. The results are not quite clear, because there are 
both negative and positive synergies between final electricity consumption per capita and population 
in EU-28 countries. Positive synergies between final electricity consumption per capita and population 
were identified in Bulgaria, Germany, Estonia, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland and Romania. 
In Slovakia synergy level was on zero level. In other EU-28 countries synergy between final electricity 
consumption per capita and population was negative. If we think normatively, we would like to see 
negative synergy between final electricity consumption per capita and population. There are quite 
many EU-member countries, which have positive synergy between final electricity consumption per 
capita and population, but majority of EU-28 countries have negative synergy between final electricity 
consumption per capita and value added. Thus, in many Middle and Eastern European countries, there 
is positive synergy between these two variables.  
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Figure 16. Average stabilised synergy level analysis in 1985-2014: Synergy analysis between final 
electricity consumption per capita and average population in the EU-28 countries. 
 
In Fig. 17 trade-off curve between final electricity consumption per capita and average population in 
the EU-28 countries is outlined. We can observe negative trade-off curve. This result is consistent with 
the synergy analysis presented above. In general, the higher is population, the lower is final electricity 
consumption per capita.  
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Figure 17. Trade-off analysis between final electricity consumption per capita and population in the 
EU-28 countries. Average stabilised synergy level analysis in 1985-2014.  
 
Ninth synergy analysis is presented in Fig. 18. This figure shows us that in most EU-28 countries (21 
EU-member countries) synergy between final electricity consumption per capita and urban population 
is negative. In some EU-member states synergy between final electricity consumption per capita and 
urban population is positive. Such countries are Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania 
and Slovakia (7 EU-member countries).  
If we think normatively, we would like to see negative synergy between final electricity consumption 
per capita and urban population. There are seven EU-member countries, which have positive synergy 
between final electricity consumption per capita and urban population, but majority of EU-28 coun-
tries have negative synergy between final electricity consumption per capita and value added. This 
observation is interesting and it should give reasons to think energy policy in these seven countries 
critically. Integration of urbanisation policy and energy policy needs special attention in these EU-
member states.  
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Figure 18. Average stabilised synergy level analysis in 1985-2014: Synergy analysis between final 
electricity consumption per capita and average urban population in the EU-28 countries. 
 
In Fig. 19 trade-off curve between final electricity consumption per capita and average urban popu-
lation in the EU-28 countries is figured out. We can observe negative trade-off curve. This result is 
consistent with the synergy analysis presented above. In general, the higher is urban population, the 
lower is final electricity consumption per capita.  
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Figure 19. Trade-off analysis between final electricity consumption per capita and urban population 
in the EU-28 countries. Average stabilised synergy level analysis in 1985-2014.  
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
Synergy and trade-off analyses provide together a transparent methodological approach to sustaina-
bility evaluations. By synergy and trade-off analyses we can provide reflective analyses about sustain-
ability processes and on-going energy efficiency trends in the European Union. Transition path(s) to-
wards better sustainability can be analysed by synergy and trade-off analyses. We can compare syn-
ergy levels of the EU member countries by synergy and trade-off analyses.  
It is possible to find out interesting country-level out-layer cases by this methodological approach. 
The reported synergy and trade-off analyses in this article reveal that in many EU member there are 
urgent needs to correct incentive schemes of energy efficiency policy. For European integration policy 
it is very interesting to observe, monitor and benchmark the observed synergy level between key var-
iables.  
On the basis of our analysis the European Union also has knowledge based reasons to pay more 
attention to the following energy policy issues:  
(1) Improving energy efficiency especially in Central and Eastern European member states;  
(2) Improving energy efficiency in the context of fast urbanization process in European cities and 
metropolitan regions, and finally; 
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(3) Paying a special attention to energy, growth and population and urbanisation policy harmonisa-
tion in the EU member states. 
This empirical study is an empirical demonstration about the power of trade-off and synergy anal-
yses in the sustainability science and especially in energy efficiency evaluation.  
There are many other vital research fields where we can apply this methodological tool box. Vali-
dation of synergy is going to be big scientific challenge in the field of trend analyses and Big Data 
analysis. Synergy analysis can also be seen to be a key method, when we analyse complex relation-
ships of large and smaller sub-systems. 
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Abstract 
This article analyses energy efficiency at the macro level in the EU-28 Member States during the pe-
riod 1990-2013. Special reference is made to the impact of energy efficiency to total primary energy 
supply. The analysis is carried out by using incremental decomposition analysis, and the results are 
presented for four time periods: 1990-2000, 2000-2005, 2005-2010 And 2010-2013. Energy effi-
ciency in terms of decreasing energy intensity has improved during the analysed period in the Euro-
pean Union. Since 2005, this impact can also be seen in decreasing total primary energy supply in 
many EU-28 Member States. 
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Introduction and Background 
Energy efficiency has been a very common and always actual policy objective of the EU and its Mem-
ber States’ energy policies since the 1970s. At a first glance, energy efficiency seems very handy to 
offer a win-win situation: improving energy efficiency decreases energy use and thus also energy costs, 
and at the same time, negative impacts related to energy use such as carbon dioxide (CO2) and other 
emissions in the air decrease. Thus, improving energy efficiency is considered as an important means 
to reach climate and energy policy targets as well as other policy goals related to energy use, directly 
or indirectly. 
Energy efficiency is one of the most studied phenomenon in the field of energy and energy policy 
studies. In the Elsevier ScienceDirect service keyword “energy efficiency” can be found in the title of 
more than 2000 peer-reviewed scientific journal articles. 
Energy efficiency, however, is a relative concept, and as such far from being without problems. This 
is one of the reasons to its popularity both in scientific and political discussions. The win-win solution 
mentioned above assumes decreasing energy consumption, but actually per unit of production only. 
The Jevons paradox (see e.g. Polimeni et al 2009) implies that improvements gained by increasing 
energy efficiency per unit are wasted in additional energy consumption, either by increasing the 
amount of units, or elsewhere. This kind of argumentation is included also in the Advanced Sustaina-
bility (ASA) approach as a “gross rebound effect” (Kaivo-oja et al 2001a; 2001b). Gross rebound effect 
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and the Jevons paradox have quite little to do with energy economists’ recent discussion on the re-
bound effect (cf. Herring 2006) at the micro level, which is, however, based on the same basic idea 
but focuses to more strict definition. This discussion is, however, beyond the scope of this article. 
Energy consumption is a result of three basic drivers as identified widely in many decomposition 
studies (e.g. Kaivo-oja & Luukkanen 2004): activity effect, intensity effect and structural effect (cf. 
Kasanen 1990). What is usually meant with energy efficiency, deals directly with only one of these 
drivers, i.e. the intensity effect. 
The objective of this article is to provide a comparative analysis on energy efficiency in the EU-28 
Member States. The report includes a comparison of the EU Member States at national level, and also 
a comparison of EU-28 as a whole. The structure of this article is the following: In this introductory 
chapter, a general definition of energy efficiency will be provided, and the definition will be applied to 
the macro level analysis. In the next chapter, the empirical analysis framework based on the Advanced 
Sustainability (ASA) approach (see Kaivo-oja et al 2001a; 2001b; Vehmas et al 2003; Vehmas 2009) 
developed in Finland Futures Research Centre (FFRC) will be presented and described. The following 
chapters present the indicator-based trends of energy efficiency in the EU-28 Member States, results 
from a decomposition analysis of total primary energy supply (TPES), and conclusions and policy rec-
ommendations from the macro level analysis. 
Methodology 
Definition of energy efficiency 
In general systems perspective, efficiency refers to a relationship between the input and output of a 
defined system. Change of efficiency over time brings out the common efficiency idea of getting more 
from less, which explains the fact that improving energy efficiency has been a common energy policy 
goal all over the World from the 1970’s oil shocks. The idea is that using less energy for a certain task 
decreases energy consumption and gives better possibilities to use energy sources with a predictable 
price development, which in practice means domestic energy sources especially in those countries 
depending on imported crude oil and imported liquid fuels. 
When energy use is chosen as an input of a system, energy efficiency refers to a relationship be-
tween energy use and the output (Equation 1): 
 
ܧ݊݁ݎ݃ݕ	݂݂݁݅ܿ݅݁݊ܿݕ ൌ ை௨௧௣௨௧ா௡௘௥௚௬	௜௡௣௨௧(1) 
An alternative interpretation to the relationship between energy input and the system output is en-
ergy productivity. These definitions are valid in all systems, and do not depend on any scale or type of 
system per se. However, the system boundary must be clearly defined. In large systems, the energy 
input usually consists of different energy sources such as electricity, heat, or different types of fuels. 
Energy efficiency of a system requires that the total energy input to the system is considered. So in 
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large systems, the use of aggregate energy units have to be used, although a lot of information is lost. 
On the other hand, also the output should be considered in total terms, which makes the use of mon-
etary as an alternative to the physical units which usually cannot be easily aggregated in large systems. 
One can argue for focusing on systems with only one energy source and one output product only, but 
the question how to select the systems for analysis remains. Here the focus is on macro level systems 
at national level, and aggregated data will be used. 
ASA Decomposition Analysis 
The Advanced Sustainability Analysis (ASA) is an approach based on so-called IPAT identity. The 
IPAT identity emerged out of the Ehrlich & Holdren/Commoner debate in the early 1970s about the 
driving forces of global environmental impacts (York et al 2003). The IPAT identity identifies the ma-
jor drivers of environmental impact (I) at the global level: the amount of population (P), the affluence 
of that population (A), and level of technology (T). Waggoner and Ausubel (1992) added a new term, 
consumption (C) in the identity and called the result as an ImPACT identity. Kaya (1990) applied the 
idea of IPAT identity to identify the drivers of climate change and carbon dioxide emissions. His appli-
cation has been called as Kaya identity, which has had an influence also to the ASA approach. 
Advanced Sustainability Analysis (ASA) is a mathematical information system developed by Fin-
land Futures Research Centre (see e.g. Malaska et al 1999; Kaivo-oja et al 2001a; 2001b; Vehmas et 
al 2003; Luukkanen et al 2005). The ASA approach can be used to analyze sustainable development 
from different points of view. The focus is on changes over time between economic and environmental, 
economic and social, and social and environmental dimensions of sustainability which can be meas-
ured with any preferred indicator or index. The choice of indicators enables the use of ASA approach 
to specific topics such as energy efficiency. The ASA approach can be applied to all levels of economic 
activity, from company level to national even to global level. 
The objectives of the ASA approach include the following: 
(1) to identify factors contributing to a change in a studied (environmental, social or economic) 
sustainable development indicator 
(2) to estimate the contribution of each factor to the studied change in quantitative terms 
(3) define and operationalize new concepts related to sustainable development 
(4) to answer policy-relevant what if –type questions related to sustainable development  
objectives. 
The ASA approach is capable of providing tools to fulfil objectives (2), (3) and (4), but objective (1) 
requires something else such as theoretical or empirical evidence related to the studied phenomena. 
In this article objective (2) is in the focus, because the ASA approach can be used to analyse the effects 
of energy efficiency indicators on relevant energy policy goals, such as those related to energy con-
sumption or CO2 emissions from fuel combustion. 
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ASA applies decomposition analysis in order to divide the observed change in environmental, social 
or economic indicators into the effects of contributing factors. Identifying the contributing factors in 
the format required by the ASA approach may be challenging, because selection of potential factors 
must be supported by theoretical or empirical arguments not based on the ASA approach. The ap-
proach itself does not support or give tools for factor identification, so it is based on either theory-
based or assumed causal relationship between the identified factors and the studied indicator. 
The decomposition analysis calculates the effect/contribution of each explaining factor and their 
“joint effect” (residual term), which in a complete decomposition must be allocated to the explaining 
factors. Sun (1996; 1998) has preferred the choice of equal allocation to the explaining factors. This 
choice is in principle the same made in the so-called Sun/Shapley decomposition method, which is 
considered as one of the preferred methods suggested by Ang (2004). 
Decomposition analysis of total primary energy supply (TPES) is based on the following master 
equation: 
 
POP
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GDP
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FEC
FEC
TPESTPES  (2) 
Driver TPES/FEC (total primary energy supply divided by final energy consumption) represents the 
efficiency of the energy transformation system. This efficiency changes when changes in the transfor-
mation process take place, e.g. when fuel use is replaced with electricity. If electricity is produced in 
condensing power plants, the transformation process becomes more inefficient because in condens-
ing power plants only 35-40 % of the fuel’s energy content is transformed into electricity, the rest is 
waste heat. Thus, a drop in the efficiency of the energy transformation process increases the need of 
primary energy (TPES). If CHP is used, the overall efficiency change is smaller, because the heat is not 
wasted but used for heating purposes either in industrial processes or as district heat (which is com-
mon e.g. in Finland). 
Driver FEC/GDP (final energy consumption divided by gross domestic product) describes energy 
intensity of the economy, which is an inverse of energy efficiency at national level, i.e. GDP productivity 
of energy use. Changes in this driver are due to changes in the structure of the economy, such as 
change from energy intensive to lighter industrial branches and services or vice versa. 
Driver GDP/POP (gross domestic product divided by number of population), GDP per capita, de-
scribes affluence of the population referred to in the original IPAT identity. 
Driver POP (number of population) was considered as the most important driver in the original IPAT 
identity which focused on global environmental issues. In energy analysis of industrial countries it is 
less significant, but defends its position in the driver identification. 
The equations for calculating the decomposed effects of the factors identified in the master equation 
(3) of total primary energy supply are the following (equations 3-5) 
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In all equations 8-10, subscript tt-1 refers to a change between a calendar year and the next year. 
Subscript t-1 refers to the absolute value of the previous year. Coefficients 1…3 define how the joint 
effect of the two variables are divided into the corresponding factor in each two-factor decomposition. 
In all decomposition analyses carried out in this article, 1=2=3=0.5. 
Special reference is made to the key drivers TPES/FEC and FEC/GDP, because they are indicators 
directly describing energy efficiency at the national level. 
Ideally, total primary energy supply (TPES) consists of (i) final energy consumption (FEC), (ii) all 
losses when primary energy is transformed into energy carriers, and (iii) losses in the transfer and 
distribution of energy carriers (such as electricity) into the sites of final consumption. However, in 
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some cases such as electricity generation from hydro, wind, solar, geothermal, and nuclear energy, 
measuring the amount of primary energy is difficult or impossible. In these cases different practices 
have been developed. In International Energy Agency statistics, which are used in the empirical anal-
yses of this report, hydro, wind and solar power are included as electricity in the primary energy, so 
statistically their transformation is 100% efficient. In the case of nuclear, on the other hand, it has been 
assumed that electricity is generated with a 33% thermal efficiency. In other words, one unit of nuclear 
electricity requires three units of primary energy. In the case of geothermal electricity, a 10% thermal 
efficiency is assumed – one nit of geothermal electricity requires ten units of primary energy. Thus, a 
comparison between different countries is challenging – e.g. the difference between Norway (with lot 
of hydro) and France (lot of nuclear) may look too large in terms of primary energy. 
Energy efficiency trends in the EU-28 Member States 
In the following, the trends of the energy efficiency related indicators TPES/FEC (total primary energy 
supply divided by final energy consumption) and FEC/GDP (final energy consumption divided by gross 
domestic product) are described by using the time series data provided by International Energy 
Agency (IEA 2015). For most Member States, the data during the years 1971-2013 will be used. For 
Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia, data is available during the time period 1990-2013. 
Trends of TPES/FEC ratio 
Figure 1 shows the TPES/FEC trend during the years 1971-2013 for the Mediterranean EU Member 
States Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, and Spain. The trends are rather stabile in all Member 
States. Italy and Portugal show the most efficient energy transformation systems, where the rate be-
tween TPES and FEC is around 1.2-1.3 during the whole time period. 
The trend of Malta is exceptional. The efficiency of the energy transformation system in Malta var-
ies a lot but is much more inefficient than in the other Mediterranean Member States during the whole 
time period. While the TPES/FEC rate in other Mediterranean Member States varies between 1.2 and 
1.6, in Malta the variation takes place between 1.6 and 2.8. The reason can be found in changes in the 
very few large units of either energy production or industrial consumption. 
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Figure 1. Trend of energy efficiency of the energy transformation system (TPES/FEC ratio) in Cyprus, 
Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Spain, 1971-2013. 
Figure 2 describes the same trend in the three largest EU Member States, i.e. France, Germany, and 
the United Kingdom. These Member States differ from each other. France, highly relying on nuclear 
power, shows an increasing trend of TPES/FEC (from 1.3 to 1.6), which means that the efficiency of 
the energy transformation system is decreasing. Nuclear electricity is calculated in the IEA statistics 
as primary energy by multiplying the amount of produced electricity by 3, and the increasing use of 
electricity is the major reason for the bad trend of energy transformation efficiency in France. The long 
period trend of Germany is quite stabile with some annual variation (1.4-1.5), and the trend of the UK 
is slightly decreasing. This reflects a slight improvement in the efficiency of the energy transformation 
system over time in the UK. 
 
 
Figure 2. Trend of energy efficiency of the energy transformation system (TPES/FEC ratio) in France, 
Germany and the United Kingdom, 1971-2013. 
In the Northern EU Member States, Denmark, Finland and Sweden (Figure 3), the TPES/FEC trend 
fluctuates quite a lot. One obvious reason for this is seasonal variation in imported electricity and hy-
dropower availability (due to changes in precipitation). The long-term TPES/FEC trend of Denmark 
has turned into a decreasing one while the trends of Sweden and Finland are still increasing. Increase 
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is due to increased use of electricity produced by nuclear with a low statistical efficiency. Thus, the 
share of electricity in final energy consumption increases, and the value of TPES/FEC increases. 
 
  
Figure 3. Trend of energy efficiency of the energy transformation system (TPES/FEC ratio) in Den-
mark, Finland and Sweden, 1971-2013. 
In Figure 4, the trends of TPES/FEC for Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria and Ireland 
are presented. In general, a slightly decreasing trend can be observed from the 1990s onwards, Lux-
embourg is an exception because changes in one factory may change the whole system because of 
the extremely small size of the economy. In the 2000s, the TPES/FEC value of Luxembourg is the 
lowest among all EU-28 Member States. 
 
 
Figure 4. Trend of energy efficiency of the energy transformation system (TPES/FEC ratio) in Aus-
tria, Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, 1971-2013. 
The Baltic Member States Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania show very different trends of TPES/FEC 
(Figure 5). Based on the IEA (2015) data, Latvia has the most efficient energy transformation system 
of the Baltic countries. The TPES/FEC trend of Estonia and Lithuania varies quite a lot, which is a com-
mon case in small EU Member States. However, the energy transformation system of Estonia is among 
the most inefficient ones in the EU. 
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Figure 5. Trend of energy efficiency of the energy transformation system (TPES/FEC ratio) in Esto-
nia, Latvia and Lithuania, 1990-2013. 
The East European EU Member States Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia have per-
formed in two different ways regarding their TPES/FEC ratio (Figure 6). When Czechoslovakia col-
lapsed, the TPES/FEC trend of Czech Republic started to increase, and the trend of Slovakia decreased. 
Shortly after that the trend of Slovakia started to increase again. Hungary and Poland, on the other 
hand, have had decreasing TPES/FEC trends since the 1990s. As such, the energy transformation sys-
tems of all these EU Member States are not among the efficient ones. In the 2000s, only Hungary has 
been below the average EU-28 level. 
 
 
Figure 6. Trend of energy efficiency of the energy transformation system (TPES/FEC ratio) in Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, 1971-2013. 
Figure 7 shows the TPES/FEC trends of four Member States recently joining the European Union. 
The trends of Croatia and Slovenia are decreasing during the period of their data availability (1990-
2013). During the same period, also the trend of Romania is a decreasing one while Bulgaria still tends 
to increase its trend. Bulgaria has quite an ineffective energy transformation system in the light of the 
IEA data. 
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Figure 7. Trend of energy efficiency of the energy transformation system (TPES/FEC ratio) in Bul-
garia, Croatia, Romania and Slovenia, 1971/1990-2013. 
Trends of energy intensity (FEC/GDP) 
When the trends of energy intensity, an inverse of energy efficiency, are looked at, there are not so 
many differences as in the case of the trend of TPES/FEC above. In practice all EU-28 Member States 
show a decreasing trend of energy intensity (FEC/GDP), the major difference is in the rate and starting 
time of the decrease. In the following, the energy intensity trends are presented by using the same 
groups of EU Member States as in presenting the TPES/FEC trends above. In general, energy intensity 
is a poor indicator of energy efficiency at the macro level because there are so many possible reasons 
for change, starting from structural change in the economy from energy intensive industrial branches 
to lighter branches and services and ending in technological improvements in a part of energy con-
suming activities of the society. 
Figure 8 shows how energy intensity has changed in the Mediterranean Member States. The change 
in energy intensity is rather small, and in some Member States such as Greece, Portugal and Spain, 
the decrease has started quite recently. Italy has a nice slightly decreasing trend of energy intensity 
from the early 1970s, while in the small islands Malta and Cyprus there is quite a lot of variation. Malta 
is exceptional case of TPES/FEC with an increasing trend of energy intensity in the most recent years 
of the analysis. 
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Figure 8. Trend of energy intensity (FEC/GDP) in Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Spain, 
1971-2013 
Figure 9 shows the long-term decreasing trend of energy intensity in the large EU Member States 
France, Germany and the United Kingdom. The level of energy intensity recently reached by the UK, 
0.05 Mtoe/1000 USD2005, is one of the lowest in the whole European Union. Denmark (Figure 13 be-
low) and Ireland (Figure 14 below) are the closest competitors. In these Member States, one Mtoe of 
consumed energy produces GDP worth 20 000 USD2005. 
 
Figure 9. Trend of energy intensity (FEC/GDP) in France, Germany, and the United KIngdom, 1971-
2013 
In the Nordic Member States Denmark, Finland and Sweden (Figure 10), a clear decreasing trend of 
energy intensity can be observed. Only during the recession periods the decreasing trend has been 
shortly interrupted in Finland and Sweden. As noted above, Denmark has reached a level of energy 
intensity among the lowest in the whole EU. 
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Figure 10. Trend of energy intensity (FEC/GDP) in Denmark, Finland and Sweden, 1971-2013. 
Figure 11 describes the energy intensity trends in the Benelux countries Belgium, Luxembourg and 
the Netherlands, and also in Austria and Ireland. The trends are decreasing ones, and Ireland together 
with Denmark (Figure 13 above) and the UK (Figure 9 above) has had one of the lowest energy inten-
sities in the European Union during the recent years. The 2013 values, for example, were 0.047, 0.050 
and 0.051 Mtoe/USD2005 for Ireland, the UK and Denmark, respectively, while the value for EU-28 was 
0.075 Mtoe/USD2005 in 2013. 
 
 
Figure 11. Trend of energy intensity (FEC/GDP) in Austria, Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands, 1971-2013. 
The Baltic Member States have data in the IEA database from the year 1990 onwards. In these 
countries, however, the decrease of energy intensity has been quite a rapid one (Figure 12). However, 
these Member States still have quite a high energy intensity rate around 0.2 Mtoe/1000 USD2005, 
which is clearly above the EU-28 average. 
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Figure 12. Trend of energy intensity (FEC/GDP) in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, 1990-2013. 
The East European Member States Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia also have a de-
creasing trend in energy intensity (Figure 13). The trends have turned into continuous decrease in the 
1990s, before that there have been several increasing phases too. The most recent values are very 
close to each other, around 0.15 Mtoe/1000 USD2005. 
 
 
Figure 13. Trend of energy intensity (FEC/GDP) in Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, 
1971-2013. 
Figure 14 shows how the energy intensity trends of Bulgaria and Romania have come down from the 
high values in early 1970s towards the level of 0.2 Mtoe/1000 USD2005. In comparison, the trends of 
Croatia and Slovenia are quite flat, but their nicely decreasing trends during the 2000s are hidden by 
the scale of Figure 17 caused by the high 1970s values of Bulgaria and Romania. 
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Figure 14. Trend of energy intensity (FEC/GDP) in Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania and Slovenia, 
1971/1990-2013. 
 
Energy efficiency as a driver of total primary energy supply (TPES) 
In the following, change total primary energy supply (TPES) will be decomposed into the relative 
contributions of the drivers described above in Equation (2). Data used in this decomposition activity 
is taken from the International Energy Agency online database (IEA 2015). This data includes total 
primary energy supply (TPES), final energy consumption (FEC), gross domestic product (GDP) in real 
prices (in 2005 USD, adjusted by exchange rates), and number of population. The data used in the 
analyses covers the years 1990-2013 and it is taken from International Energy Agency (IEA 2015). 
The results are based on an analysis of incremental (annual) changes, and they are always pre-
sented as percentage of a selected base year value of the decomposed indicator, i.e. total primary 
energy supply (TPES). Tables 1-4 show results from analyses carried out for the years 1990-2013, 
divided into four time periods: 1990-2000 (Table 1), 2000-2005 (Table 2), 2005-2010 (Table 3) and 
2010-2013 (Table 4). The main results are the relative contributions of the energy efficiency related 
drivers TPES/FEC and FEC/GDP as well as other drivers, i.e. GDP/POP and POP, to the change of total 
primary energy supply (TPES). The incremental effects are summed up for each time period and 
presented as percentage from the absolute TPES value of the first year of each time period. Basic sta-
tistical info (median, average, standard deviation and minimum and maximum values) on the annual 
effects during each of the selected time periods (as percentage of the previous year’s TPES value) are 
presented as well.  
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Table 1. Results of total primary energy supply (TPES) decomposition analysis for EU Member States and EU15 and EU-28 aggregates, 1990-2000.  
Cumulative effects are sums of incremental (annual) effects. 
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Table 2. Results of total primary energy supply (TPES) decomposition analysis for EU-28 Member States, 2000-2005. Cumulative effects are sums of 
incremental (annual) effects. 
 
255 
Table 3. Results of total primary energy supply (TPES) decomposition analysis for EU-28 Member States, 2005-2010. Cumulative effects are sums of  
incremental (annual) effects. 
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Table 4. Results of total primary energy supply (TPES) decomposition analysis for EU-28 Member States, 2010-2013. Cumulative effects are sums of incre-
mental (annual) effects. 
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In Tables 1-4, the most decreasing and the most increasing values for the effects of TPES/FEC and 
FEC/GDP have been marked with different shades of green (decreasing effect) and red (increasing 
effect). The scales of the shades are based on the following decrease/increase categories:  
-20.00% or more bright green 
-19.99%…-10.00% green 
-9.99%...-2.50% light green 
-2.49% – 2.49% white 
2.50%…9.99% light red 
10.00%…19.99% red 
20.00% or more bright red 
In the sense how changes in energy efficiency related indicators TPES/FEC and FEC/GDP have con-
tributed to change in total primary energy supply (TPES), the performance of EU Member States as 
well as the performance of the EU as a whole has been very different during the four different time 
periods, 1990-2000, 2000-2005, 2005-2010 and 2010.2013. 
Results, EU‐28 Member States 1990‐2000 
In the first time period 1990-2000 (Table 1), total primary energy supply increased in 17 Member 
States and also at the aggregate levels of EU-15 (4.3%) and EU-28 (1.2%). Large increase took place 
in Portugal (20.6%), Cyprus (19.8%), Spain (15.7%) and Ireland (12.9%). Total primary energy supply 
decreased in 11 Member States, larges decreases took place in Lithuania (-27.7%), Latvia (-21.4%), 
Romania (-15.5%), Estonia (14.1%) and Bulgaria (-12.9%). Generally speaking, TPES increased espe-
cially in the Mediterranean Member States and decreased in the Baltic and East European Member 
States. Among the large EU Member States, changes were quite modest, TPES increased in France 
(8.1%), the UK (3.1%) and Italy (1.8%), and decreased in Germany (-1.6%). 
The change in energy intensity (FEC/GDP) had a decreasing effect in 22 Member States and in-
creasing effect in six Member States, i.e. in Portugal, Spain Bulgaria, Cyprus, Slovenia and Belgium 
(Table 1). Decreasing effect was relatively large (compared to the 1990 absolute TPES value) in Lith-
uania (-16.0%), Bulgaria (-15.2%), Slovakia (-13.2%), Estonia (-12.9%), Ireland (-12.4%), Poland (-
11.9%), Sweden (-11.7%), Romania (-11.3%), Malta (-11.0%), and Luxembourg (-10.2%). From these 
Member States, in Bulgaria, Estonia and Romania the change in TPES was also large. At the EU aggre-
gate level, change in energy intensity had a modest decreasing effect, -5.3% in EU-15 and -7.3% in EU-
28. An interesting observation is that the incremental (annual) change in energy intensity had a large 
variation in values (large difference in minimum and maximum values and large standard deviation) 
in those Member States with large decrease in total primary energy supply. The Member States with 
large increase in TPES had much smaller difference in minimum and maximum values as well as 
smaller standard deviation of FEC/GDP. 
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The change in efficiency of the energy transformation process (TPES/FEC) had a decreasing effect 
in 18 Member States (Table 1). The larges decreasing effects were in Sweden (-8.0%), Malta (-5.7%), 
Luxembourg (-5.2%), and Slovenia (-5.0%). In most of the Member States with decreasing TPES/FEC 
effect, however, total primary energy supply increased during the years 1990-2000. Change in 
TPES/FEC decreased total primary energy supply also in the EU aggregates, -0.5% in EU-15 and the 
same in EU-28. When looking at the annual changes, Member States such as Malta, Cyprus, Romania 
and Sweden had large difference in minimum and maximum values and large standard deviation of 
TPES/FEC with very different change of TPES in percentage (-0.4%, 19.8%, -15.5% and 0.7%, respec-
tively. 
EU Member States with a decrease in total primary energy supply (TPES) and decreasing effect in 
both energy efficiency related drivers in the time period 1990-2000, included Latvia, Poland, Germany, 
Malta, and Luxembourg. Unlike the others, during this 10-year period Latvia suffered from a decreasing 
effect of economic growth (GDP/POP). 
TPES decomposition results, EU‐28 Member States 2000‐2005 
In the second time period 2000-2005 (Table 2), total primary energy supply (TPES) increased even 
more, in 27 Member States and in the EU aggregates (2.4% in EU-15 and 2.5% in EU-28, from the 
absolute TPES value in the year 2000). TPES increase was large in Lithuania (16.8%), Luxembourg 
(12.9%) and Latvia (10.2%), totally different Member States than in the previous time period. Total 
primary energy supply decreased only in the UK, and even there very marginally (-0.1%). In France, 
Germany, and Italy TPES increased 5.3%, 0.1%, and 2.9%, respectively. 
Change in energy intensity (FEC/GDP) had in the period 2000-2005 a decreasing effect on TPES 
in 23 EU Member States (Table 2). A small increasing effect took place in four Member States, i.e. in 
Austria, Italy, Portugal and Spain, and there was no effect in Belgium. Decreasing effect was large in 
Lithuania (-15.9%), Sweden (-14.9%), Latvia (-11.9%) and Slovakia (-11.2%). Large Member States 
France, Germany, and the UK had decreasing effects -3.6%, -1.3%, and -6.8%, respectively. At the 
aggregate level, change in energy intensity had a decreasing effect, -2.2% in EU-15 and -2.1% in EU-
28. Regarding the incremental (annual) values of FEC/GDP change, variation in terms of standard 
deviation and difference between minimum and maximum values was the largest in Malta. 
Change in the efficiency of the energy transformation system (TPES/FEC) decreased total primary 
energy supply in 13 EU Member States in the period 2000-2005 (Table 2), but the decreasing effects 
were in all cases only modest, Hungary and Ireland had the largest effects, both -2.5%. The UK was 
the only one of the large Member States with a decreasing effect (-0.2%). Increasing effects were the 
largest in Malta (10.6% and Sweden (9.9%). Large Member States France, Germany, and the UK had 
increasing effects 2.9%, 0.2%, and 0.6%, respectively. EU aggregates had small increasing effects, 
0.5% in EU-15 and 0.2% in EU-28. Large variation in annual (incremental) effects took place in Malta 
and Lithuania. 
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In general, 2000-2005 was a poor period in terms of impacts of energy efficiency on total primary 
energy supply, although there were decreasing effects in both of the energy efficiency related drivers 
in many EU Member States. However, none of the Member States reached a situation where decreas-
ing effects in both energy efficiency related drivers were combined to a decrease in total primary en-
ergy supply (TPES) during the period 2000-2005. 
TPES decomposition results, EU‐28 Member States 2005‐2010 
In the third time period 2005-2010 (Table 3), total primary energy supply (TPES) decreased in 20 EU 
Member States and increased in 8 Member States. Largest decreases took place in Lithuania (-14.7%), 
while in all the others decrease was only modest varying between -4.8% and -0.3%. TPES increases 
were also modest ones varying between 0.5% and 4.2%. The large EU Member States France, Ger-
many, Italy, and the UK all had a decrease of TPES in 2005-2010; -2.5%, -1.3%, -3.0%, and -3.8%, 
respectively. At the EU aggregate level, TPES change was -2.0% in EU-15 and -1.7% in EU-28. 
Change in energy intensity (FEC/GDP) had a decreasing effect on TPES in 23 Member States in 
2005-2010 (Table 3). Large effects were in Slovakia (-12.3%), Bulgaria (-11.3%), and Romania (-
10.4%). In other Member States, the decreasing TPES change varied between -7.4% and -0.2%. All 
the large Member States (France, Germany, Italy, and the UK) had a modest decreasing FEC/GDP 
effect. The increasing effect in five Member States varied modestly between 0.2% and 4.3%. In both 
EU aggregates, energy intensity had a -3.3% decreasing effect on TPES. Malta, Latvia, Slovakia and 
Bulgaria had the largest variation in incremental (annual) FEC/GDP effects. 
Change in efficiency of the energy transformation system (TPES/FEC) had a decreasing effect on 
TPES in 18 Member States but a significant one in Lithuania (-14.9%) and Malta (-10.2%) only (Table 
3). These Member States had also a large variation in incremental (annual) effects (large standard 
deviation and large difference in minimum and maximum values). In other Member States, the de-
creasing FEC/GDP effect varied between -2.2% and -0.1%. The increasing effect of TPES/FEC in 10 
Member States varied between 0.3% and 1.7%. At the EU aggregate level, the effect of TPES/FEC was 
a decreasing one, -0.5% both in EU-15 and EU-28. The large Member States were close to these fig-
ures, even France with an increasing effect of 0.5%. Large variation in incremental (annual) TPES/FEC 
effects (large standard deviation and large difference between minimum and maximum values) can 
be identified in Malta, Lithuania and Estonia. 
In general, 2005-2010 was quite a good time period in terms of energy efficiency impact on total 
primary energy supply. 10 Member States, i.e. Croatia, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Portugal, 
Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, and the UK, as well as both EU aggregates EU-15 and EU-28, had a decrease 
in TPES and decreasing effect in both energy efficiency related drivers, FEC/GDP and TPES/FEC. 
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TPES decomposition results, EU‐28 Member States 2010–2013 
In the most recent time period 2010-2013 (Table 4), total primary energy supply (TPES) decreased in 
all EU Member States except Estonia, where TPES increased 2.5%. Decrease in this short 3-year time 
period varied between -7.0% and -0.7%. In the whole EU, decrease was -2.8% in EU-15 and -2.7% in 
EU-28. All large EU member States France, Germany, Italy, and the UK were close to these EU-level 
decreasing effects. 
Change in the energy intensity (FEC/GDP) decreased total primary energy supply (TPES) in all 28 
EU Member States during 2010-2013 (Table 4). Sweden (-12.1%) and Latvia (-10.8%) had the largest 
decreasing effects, while in other Member States, including the large ones, the value varied between -
5.7% and -0.8%. The EU aggregate value was -3.2% for both EU-15 and EU-28. Regarding the annual 
(incremental) effects, quite a large variation took place during this time period in Estonia, Ireland, Lat-
via, and the UK. 
Change in efficiency of the energy transformation system (TPES/FEC) had a decreasing effect in 18 
EU Member States, the values varying between -6.6% and -0.2% from the absolute TPES value in 
2010 (Table 4). Increasing effect in 10 Member States varied between 0.2% and 4.6%. EU-15 and EU-
28 had both a TPES/FEC effect value -0.1%. Malta and Greece had a large variation in the incremental 
(annual) values of the TPES/FEC effect in terms of standard deviation and difference between the 
minimum and maximum values. 
The most recent time period 2010-2013 was the shortest but also best in terms of the effects of 
energy intensity related drivers on total primary energy supply (TPES). 18 out of 28 EU Member States 
had a decrease in TPES and also a decreasing effect of both energy intensity related drivers, FEC/GDP 
and TPES/FEC. 
Conclusions 
In this article, energy efficiency of EU-28 Member States has been studied. Focus has been on macro 
level indicators of energy efficiency, their long-term historical trends and their decomposed effects on 
energy consumption (total primary energy supply TPES). In the empirical analyses, the most recent 
data from the International Energy Agency (IEA 2015) has been used. 
The indicators of energy efficiency used in this study are energy intensity of the economy (final 
energy consumption FEC divided by gross domestic product GDP in fixed USD 2005 prices) and effi-
ciency of the energy transformation system, ratio of total primary energy supply TPES and final energy 
consumption FEC). The long-term trends of these indicators can be heavily generalized by saying that 
energy intensity has decreased significantly in most of the EU-28 Member States, but the trend of 
TPES/FEC ratio is not so clear and varies a lot between different Member States. Increasing use of 
electricity affects the TPES/FEC ratio very differently, depending on the used primary energy sources 
(fossil, nuclear, renewables) and modes of electricity production (CHP, condensing power). Essential 
here is how primary energy is calculated in energy statistics. In some cases such as hydro, wind, and 
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solar, produced electricity is calculated as such also in primary energy, in some other cases such as 
nuclear or geothermal, a thermal efficiency is assumed. This may make the use of aggregated energy 
indicators and their international comparison problematic. Thus, the EU Member States relying on 
nuclear power and fossil fuels may have a stronger increasing trend in the TPES/FEC ratio than Mem-
ber States relying on energy sources where the statistical ratio equals to 1. On the other hand, calcu-
lation principles are similar for all EU Member States, so it is possible to make comparisons being 
aware of the statistical calculation procedures. 
The effect of energy intensity on total primary energy supply (TPES) was studied by chained two-
factor decomposition analysis based on the Advanced Sustainability Approach (ASA) developed by 
the Finland Futures Research Centre at Turku School of Economics, University of Turku. The analysis 
was made for the period 1990-2013 using incremental (annual) changes for the first time, and the 
results were presented as incremental sums for four time periods, the first one was ten years (1990-
2000), then two five-year periods (2000-2005, 2005-2010) and the most recent three-year period 
(2010-2013). 
There are quite significant differences between EU Member States’ performance in energy effi-
ciency, and this study brings something out of them. There is significant variation between the annual 
changes among the EU Member States, both in the absolute trends of energy efficiency drivers 
FEC/GDP and TPES/FEC, as well as in the decomposed effects of these drivers on total primary energy 
supply. The variation is large especially in small EU Member States and the new EU Member States. 
The energy efficiency performance of the EU Member States seems to improve over time. Time 
period 2000-2005 was the worst period in practically all Member States, but since then total primary 
energy supply has decreased in many Member States, but not in all of them. 
The trend of energy intensity is good in general terms, but in practice it depends not only on good 
performance in energy efficiency, but also on poor economic performance which is directly reflected 
into the indicator FEC/GDP. This is important to keep in when looking at the period 2005-2010, which 
includes the period of the financial crisis. During that time, however, the decreasing effect of driver 
GPD/POP has a decreasing effect in a few Member States only. However, increasing effect to total 
primary energy supply is quite small in many Member States during that period.  
The trend of TPES/FEC ratio reflects the efficiency of the energy transformation system from pri-
mary energy to final energy consumption. In some countries there is a decreasing trend, but also in-
creasing trends have been identified. This may partly be due to changes in real efficiency, but is also 
influenced by the fact that energy statistics do not treat different energy sources used in electricity 
production in a similar way. Some energy sources such as hydro, wind and solar have a TPES/FEC ratio 
of 1, but nuclear has a ratio 3. Fuel-based electricity generation is more coherent in this sense, when 
primary energy is calculated from the fuel’s energy content, and electricity and heat are treated as 
such in final energy consumption. However, the TPES/FEC ratio does not take into account the effi-
ciency of the appliances consuming the final energy and providing the actual energy service. 
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Abstract   
The paper presents the outcome of a cooperative foresight work that took place simultaneously in EU 
and China, aiming to produce scenarios for the global innovation environment in 2030, drawing special 
focus in the cooperation potential between EU and China. The research team has utilised a combina-
tion of foresight methodologies such us desk-study analysis, Delphi, media scanning, interviews, ex-
ploratory workshops, and patent/paper analysis, in order to identify critical drivers and trends, and 
draw plausible scenarios for China in 2030.  
During the first phase of the study, the team focused on China’s current innovation capabilities, and 
challenges that may drive innovation toward 2030, as well as on specific trends in business model 
innovation resulting in scenarios for Chinese innovation in 2030. In parallel, in Europe the team fo-
cused on the western views towards China (current status and future cooperation potential). In addi-
tion, specific technological areas presenting opportunities for research and technological cooperation, 
and emerging business models and markets are presented and discussed.   
Finally, the paper pinpoints specific technological sectors that gather the greatest cooperation po-
tential between EU and China, aiming to support the “future-proof” decisions of policy makers, RTOs, 
and corporations. 
Key words: China, innovation, business model, 2030, scenarios, EU 
Introduction and Background 
The aim of this research is to investigate the future of the Innovation landscape in China by 2030, and 
it is performed in the context of the DRAGON-STAR Plus project (funded by the European Commis-
sion under Horizon 2020). 
The research work has focused on identifying trends, driving forces, and novel business models and 
markets that will shape Europe, China and the rest of World over the next 20 years, while special focus 
was drawn upon the interaction between EU and China in the area of Research and Innovation. The 
overall objective is to identify specific areas with potential for cooperation, and suggest policies for 
successful bilateral cooperation. 
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Material and Methods 
The research team has followed a multidimensional methodology, in order to validate findings and 
assess trends and drivers leading to the formulation of future scenarios (Figure 1). Furthermore, the 
research team proceeded with the capitalization of outcomes and results through the interaction with 
policy making stakeholders. Due to the specific requirements and resources available, the work was 
performed in parallel by two teams, in Europe and China, and different tools were utilized to match 
specific needs. The outcomes of the two teams were synthesized periodically, allowing the validation 
and cross-check of components of the research. 
 
 
Figure 1: Organisational Design  
The basis of the research was the composition of findings of existing body of literature; academic 
papers, foresight books and studies, executive reports, and the media. Foci were trends, drivers, and 
novel business models transforming the innovation environment in Europe and China, documented 
and complemented by a data mining study of Chinese patents and scientific publications to identify 
key growth areas and knowledge ecosystems. The patent analysis (see Abbas, A, Zhang, L and Khan 
S.K., 2014), has revealed trends in patent fillings in China and was used to compare them with respec-
tive patent fillings in Europe. The desk study provided the necessary knowledge basis to formulate the 
research, to identify and select relevant trends and drivers, and design the next research steps. Inter-
views with Chinese innovators were used during the scoping phase to identify and validate emerging 
business models, and trends in China.  
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The desk research was further validated through a consultation process that was held in China in 
the form of a workshop. The interactive workshop in Shanghai aimed in exploring different possible 
futures for innovation in China toward 2030 using the scenario approach. The full-day workshop was 
held on May 22nd 2015, with 21 participants representing European multinationals, start-ups, aca-
demia, and European national science and innovation agencies. 
In order to consolidate the body of research and opinions gained at this point, the research team 
used the Delphi method, to collect views from various experts on specific trends and technological 
areas especially as regards the future of EU-China collaboration on research and innovation. 71 experts 
in total,  from 29 countries, coming from various business, research and innovation backgrounds (44% 
with foresight experience), replied to 55 questions on Trends, Emerging Business Models, and for the 
perspectives of specific Technology Sectors as regards the future of EU-China Cooperation. The se-
lection of the thematic areas was based on a previous foresight exercise (Gokhberg, 2016) for Russia 
(Russia 2030: Science and Technology Foresight, but was slightly adapted to better fit our research.  
Results 
The preliminary findings of the research provide insights for the future innovation environment in 
China and the perspectives for collaboration with the EU. The extensive patent analysis (Figures 2 and 
3), focused on growth rates of patents in China and Europe per thematic area, allowing to identify 
specific areas that present high development, as well as specific topics where China is championing in 
comparison with Europe, such as Nantennas and Drones. Two sources were used for this analysis. The 
first source was the complete database of Chinese invention patents from 2012 to 2015, where patents 
filed from an address in Mainland China were used for the analysis. The second was the database of 
patents filed with the European Patent Office. 
In order to validate the above results and the insights gained through the desk research, the research 
group proceeded with a consultation process in the form of Workshop. The workshop was divided into 
two parts; in the first part the participants discussed China’s current innovation capabilities, challenges 
that may drive innovation toward 2030 and trends in business model innovation. In the second part, 
drivers, options, and scenarios were discussed and analyzed. While a drivers and options had been 
researched before the workshop and used as input, additional drivers and options were added by the 
participants. This consultation process resulted in a scenario map for Chinese innovation in 2030.  A 
brief description of the main outputs follows. 
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Figure 2: Emerging technologies in Chinese R&D 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Emerging technology gaps and complementarities 
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At the start of the workshop, participants were asked to answer a set of introductory questions 
about innovation in China 2030. The questions were designed to cover different areas related to the 
focal topic and there were used as a warm up, and as a tool to scan the overall perception of the par-
ticipants towards China. The same set of questions was also put to the experts participated in the 
Delphi study, allowing the comparison of the opinions and attitudes of experts settled in China and 
Europe.  Figure 4 summarizes the results. 
The results show that, in most of the cases, experts agree on the high performance of China in re-
gard to science and innovation. They are, however, less optimistic when it comes to green technology 
and the appeal of Chinese culture.  
Following the overall framework of the China innovation landscape, the participants were presented 
with 43 business model cases from China. The business model cases were generated through a review 
of Chinese news media prior to the workshop, where illustrative cases of different business models 
were selected. These cases were divided into three categories by the participants: specialized, generic, 
and traditionalist. Specialized business models translated into finding a new way to break into an area 
and carving out a niche in that area. Generic business models typically involve building a platform or 
creating a space for an ecosystem. Traditionalist models often entail cost-focused innovation, modu-
larization, and process-based innovation in manufacturing. 
 
 
 
As characterized by the participants, specialist business models are seeking specific value, while 
generalist business models create the conditions for such value to exist, and traditionalist business 
models focus on what is good enough. Innovation can be found in China in all three categories, but 
traditionalist models were believed by the participants to be an increasingly ‘exhausted mine’ with less 
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 120%
By 2030, 15 Chinese companies will be on the list of world's
50 most innovative.
By 2030, domestic private entrepreneurs, rather than the
Chinese government or foreign corporations, will be the…
By 2030, China will have globally famous pop stars and
actors who are as famous in the West as the biggest…
By 2030, China will be the leading country in terms of
exports of "green tech".
By 2030, inland China will be regarded as a necessary place
to have the presence of international corporations.
By 2030, China has become a dominant Nobel Prize nation.
By 2030, all major international technology companies have
research centers in China.
By 2030, at least one university in China competes with
Harvard and Oxford of the world's best students.
Figure 4: Expert views about China 2030
Shanghai workshop Delphi
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importance in the future. In relation to business model innovation, the major trends in China identified 
by the participants were; (a) the increasingly common practice of cutting out intermediaries and cre-
ating market places, (b) the merging of producers and consumers ("prosumers"), and (c) market data 
increasingly being collected in non-traditional ways. 
The next topic of the consultation were China’s innovation capabilities based on the country’s per-
formance along a number of dimensions in the 2014 study Global Innovation Index (Cornell University, 
INSEAD, and WIPO, 2014), as well as the size and growth rate of more than 600 major patent cate-
gories based on the standard international patent classifications of the World Intellectual Property 
Organization.  The results from the experts input indicate that key strengths to build on include: (a) 
strong manufacturing capabilities with fast execution, large scale, and a large domestic market; (b) 
Strong industrial learning and knowledge absorption capabilities; and (c) an entrepreneurial mindset 
among the Chinese people. On the contrary, capabilities that need improvement include: (a) Aca-
demic learning, where basic research, teaching, and language capabilities lag behind; (b) Institutions, 
which need to become more supportive of innovations; and (c) access to resources, where shortages 
of food, water, and natural resources are expected to be an important driver of innovation. 
At the final stage of the consultation process, future challenges (i.e. trends and drivers) were dis-
cussed. Figure 5 shows the outcome of the discussion on trends that will push innovation in China 
toward 2030. Areas of important were believed to include the development of smart cities, health care 
and e-health, ageing infrastructure, values and lifestyles of new generations, and the quest fofr credi-
bility among Chinese brands.  
In addition, a set of 9 uncertainty dimensions were identified through research and expert interviews 
in relation to the focal question: how will innovation in China develop toward 2030? These, nine key 
uncertainties were provided as input for the discussion, each with three possible options. The groups 
placed each option on a low impact-high impact as well as a low probability-high probability scale and 
the values were used as input for the scenario analysis (figure 6). 
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Figure 5. Trends that will drive innovation in China towards 2030 
 
 
Figure 6. Drivers of innovation in China towards 2030 
 
In order to converge the opinions and the knowledge derived from the literature review and the 
consultation process, a Delphi questionnaire was developed and used, in order to assess the views of 
experts from the “West” on the innovation landscape of China. The first step was the identification of 
relevant trends and future studies worldwide, followed by verification and analysis, in order to identify 
major megatrends (as defined by Naisbitt, 1982) and emerging business models. In the context, ex-
perts provided feedback on 55 questions on global megatrends, emerging business models, specific 
technological areas.  
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The global megatrends were evaluated by the experts towards their ability to transform the global 
innovation landscape by 2030. As it was expected, the Delphi analysis validated the importance and 
high probability of the five pre-selected megatrends (MGs), in shaping the innovation environment by 
2030: Scarcity of Resources, Climate Change, New Technologies, Globalization 2.0, and Changing 
Demographics.  
A second objective of the Delphi, was to identify specific technology areas that are going to be 
strong in Europe 2030. The experts evaluated 34 broad technological areas in various fields. The pre-
selection of the technological areas was based on a smiliar study for Russia (Gokjberg, 2016) and 
adaptaded taking input from on-going horizon scanning of The Millennium Project (Glenn, 2015). 
The overall results are summarized in the following Figure 7, while the strongest and the weakest 
technological areas in Europe by 2030 are summarized here: 
 
Europe 2030 
 
Strongest Technological Areas Weakest Technological Areas 
Energy storage Nuclear energy 
IoT Saltwater agriculture 
Nano-sensor Nuclear fusion 
Brain science Cultivated meat 
Medical materials Fish farming 
Cancer diagnosis and treatment Space exploration 
Solar energy Carbon capture and storage 
3D/4D printing Crop production 
High-energy density materials Unmanned aerial vehicle 
Wearable health devices Virtual Reality & Augmented reality 
Artificial Intelligence Customized food 
Artificial organs Aircrafts 
Information protection High density data storage 
 
Figure 7: Strong and Weak technological areas in Europe 2030  
In addition, experts were requested to evaluate (from 1 to 10) the importance of 12 business models 
and markets towards 2030 (Figure 8). The “rise of services” and the “silver economy” are rated as the 
most important towards 2030, followed by the business models of “circular economy model”, “sharing 
economy”, and “glocalizing”, underlying specific opportunities and challenges for traditional European 
and Chinese industries. 
The last set of the Delphi questions was focusing on the collaboration areas between Europe and 
China with highest pay-off potential (Figure 9). The areas with the highest cooperation potential be-
tween EU and China are: Environmental Management, Robotics, Telecommunications, Renewable en-
ergy, Smart energy systems of the Future, and Agricultural biotechnologies. The areas deemed with 
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the lowest cooperation potential between Europe and China are: Nuclear fusion, Safe nuclear engi-
neering, Space exploration, Drugs, Hydrogen power. 
 
 
Figure 8: Importance of business models by 2030 
 
6,00 6,50 7,00 7,50 8,00 8,50
12.  The ecosystem
11. The experience model
10. The Market place
9. The free model
8. The freemium model
7.The subscription model
6. The circular economy
5. Blockchain
4.The rise of services
3. Silver Economy
2.Glocalizing
1. Sharing Ecoomy
Importance of business models by 2030
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Figure 9: Areas with the highest and lowest cooperation potential between Europe and China 
 
Scenarios & Conclusion 
As it was briefly presented, having confirmed the megatrends, and emerging business models that are 
changing the global future, the team with the support of the experts identified a set of nine key dimen-
sions (uncertainties), each with three options that generated 20,000 possible scenarios. The uncer-
tainty dimensions were ranked in the following way: 
 
1. Global integration, 2. Talent & culture, 3. Government & regulation, 4. Network effects, 5. Manufac-
turing, 6. Innovation drivers, 7. Access to money, 8. Innovation actors & 9. Types of innovation. 
 
However, as not all uncertainties are independent, as smaller number of overall dimensions has 
been identified. The number of plausible scenarios was further reduced after ranking the uncertainties 
by importance, that revealed two overaching uncertainty dimensions. The first is related to the Chi-
nese government’s approach toward innovation, and the second dimension is relative to China’s cre-
ative capabilities. These two overaching dimensions were used as the axes of the key four produced 
scenarios:  
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Figure 10: China 2030 innovation scenarios 
 
China INC: Command‐driven innovation  
The Chinese government is the entrepreneur. It actively allocates resources to different innovation 
mega projects and is less interested in developing broad creative capabilities. A small creative elite 
takes charge in driving innovation, while foreign companies complain that the playing field is uneven. 
Bonsai: Guided innovation along defined paths 
The government takes an active role, while at the same time a large creative class and a free flows of 
knowledge and ideas emerge. Rather than allocating resources to specific projects, the state directs 
the industry and academia in certain directions by using incentives 
Galapagos: Scattered innovation islands 
The Chinese government focuses on framework conditions rather than taking an active role in driving 
innovation, but fails to creative a broad creative class. Rather than strong ecosystems with crowd-
driven innovation, small cliques of innovation stakeholders form in different areas.  
Hot pot: Integrated creative ecosystems 
China has an open knowledge flow environment, and a strong creative class, while the government 
works on creating a favourable framework for innovation. This results in a vibrant startup ecosystem, 
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a stronger appeal of Chinese brands on the international stage, and new types of thinking that lead to 
disruptive innovation. 
Foreseeing the future is practically impossible, investigating the innovation future of China and the 
collaborations prospects with Europe is an equally impossible task. Nevertheless the research findings 
of the research team in Europe and China has revealed, as briefly described above, some potential 
trajectories of the innovation future of China.  
The main conclusion coming from the innovation scenarios is that everything will be about redifing 
the rules of the game. This is related with (a) the government policy and how it attempts to guide 
China’s innovation trajectory, (b) the current industrial capabilities and the evolution over time of 
knowledge ecosystems, and the (c) the impact on innovation of cultural, creative, and consumer 
trends. 
As regards the European actors, they need to learn from China how to be: (a) better and quicker 
adaptive to new business models, (b) able to tap into and benefit from Chinese ecosystems, (c) orga-
nized in a way that enables them to innovate fast. On the other hand,  
Chinese actors can also learn from Europe, how to be more people-centered and environmental 
aware, how to nourish and use open models of innovation.  
In the next steps, the team is going to involve relevant stakeholders in China & Europe, pol-
icy makers from the private and public sector, aiming to initiate a long-term discussion on 
potential cooperation routes. 
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Abstract  
This paper discusses the development of futures and foresight thinking in Hong Kong, analyses past 
and current public and private sector organisations that engage in foresight for the territory's socio-
economic long-term development.  
Introduction and Background 
Structure of the paper:   
Our research is: What is the current state of futures thinking and what is it potential? To answer this 
question, we analyse public and private organisations engaging in futures thinking related to grand 
societal challenges of Hong Kong. In the last part of the paper we draw on interviews and comments 
by advocates supporting ideas of the creation of a participatory public space where futures can be 
anticipated and co-created.  
Material and Methods 
Our approach is based on descriptive research and includes elements of action research, such as in-
terviews and observation. We analyse and review activities of organisations relating to the practice of 
futures and foresight thinking in the public policy discourse. Our focus is on reflecting the perceptions 
and activities of different actors in the discourse on the future of Hong Kong.  
Descriptive research provides answers to the questions of who, what, when, where, and how asso-
ciated with a particular research problem; a descriptive study cannot conclusively ascertain answers 
to why. Descriptive research is used to obtain information concerning the current status of a phenom-
enon and to describe "what exists" with respect to variables or conditions in a situation. Our phenom-
enon is the state of foresight and futures thinking in Hong Kong from 2010 until today.  
The materials are mostly public documents from organisations in Hong Kong, accessible through 
the internet or public repositories at universities. The documents of the HK Foresight Centre have been 
accessed through historical, non-published records.  
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1. The role of future thinking in shaping a city's/nation's long term development 
At the 2016 Pujang Innovation Forum on Technology Foresight in Shanghai, jointly hosted by the Chi-
nese Academy of Science and Technology for Development, the Shanghai Institute for Science of Sci-
ence and UNESCO Shanghai in 2016, scholars discussed how futures thinking developed in Japan, 
Korea and China and how foresight practices support socio-economic long-term planning in a fast 
changing environment. Developing foresight is based on qualitative and quantitative, as well as ex-
ploratory methods, and aims to explore possibilities, discuss policy choices and assess alternatives.  
Foresight is also about futures thinking, which includes the assessment of existing medium-to-long-
term visions, the assessment of desired, possible and alternative scenarios; the identification of future 
applications and/or implications of new technologies; the identification of opportunities, threats and 
challenges for the future, the assessment of possible impacts of policy recommendations and deci-
sions derived from foresight; as well as the creation of a foresight culture through methodology and 
capacity building. An important contribution of futures thinking in foresight exercises is the timely 
identification of issues that should alert and support decision-making, especially when it comes to 
priority-setting. (European Commission 2009, p. 27) 
While all three countries have established public research institutions that aim to explore possible 
futures, it was noted that there is no dedicated public or private institution in Hong Kong that provides 
futures thinking for policy making in the Special Administrative Region of China, neither on technolog-
ical or societal futures. 
An important objective of foresight is to orient policy development. This often includes the provision 
of methodological support and advice on policy directions. Such orientation often requires the devel-
opment of new perspectives into existing agenda-setting, consensus-based frameworks to explore 
policy options; and guidelines to assist government and other actors in policy design and decision-
making processes. (European Commission, 2009) 
Although technology foresight was the main topic at the forum, foresight today includes whole so-
ciety perspectives, and is defined as a “process involved in systematically attempting to look into the 
longer-term future of science, technology, the economy, the environment and society with the aim of 
identifying the emerging generic technologies and the underpinning areas of strategic research likely 
to yield the greatest economic and social benefits” (Martin in Ruff 2002).  Today, future and foresight 
research implies “society and technology foresight”, as well as participatory spaces where actors can 
jointly use methods and tools to experiment with possible futures. Such social testbeds are called living 
labs, citizen laboratory or govlab, future centre or mindlabs.  
One of the most common general objectives of foresight is to foster cooperation and networking, 
which implies “the creation of a common space for open thinking” (European Commission, p. 28). 
Despite different names, the operating principles of these spaces is similar. 
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2. Futures thinking in Hong Kong 
Although Hong Kong does not have a single organisation dedicated to foresight, an analysis of past 
and current stakeholders in Hong Kong in government, universities, think tanks and non-government 
organisations shows that there are some futures and foresight related activities. 
2.1  Government agencies: 
Futures Thinking is a method for informed reflection on the major changes that will occur in the next 
decades in all areas of social life, including education. Futures Thinking uses a multidisciplinary ap-
proach to pierce the veil of received opinion and identify the dynamics that are creating the future. 
The Planning Department, a government agency under the Development Bureau, has since the 
1970s reviewed the territorial development strategy “to guide planning, land and infrastructure devel-
opment and the shaping of the built environment”. The last review, "Hong Kong 2030: Planning Vision 
and Strategy" ("Hong Kong 2030"), was published in 2007, with a continuation called Hong Kong 
2030+ focusing on wider public engagement and including more stakeholders. Increasing public en-
gagement and participatory methods has become a common practice in the futures research commu-
nity.     
"Hong Kong 2030+: Towards a Planning Vision and Strategy Transcending 2030" ("Hong Kong 
2030+"), a comprehensive strategic study to update the territorial development strategy, is built on 
the foundations of Hong Kong 2030 and has revisited the planning strategy and spatial development 
directions beyond 2030 in the light of the dynamics and challenges ahead. It represents the Govern-
ment's vision, policy and strategy for the territorial development of Hong Kong beyond 2030. A vi-
sionary, proactive, pragmatic and action-oriented approach is adopted to ensure a focused public di-
alogue on the key planning issues critical to future development and a timely response to the changing 
circumstances in and outside of Hong Kong. (quoted from http://www.hk2030plus.hk/about_a.htm) 
The Efficiency Unit (EU) of the Chief Secretary's Office of HKSAR Government has been exploring 
the feasibility of a government-sponsored Future Centre since 2010, and refers to co-creation solu-
tions with communities through innovation labs in a report on Public Sector Reform in Hong Kong.  The 
EU sees futures thinking spaces as stimulus to cross-departmental government innovation with a fu-
ture orientation. A Future Centre would integrate creative problem solving, organizational learning, 
knowledge creation, and organizational change and renewal by using the wisdom of crowds. The EU 
organized a "Innovation in Public Service" workshop in April 2011, and has also sent staff to attend 
Aalto Camp for Societal Innovation held at the Aalto University in Finland in August 2011, where soci-
etal issues were discussed and prototyped by participants from government, business, NGOs and ac-
ademia. 
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The Central Policy Unit (CPU) had a Commission on Strategic Development between 1998 and mid-
2017, which had the following task: “The Commission on Strategic Development ("Commission") is 
an important advisory body established in 1998 to explore the way forward for Hong Kong's long-term 
development strategies. The Chief Executive has invited talents from different fields to join the Com-
mission. The Commission provides a platform for various sectors of the community to explore with 
the Government major issues pertaining to Hong Kong's long-term and overall development. The ob-
jective is to gauge a wide range of community views at the early stage of policy formulation to be 
considered by the relevant policy bureaux, thereby laying the foundation for formulating specific poli-
cies. The Commission's work can help make policy formulation more scientific and transparent, 
backed up by enhanced public participation and acceptance. (...)” 
A analysis of research output of the past three years shows that the organisation primarily looked 
at current policy issues.  
 
The Innovation and Technology Bureau 
The HK government’s Innovation and Technology Bureau, states that its role is to create a  “vibrant 
ecosystem for the government, industry, academia and the research sector” and  aims to “develop 
Hong Kong into a knowledge-based economy and an innovation hub for technology and its application 
in the region”.  
The bureau’s main goal is to “strengthen cooperation among stakeholders and create greater syn-
ergy”, however it does not engage in foresight or long-term perspectives on how R&D and technology 
might help to achieve that goal, nor does it explain what steps might be conducive for Hong Kong to  
develop into a knowledge-based economy.  
Out of the eight measures, the ITB considers relevant for Hong Kong’s future development, seven 
contain the word “technology”, indicating a lack of whole society, inclusive innovation and futures 
thinking.  
- strengthen support for the innovation and technology sector 
- facilitate the development of the information and communications technology industry 
- strengthen cooperation among stakeholders and create greater synergy 
- encourage private sector participation in R&D and commercialisation of R&D results 
- coordinate inter-bureau policy efforts in R&D and technology matters; 
- strengthen collaboration with other economies to promote scientific and technology ex-
changes; 
- enhance support for nurturing of innovation and technology talents; 
- foster development of innovation and technology to promote development of high-end man-
ufacturing industry 
 
The OECD (1996) defines knowledge-based economies as economies which are directly based on 
the production, distribution and use of knowledge and information, which includes learning, education 
280 
and social aspects of knowledge networks. The societal and systemic perspectives of innovation are 
not addressed in Hong Kong’s strategy about the role of R&D and its future.  
 
Council for Sustainable Development 
According to their website, the Study on Sustainable Development for the 21st Century in Hong Kong 
(SUSDEV 21) was commissioned by the Government in 1997. The study was conceived in response to 
the need to take account of environmental and social concerns as well as economic aspects when 
making decisions about the future of Hong Kong. The council is an example of a public sector unit 
tasked with futures thinking.  
The SUSDEV 21 study has been primarily concerned with developing a systematic process to enable 
Hong Kong's decision makers to take into consideration the long term implications of strategic devel-
opment decisions, using a set of forward-looking sustainability indicators. 
Major outputs of the study include: Developed a definition of sustainable development which en-
capsulates the key themes and broad scope of sustainable development applicable to Hong Kong – 
"Sustainable development in Hong Kong balances social, economic, environmental and resource 
needs, both for present and future generations, simultaneously achieving a vibrant economy, social 
progress and a high quality environment, locally, nationally and internationally, through the efforts of 
the community and the Government". 
The Council also developed foresight tools, such as the Computer-aided Sustainability Evaluation 
Tool (CASET) for conducting sustainability assessment of strategic policy and project proposals; and 
recommended institutional changes to help Government take better account of sustainable develop-
ment issues in its decision making, including establishing the Council for Sustainable Development as 
well as the Sustainable Development Division (formerly known as the Sustainable Development Unit) 
2.2  Universities 
Futures Studies is a scientific research field involving scholars and researchers across many disci-
plines. There are undergraduate and postgraduate programs available in universities around the world, 
however, the eight research universities in Hong Kong currently do not provide Futures Research re-
lated programmes, apart from a few single topical courses, such as: 
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- Education University of Hong Kong has a “Futures Thinking and Creativity for Sustainability”, 
a general education course 
- The University of Hong Kong conducts a common course on “Global Issues Energy Futures, 
Globalization and Sustainability 
- The Hong Kong Polytechnic University Design School includes futures thinking in the design 
thinking curriculum  
 
Courses on future and foresight methods and tools, such as technology monitoring/scanning, envi-
ronmental monitoring/scanning, Delphi studies, participatory methods, prototyping futures, trend re-
search and impact analysis, systemic modelling, scenario construction, design thinking and co-crea-
tion may be included in some science courses, however, they are not offered for developing whole 
society futures.  
According to Our Hong Kong Foundation the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) among Hong 
Kong universities adopts an inclusive definition for research output covering publications, patents, ar-
tefacts, that are publicly accessible, contains an element of innovation and contributes to scholarship. 
Publication remains the dominant output in the RAE, thus implying that the KPIs for universities’ re-
search efforts are skewed towards publication rather than societal impact and contribution to fore-
sight for Hong Kong’s development. Members in the humanities discipline have raised concerns that 
the RAE fails to appreciate locally-oriented academic work that make an impact to the local commu-
nity but may find it hard to get into international journals. 
Another structural barrier to futures thinking in scholarly research lies in the lack of collaboration 
between institutions. The study by Our Hong Kong Foundation states that “in Hong Kong, around 30% 
of RGC funding goes to midsize and large projects that require some form of collaboration between 
institutions. Approximately 70% is allocated to small projects. The General Research Fund, the largest  
of the Research Grant Council’s funding schemes, accounting for half of the 2015/16 funding, has a 
funding rate of over 30%, with an average funding size of less than US$100,000 per project for 2 
years. The fragmentation in Hong Kong, on top of the already small size of the funding pool, makes it 
difficult to develop globally competitive niches.” (p. 31) 
2.3  Thinks Tanks and Non-governmental Organisations 
Vision 2047 Foundation  
Established in 1989, “committed to the future of Hong Kong” Vision 2047 Foundation “does not take 
an institutional position on issues that affect Hong Kong. Diversity of views amongst our members and 
frank and open exchange is encouraged. The common link between members is our commitment to 
the long-term well being of Hong Kong and the belief that thoughtful and respectful exchange gener-
ates greater understanding of different views” (quoted from website) 
The foundation provides a space for discussion about the future of Hong Kong, however, it does not 
use futures or foresight methods, nor does it publish report and studies.  
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Hong Kong Democratic Foundation 
Hong Kong Democratic Foundation (HKDF) was established in 1989 by Jimmy McGregor and C.H. 
Leung as a not-for-profit think tank on public policy issues, including the democratic development of 
Hong Kong under the One Country, Two Systems framework and The Basic Law. HKDF promotes 
dialogue among stakeholders, experts, and those keenly interested in the development of Hong Kong 
and China.  HKDF seeks to influence Hong Kong’s economic, political and social development through 
position papers, speaker luncheons and briefings, and meetings with Government, legislators, experts, 
and the corps consular. The foundation discusses aspects of the future of Hong Kong; it does not pro-
duce research. 
 
Hong Kong Foresight Centre 
A non-profit organisation founded in 2008 to create a space for future and foresight thinking in Hong 
Kong modelled after existing centres in Europe. The statement of intent describes the scope of activities: 
 
Statement of Intent of the Hong Kong Foresight Project: 
The project is an engagement and consensus building process to help identify issues of concern to 
Hong Kong and help formulate workable public policies to address them. There is a need for such a 
project because it was felt that in terms of policy development, Hong Kong seems to have lost the 
ability to engage stakeholders at an early stage, and that policy makers seem to lack both the convic-
tion of the importance to gather and build consensus and the requisite political skills to do so. 
The Hong Kong Foresight Project is not a think tank but provides a space to bring together various 
think tanks and relevant parties and to engage them in helping to provide idea generation and research 
support in the early stages of policy formulation. The genesis of the project is rooted in our shared love 
for Hong Kong, the desire to create a more well-functioning society and the motivation to make poli-
cies more effective. The following statement of intent might be a good way to describe the project at 
a more practical level: “The Hong Kong Foresight Project aims to provide a neutral space in which 
stakeholders may seek solutions to emerging issues of significant importance. The task is to find com-
mon ground through open discussions in a facilitated and supportive surrounding.” 
 
Project focus and output: 
The Project will focus primarily on policy formulation (i.e. Issues > Vision > Policy > Policy Elements), 
and much less on specific implementation elements, (i.e. Programs > Program Elements > Implemen-
tation Process) unless they impinge on policy soundness. 
Outputs of a specific Project should include a statement of vision, a set of recommended policies 
and succinct actionable plans. Furthermore such actionable plans should incorporate in their elements, 
Aims/Goals, Analysis, Action List, and Next Steps. 
The outcomes of a project should take into account and incorporate to the extent possible divergent 
but relevant viewpoints. (end of citation) 
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The Hong Kong Foresight Project (the name was changed to Centre later on) had a council of vol-
untary founding members taking an active role in guiding the development of future issues; ”Connect-
ors”, which were representatives from think tanks and NGOs interested in engaging the process, as 
well as “Supporters”, individuals who would like to participate. 
Between 2008 and 2012, the Hong Kong Foresight Centre organised a number of public events with 
futurists from the James Martin 21st Century School at Oxford University, representatives from similar 
organisations in the Netherlands, Sweden and Israel. Some of the events were hosted by government 
agencies, such at the Efficiency Unit and the Intellectual Property Department. The Hong Kong Fore-
sight Centre also organised public seminars on Public Sector Information, on “Innovating with Infor-
mation” through workshops for senior government officials, and facilitated discussion and collabora-
tion among other local think tanks on poverty alleviation in Hong Kong.  
The Hong Kong Foresight Centre ceased operations in 2012, both as result of lack of government 
support as well as internal organisational issues. Although the organisation could not be sustained, it 
brought the idea of future and foresight centres as participatory policy instrument and neutral space 
for multi-stakeholder engagement into the public discourse. 
3. Renewed interest for a Participatory Future Space after 2017 
After the Innovation and Technology Bureau (ITB) was set up in Nov 2015, the head of the agency had 
arranged a meeting with the head of Efficiency Unit to discuss establishing the first Future Centre in 
Hong Kong in Apr 2016. However, there was not enough support within the government at that time, 
and the talks were only taken up again after the new Chief Executive, Carrie Lam, came on board on 1 
July 2017. 
An experienced government administrator and ex-Convener of the Non-official Members of the 
Executive Council of the HKSAR Government, Mr Lam Woon-kwong, shared his views at an event 
hosted by Hong Kong Democratic Foundation on 7 January 2011. He acknowledged that better policy 
making is important, and that one problem with the civil service in Hong Kong is that talents are almost 
entirely inbred. With a fast-changing world, the Hong Kong civil service lacks specialist expertise, and 
even if some officers may be trained to handle specialist policy areas, they lack the political capacity 
to handle complex policy-making processes. He considered it being one the reasons why Hong Kong 
is lagging quite significantly behind in areas such as information, innovation, technology and creative 
industries. Five years after 1997, the permanent civil servants were topped with a layer of political 
appointees who were supposed to bring with them more specialist expertise and political capacity to 
tackle the complex political situation. However, circumstances turned for the worse: with deep eco-
nomic recession and major political upheaval brought about by increasingly adversarial divide in the 
Legislative Council, the HKSAR Government had to fire-fight most of the time, leaving “no time for 
research and analysis” (Lung 2016) 
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According to Lam, the government should institutionalize a system to lead the community to agree 
on a common set of objectives. He pointed out that the best way forward would be to leave the en-
gagement process open and empower stakeholders to make their own rules to resolve differences 
through organized interaction, guided and arbitrated by trusted third party leaders. “But if the lesson 
has already been learned and the precedent for success is recorded, how did we end up in our present 
impasse? The problem is again complex but it boils down to the common syndrome: lack of genuine 
desire to be open, lack of will to engage the opposition and be seriously inclusive, lack of honesty to 
admit failures, and in the end lack of sincere commitment from the top.” (Lung 2016) 
He further commented that the concept of an open forum where all stakeholders shared their views 
existed during the 2005-2012 government period. In his view, there are two pre-conditions for a Future 
Centre to work: it should be open and democratic. Being democratic is normally a prerequisite for 
openness. At least, people should broadly share some common values to be able to come to terms, 
like in the Scandinavian countries. Hong Kong might have been quite close to sharing these prerequi-
sites before 1997, however, “over the past 20 years, Hong Kong has really been going down the drain 
in terms of openness”. 
Mr. Lam elaborated further on how he had steered a research project, commissioned by the Bau-
hinia Foundation and headed by Professor Joseph Chan Cho-wai of the University of Hong Kong, on 
prototyping a new model of civic engagement using the Kai Tak (old airport) Planning Study as an 
example. The planning project began before 1997 but failed repeatedly to get through the system be-
cause of strong objection from many stakeholders, including a substantial proportion of the general 
public. In the end, a truly open and inclusive system of civic engagement was adopted and a consensus 
was reached after two and a half years. All the requirements of the stakeholders were met in the final 
"2006 Outline Zoning Plan for Kai Tak". However, the lesson had not been promulgated within the 
government, thus the success of this case could not be replicated. 
Under the new government, there is renewed discussion of a consensual approach on policy making. 
A Future Centre, as a civic engagement model in use in some European countries, might be a way 
forward. But it should preferably be initiated from within the government or at least it should show its 
commitment by providing the idea with administrative and funding support. One of the initial policy 
areas it could focus on is youth development where stakeholders are diverse and they hold a wide 
range of views, suggested Lam (discussion transcript 18 August 2017) 
Results  
By describing the organisations and the public discussion about the potential of a participatory public 
space to discuss the future of Hong Kong, the reasons for lack of futures thinking in Hong Kong, the 
reasons behind it, as well as exploring the opportunities for developing capacities for foresight in Hong 
Kong.  
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Organisations engaging in futures and foresight thinking are typically public research organisations, 
e.g. specialised government agencies, research institutes at universities or think tanks. Our analysis 
shows that while there is no dedicated organisation in Hong Kong, there are a few that include futures 
research in their agenda and programmes.  
While Hong Kong is strong on strategic planning of the future of tangible infrastructure, intangible 
aspects of future, such as societal future issues, are less of a concern.  
It is also evident that engaging citizen and stakeholders in issues relating to public policy formula-
tion and building capacities for knowledge and action for complex issues is not very developed. 
Constructive experiences with using neutral spaces where citizens and stakeholders seek solutions 
to emerging issues and finding common grounds through open discussion in a facilitated and neutral 
surrounding are largely not practised. 
The notion that futures studies are the scientific study of “possible, desirable, and probable” future 
developments and scope for design, as well as the conditions for these in the past and in the present. 
Modern futures studies assume that the future is not entirely determinable and that different future 
developments (‘futures’) are possible and there is scope for design. (Kreibich et.al. 2012) 
Discussion and Conclusions 
Developing Future and Foresight is important for a city/region to understand the driving forces of 
change in society, economy and politics and shape desirable futures. 
Hong Kong has a broad range of public and private research organisations that could collaborate on 
all aspects of future development in economy, politics, society, ecology on a global or regional scale.  
Currently, there are hardly any incentives for collaborations between Hong Kong’s  R&D organisations 
could strengthen the link between universities and industry. Through changing the mechanisms in 
funding schemes, the government could set priorities for research focusing on collaborative efforts. 
Long-term foresight (10-50 years), not only focused on infrastructure, should also include anticipa-
tion of future developments in science, technology, economy, politics and and society. Foresight is not 
only about anticipation of futures, but also supporting identifying and prioritizing related policy 
measures. 
A recent anthology with the title Hong Kong “Borrowed place, borrowed time” reflects about a 
phrase coined to describe colonial Hong Kong in the years before its return to China in 1997. The 
handover period under the one country, two systems arrangement will last until 2047.  For those in-
terested in the future of this special place, foresight and futures thinking might be a meaningful way 
to explore potential futures. 
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